Category: Artificial Intelligence

California Proposes Amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct re Artificial Intelligence

California Proposes Amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct re Artificial Intelligence

California is proposing new comments to the Rules of Professional Conduct to deal with artificial intelligence. These edits to the comments are the result of numerous decisions where lawyers used AI to create briefs and memoranda without checking to see if the citations were, in fact, real ones. Telling lawyers not to do this has not worked. California makes another attempt by proposing new comments to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Summary: California Proposed Amended Rules on Artificial Intelligence

The California State Bar is proposing amendments to six Rules of Professional Conduct to address lawyers’ use of artificial intelligence. The changes are targeted additions to existing rules rather than wholesale rewrites. Here is a rule-by-rule breakdown:


Rule 1.1 — Competence

The core rule text is unchanged. Two new comments are added:

  • Comment [1] expands the existing duty to keep abreast of legal developments to explicitly include AI, requiring lawyers to understand the “benefits and risks” of AI tools.
  • Comment [2] (new) requires lawyers to independently review, verify, and exercise professional judgmentover any AI-generated output used in client representation.

Rule 1.4 — Communication with Clients

Again, the rule text is unchanged. A new Comment [5] requires that when AI use presents a significant risk or materially affects the scope, cost, manner, or decision-making of a representation, the lawyer must communicate sufficient information about that AI use to allow the client to make informed decisions. The duty is contextual — lawyers must assess novelty of the technology, associated risks, scope of representation, and client sophistication.


Rule 1.6 — Confidentiality

A new Comment [2] significantly expands the definition of “reveal” as it applies to confidential information. Inputting client data into an AI tool now constitutes a potential disclosure of confidential information if it creates a material risk that the information could be accessed, retained, or used by the system or other users inconsistently with the duty of confidentiality. This is perhaps the most practically significant amendment.


Rule 3.3 — Candor Toward the Tribunal

A new Comment [3] directly addresses the problem of AI-generated legal citations — a clear response to high-profile incidents of lawyers submitting fabricated AI-generated case citations. It states that the duty of candor requires lawyers to verify the accuracy and existence of all cited authorities, including those generated or assisted by AI, before submission to any tribunal.


Rule 5.1 — Responsibilities of Managerial and Supervisory Lawyers

Comment [1] is amended to add governance of AI use to the list of internal policies that managing lawyers must implement. Firm-wide AI policies are thus now treated as a component of a manager’s baseline supervisory obligations under the Rules.


Rule 5.3 — Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants

The comment is amended to require that lawyers supervising nonlawyer staff provide instruction on AI use in the provision of legal services, alongside other ethical obligations. This is particularly relevant given the growing use of AI tools by paralegals and other support staff.


Key Takeaways

All amendments are comment-level additions — the black-letter rule text is largely preserved. Taken together, the proposed rules create an integrated framework: lawyers must understand AI (1.1), supervise its use (5.1, 5.3), protect client data when using it (1.6), disclose significant AI use to clients (1.4), and verify AI-generated legal authority before filing (3.3). Non-compliance with any of these obligations could form the basis for a disciplinary proceeding.

My comment: We all make mistakes. You should check any work that has your name on it for accuracy, even work by trusted colleagues. There is no reason to embarrass yourself by submitting a brief with false citations. If you screwed up, call me and I can often help you clean up the mess.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

State v. Hannah Renee Payne – Hallucinated Citations

State v. Hannah Renee Payne – Hallucinated Citations

This is an appeal from a criminal trial. The Georgia Supreme Court appears to have noticed that the prosecutor’s memorandum and proposed order (denying Ms. Payne a new trial) was prepared with hallucinated citations and was prepared by artificial intelligence. The case is an important one. Under Georgia law, if you are convicted of murder you receive a life sentence.

Hannah Payne was sentenced to life in prison for murder. She intervened after she witnessed a traffic collision and attempted to make a citizen’s arrest of a man who had engaged in reckless driving and had caused an accident. During the confrontation she shot the reckless driver who died. The jury apparently found that her actions were unreasonable and she was convicted of murder and sentenced to natural life in prison. The prosecutor apparently cited nonexistent cases in her briefs in the trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court. Unfortunately for the State, the trial court cited the nonexistent cases in its order denying Ms. Payne a new trial.

Ms. Payne’s appeal presents real issues. Did she have the right to do a citizen’s arrest of the victim? Were her actions in the altercation reasonable? Obviously, she has a right to pursue her appeal. There is a nonzero chance that the hallucinated citations played a role in the conviction of Ms. Payne and in the trial court’s decision to deny her new trial motion. She may still lose the appeal, but she is fortunate that the prosecutor made an obvious error in using artificial intelligence to draft briefs. This gives her appeal, which has some merit in my view, a chance of success. There is a group of people who believe that everyone charged with a crime is guilty. I do not share that view. Ms. Payne may have acted reasonably in drawing a gun to make a citizen’s arrest of a reckless driver. Her conviction may be unjust. Her sentence of life in prison is clearly unjust, but that is Georgia law. Without the prosecutor’s use of hallucinated cases, the conviction would have been affirmed and no one would have paid any attention to this case. A young woman’s life would be completely wasted behind bars.

The prosecutor will, no doubt, face discipline for the hallucinated case citations. That isn’t the real story. The real story is how few criminal cases actually receive the scrutiny they deserve.

Here are citations to some of the news stories covering this case:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/did-phantom-cases-end-murder-205550482.html

https://www.ajc.com/news/2026/03/chief-justice-presses-clayton-prosecutor-about-citing-cases-that-dont-exist/

https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/clayton-county/georgia-supreme-court-weighs-new-trial-woman-convicted-killing-driver-after-crash/TRAIXVOZJ5HPDKCPXEJ4XGITKY/

New York Court Sanctions Lawyer for Hallucinated Citations

In a foreclosure case a defense lawyer used hallucinated citations in a brief. Result: $5,000 sanction. The case, as the court notes, was routine.

“Where this appeal becomes unconventional, however, is that defendant’s opening brief cites six cases which do not exist. Plaintiff identified these fabricated cases as possibly being the product of artificial intelligence (hereinafter AI), and moved for an order seeking, among other things, sanctions against defendant and defense counsel. Defendant claimed the nonexistent cases were citation or formatting errors that he would correct in his reply brief, and then opposed the motion for sanctions with more fake cases and interpretations for existing cases that are at best strenuously attenuated, and at worst entirely inapposite. Defendant’s subsequent reply brief acknowledged that his “citation of fictitious cases is a serious error” and that they are “problematic,” but failed to offer any corrections or further explanation as previously stated. He then proceeded to include more fake cases and false legal propositions in two subsequent letters to this Court that requested judicial notice of a bankruptcy stay. In examining the propriety of defendant’s previously filed papers, more nonexistent cases were discovered in a motion that granted affirmative relief to defendant. Defense counsel reluctantly conceded during oral argument that he used AI in the preparation of his papers and, although he told the Court that he checked his papers, the filings themselves demonstrate otherwise. In total, defendant’s five filings during this appeal include no less than 23 fabricated cases, as well as many other blatant misrepresentations of fact or law from actual cases.

Although other state and federal courts have had the occasion to address the misuse of AI in legal papers, this Court has not yet had that opportunity. In doing so, we recognize that, as did the shift from digest books to online legal databases, generative artificial intelligence (hereinafter GenAI) represents a new paradigm for the legal profession, one which is not inherently improper, but rather has the potential to offer benefits to attorneys and the public — particularly in promoting access to justice, saving costs for clients and assisting courts with efficient and accurate administration of justice (see Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 FRD 489, 492-493 [D Wyo 2025]Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F Supp 3d 443, 448 [SD NY 2023]).[4] At the same time, attorneys and litigants must be aware of the dangers that GenAI presents to the legal profession. At the forefront of that peril are AI “hallucinations,” which occur when an AI database generates incorrect or misleading sources of information due to a “variety of factors, including insufficient training data, incorrect assumptions made by the model, or biases in the data used to train the model” (What are AI Hallucinations?,https://cloud.google.com/discover/what-are-ai-hallucinations [last accessed Jan. 6, 2026]; see generally United States v. Google LLC, ___ F Supp 3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 2523010, *15, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 170459, *74 [D DC, Sept. 2, 2025, Nos. 20-cv-3010 (APM), 20-cv-3715 (APM)]).[5] Hallucinated cases may look like a real case because they include familiar-looking reporter information, but their citations lead to cases with different names, in different courts and on different topics — or even to no case at all (see Sanders v. United States, 176 Fed Cl 163, 168-169 [Fed Cl 2025]). Even where GenAI provides accurate case citations, it nonetheless may misrepresent the holdings of the cited cases — often in favor of the user supplying the query (see Green Bldg. Initiative, Inc. v. Peacock, 350 FRD 289, 292 [D Ore 2025]; Kruglyak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 774 F Supp 3d 767, 770 [WD Va 2025]see also Matter of Richburg, 671 BR 918, 924 n 11 [Bankr D SC 2025]).[6]

Courts throughout the country which have been confronted with AI-generated authorities have concluded that filing papers containing hallucinated cases and fabricated legal authorities may be sanctionable (see generally OTG New York, Inc. v. OTTOGI Am., Inc., 2025 WL 2671460, *2-3, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 183358, *7-8 [D NJ, Sept. 18, 2025, No. 24-cv-07209 (BRM) (JRA)]). This includes where the fake citations stand for accurate legal principles (see Ader v. Ader, 87 Misc 3d 1213[A], *2 [Sup Ct, NY County 2025]; see also United States v. McGee, ___ F Supp 3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 2888065, at *7, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 201350, * 19; Johnson v. Dunn, 2025 WL 2086116, *16, US Dist LEXIS 141805, *45-46 [ND Ala, July 23, 2025, No. 2:21-cv-1701-AMM]), as there are many harms associated with the submission of fake cases that extend beyond merely wasting the time and money of the opposing party, but also in taking up the court’s resources to evaluate and resolve the deception (see Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F Supp 3d at 448).

In New York, courts have discretion to award costs or impose financial sanctions against an attorney or party for engaging in frivolous conduct (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[a], [b]; WFE Ventures, Inc. v. GBD Lake Placid, LLC, 197 AD3d 824, 836 [3d Dept 2021]). “[C]onduct is frivolous if: (1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]). “In determining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous, the court shall consider, among other issues the circumstances under which the conduct took place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct, and whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, should have been apparent, or was brought to the attention of counsel or the party” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]; see Matter of Minister, Elders & Deacons of Refm. Prot. Dutch Church of City of N.Y. v. 198 Broadway, 76 NY2d 411, 414 [1990]). Moreover, rule 3.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer” (Rules of Prof Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 3.3[a][1]). Sanctions may be appropriate for frivolous and meritless appeals (see Bell v. State of New York, 96 NY2d 811, 812 [2001]), and are a common consequence for misuses of judicial process which unnecessarily divert “the time and attention of . . . [the] Judges of this State” (Matter of Minister, Elders & Deacons of Refm. Prot. Dutch Church of City of N.Y. v. 198 Broadway, 76 NY2d at 415see generally Engel v. CBS, Inc., 93 NY2d 195, 207 [1999]Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F Supp 3d at 448).

Here, defendant submitted at least 23 fabricated legal authorities across five filings during the pendency of this appeal.[7] He has also misrepresented the holdings of several real cases as being dispositive in his favor — when they were not.[8] It is axiomatic that submission of fabricated legal authorities is completely without merit in law and therefore constitutes frivolous conduct (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][1]). It cannot be said that fabricated legal authorities constitute “existing law” so as to provide a nonfrivolous ground for extending, modifying or reversing existing law (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][1]; see generally Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 FRD at 495Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F Supp 3d at 461). Defense counsel acknowledged during oral argument that the papers were his own, and, nevertheless, “[b]y signing a paper, an attorney or party certifies that, to the best of that person’s knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the presentation of the paper or the contentions therein are not frivolous” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1a[b][1]). However, the excuse for fabricated legal authorities offered by defendant in his papers is incredible. Moreover, during oral argument defense counsel estimated that 90% of the citations he used were accurate, which, even if it were true, is simply unacceptable by any measure of candor to any court (see Rules of Prof Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 3.3[a][1]). Where we are most troubled is that more than half of the fake cases offered by defendant came after he was on notice of such issue, whereby his reliance on fabricated legal authorities grew more prolific as this appeal proceeded — despite it being apparent to him that such conduct lacked a legal basis (see Ader v. Ader, 87 Misc 3d 1213[A], *1; see also 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]; Rules of Prof Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 3.3[a][1]). Rather than taking remedial measures or expressing remorse, defense counsel essentially doubled down during oral argument on his reliance of fake legal authorities as not “germane” to the appeal.[9]

Turning to the appropriate sanction, courts must consider that sanctions are both retributive, in that they punish past conduct, but are also “goal oriented, in that they are useful in deterring future frivolous conduct not only by the particular parties, but also by the [b]ar at large” (Levy v. Carol Mgt. Corp., 260 AD2d 27, 34 [1st Dept 1999]). In doing so, courts around the country have imposed sanctions ranging from warnings to tens of thousands of dollars to attorneys who have submitted AI hallucinated legal authorities and false propositions (see e.g. Cojom v. Roblen, LLC, 2025 WL 3205930, *4, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 225325, *9-10 [D Conn, Nov. 17, 2025, No. 3:23-CV-1669 (JCH)] [involving three nonexistent cases; total sanction $500]; Hall v. Academy Charter Sch., 2025 WL 2256653, *5-6, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 152628, *14-16[ED NY, Aug. 7, 2025, No. 2:24-cv-08630-JMW] [involving three nonexistent cases; warning]; Lacey v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 2025 WL 1363069, *5, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 90370, *13 [CD Cal, May 5, 2025, No. CV 24-5205 FMO (MAAx)] [involving nine incorrect citations and two authorities that did not exist by attorneys in two law firms; total sanctions $31,100]). Such broad range reflects a constellation of factors surrounding the conduct of the attorney or party offering such fabricated legal authorities, including the number of fake cases or propositions, whether there were fake quotes, if the submitter continued to use or create more fabricated authorities across other filings in the same proceeding after being on notice of the misconduct, there was an admission of the error, there was remorse and the extent of the impact that the fabricated legal authorities had on the proceedings. Considering these factors, courts in cases involving comparable misconduct by defense counsel have imposed significant sanctions (see e.g. Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P., 114 Cal App 5th 426, 449, 336 Cal Rptr 3d 897, 912 [Cal Ct App 2025] [involving 21 fabricated case citations and quotations by attorney; total sanction $10,000]; Mid Cent. Operating Engrs. Health & Welfare Fund v. HoosierVac LLC, 2025 WL 1511211, *2, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 100748, *3-4 [SD Ind, May 28, 2025, No. 2:24-cv-00326-JPH-MJD] [involving six nonexistent cases across multiple filings; total sanction $6,000]; Kruse v. Karlen, 692 SW3d 43, 50-54 [Mo Ct App 2024] [involving 22 fabricated case citations and multiple statutory misstatements by attorney; total sanction $10,000]).

Accordingly, recognizing this as the first appellate-level case in New York addressing sanctions for the misuse of GenAI, we find the imposition of a monetary sanction on defense counsel Joshua A. Douglass in the amount of $5,000 to be appropriate under the circumstances, with the further goal of deterring future frivolous conduct by defendant and the bar at large (see Levy v. Carol Mgt. Corp., 260 AD2d at 34). To be clear, attorneys and litigants are not prohibited from using GenAI to assist with the preparation of court submissions. The issue arises when attorneys and staff are not sufficiently trained on the dangers of such technology, and instead erroneously rely on it without human oversight. As with the work from a paralegal, intern or another attorney, the use of GenAI in no way abrogates an attorney’s or litigant’s obligation to fact check and cite check every document filed with a court. To do otherwise may be sanctionable, depending on the facts and particular circumstances of each case.”

Citation: 2026 NY Slip Op 00040

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, Respondent,
v.
Jean LeTennier, Also Known as Jean Michel LeTennier and Jean M. LeTennier, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

Pro Se Litigant Cautioned About Hallucinated Case Citations

Pro Se Litigant Cautioned About Hallucinated Case Citations

Two days before Christmas, a district court in Nebraska cautioned a pro se litigant about using generative AI in his legal memoranda.

In the motion to reconsider, Leber raises the same arguments the Court rejected in his motion for partial final judgment. In “support” of his arguments, Leber repeatedly cites to a case which appears to be a hallucination of artificial intelligence, despite Leber’s certification that he has “reviewed and verified the accuracy of all content, citations, and legal authority referenced” in his filing (Filing No. 68-1).[1] The Court had previously warned Leber about this in its previous order. And Leber’s pro se status does not excuse him from “comply[ing] with court rules and directives.” See Soliman v. Johanns, 412 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005). Leber is again instructed to verify the accuracy of all content, citations, and legal authority in his filings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); NECivR 7.1(d)(5) (providing that “[a]ny brief not in compliance with this subsection may be stricken”— without further notice—”in the sole discretion of the court” and that a “material misrepresentation in the certificate of compliance” may also result in “sanctions against the person signing the document”).

The court denied the motion to reconsider. The citation is Leber v. Bryan Medical Center, D. Nebraska 2025, 8:25 cv 401.

Illinois Court Sanctions Lawyer for Hallucinated Cases

Illinois Court Sanctions Lawyer for Hallucinated Cases

Lawyers continued to use AI to generate briefs and other legal pleadings. Somehow they have not learned yet that the AI can hallucinate cases (make cases up) if you ask it to draft a brief. An Illinois lawyer recently used generative AI in a brief for the appellate court and then tried to deflect responsibility when he was questioned about it.

The case is In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App 4th 241427. The discussion of the transgression is fairly extensive:

¶ 42 The circuit court of Sangamon County appointed Mr. Panichi on November 4, 2024, to represent respondent-appellant in this accelerated appeal from the termination of respondent’s parental rights filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). After an in-depth review of the briefs, this court recognized that Mr. Panichi cited eight apparently nonexistent cases in respondent’s opening and reply briefs. In one instance, he provided a direct quote from one of these cases. Concerned that respondent’s briefs contained citations to apparently nonexistent cases, this court, on its own motion, ordered Mr. Panichi to file copies of “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614″; “In re A.G., 2022 IL App (1st) 220119″; “In re R.C., 195 Ill. App. 3d 827 (1st Dist. 1990)”; “In re R.D.S., 2021 IL App (2d) 200092″; “In re M.H., Jr., 196 Ill. App. 3d 976 (1st Dist. 1990)”; “In re Brandon E., 382 Ill. App. 3d 389 (2d Dist. 2008)”; “In re K.L.P., 381 Ill. App. 3d 817 (4th Dist. 2008)”; and “In re Ca. B., 386 Ill. App. 3d 507 (2d Dist. 2008).” We further ordered Mr. Panichi to appear before this court personally and show cause why he should not be sanctioned.

¶ 43 On June 16, 2025, Mr. Panichi filed a two-page response to this court’s rule to show cause entitled “Verified Memorandum and Response to June 10, 2025, Order re Rule 375 Sanctions.” He stated in paragraph 2(a) of his response that “the following two cases are valid, published Illinois Appellate Court decisions and were properly cited,” and he cited “In re Brandon A., 395 Ill. App. 3d 224 (4th Dist. 2009),” and “In re Adoption of K.L.P., 316 Ill. App. 3d 110 (4th Dist. 2000).” In paragraph 2(b), he stated that “the following case is a valid published decision but was incorrectly cited in the brief,” and he cited “In re M.F., 304 Ill. App. 3d 236 (5th Dist. 1999).” In paragraph 2(c) of his response, he admitted that the “remaining five citations contained in the Appellant’s Brief were determined to be invalid or nonexistent.” He attached copies of the first three decisions referenced in his response.

¶ 44 Mr. Panichi appeared before this court personally on June 18, 2025. The proceedings were recorded. He acknowledged that he was familiar with the principles of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct 1, 2020) and the principles of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010 Rules 1.1, 3.1, 3.3 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010), and Rule 8.4 (eff. July 1, 2024). He stated that he had been appointed to handle this appeal by the circuit court of Sangamon County and was compensated for his work at the rate of $150 per hour, for a total of $6,925. He did not intend to submit any further invoices for this case. He later addressed this amount, explaining that it “was more than [he] usually charge[s]” and this case “was out of the ordinary in terms of time spent” because his office “did some exceptional work trying to get some other information before the court” by filing “a brief trying to open up the proofs,” but he did not remember the matter exactly.

¶ 45 Regarding his response in paragraph 2(a), the court pointed out to Mr. Panichi that despite his claim that Brandon A., 395 Ill. App. 3d 224, and Adoption of K.L.P., 316 Ill. App. 3d 110, were “valid” cases that “were properly cited,” he had actually cited in his brief “In re Brandon E., 382 Ill. App. 3d 389 (2d Dist. 2008),” and “In re K.L.P., 381 Ill. App. 3d 817 (4th Dist. 2008),” which were completely different citations. (We also noted that Adoption of K.L.P. is a Second District case, not a Fourth District case, as Mr. Panichi wrote in his response.) The court further observed that neither Brandon A. nor Adoption of K.L.P. supports the propositions for which “Brandon E.” and “K.L.P.” were originally cited in his opening brief. Mr. Panichi stated that he was not currently familiar with the content of the cases but claimed that he had been so at one time. He admitted that he did not read either of these decisions before filing his response to the court’s rule to show cause. He later admitted that he misread the court’s rule to show cause as citing “Brandon A.,” when it cited “Brandon E.” He acknowledged that he did not list a citation for “Brandon E.” in his response and never looked up whether “Brandon E.” existed.

¶ 46 Regarding his response in paragraph 2(b), the court noted during the hearing that M.F., 304 Ill. App. 3d 236, the case Mr. Panichi claimed to have intended to cite, did not contain the quotation for which he cited “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614,” in his reply brief. Mr. Panichi admitted that he did not know where he obtained the quotation and did not believe it was accurate. The court stated that Mr. Panichi may have persisted in misleading the court in his statements in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of his response.

¶ 47 Mr. Panichi later explained that his miscitation in his briefs of the three cases he attached to his response to the rule to show cause “might be an example of poor lawyering, poor arguing, stretching principles, I don’t have an answer for that.” However, he then claimed that “to the best of [his] knowledge, [these cases] were cited for the appropriate principles.” He admitted, though, that he had read only one of the three cases he attached to his response and could not remember which one. He further explained that he believed that the court’s rule to show cause asked only for him to identify which cases existed, not to argue how those cases applied.

¶ 48 The court then turned to Mr. Panichi’s response in paragraph 2(c) and asked how those five admittedly nonexistent citations came to appear in his brief. Mr. Panichi initially clarified that he did not claim to have an “excuse,” just an “explanation.” He also informed the court that he had already notified Judge Karen Tharp, who appointed him as counsel in this appeal, as well as his private clients whose appeals were pending, about these proceedings. He then admitted that in preparing the briefs and conducting research in this case, he used artificial intelligence (AI) to write a draft of the brief, then “looked it over and [he] did not read the cases that were in support of the brief.” He further explained that at the time he filed the briefs in this case, he was “extremely busy” and “was not thorough enough.” He stated that his use of AI was prompted by “a perfect storm” of “temptation of AI out there at a time when [he] was busy and trying to meet deadlines.” He had since learned about AI “hallucinations,” in which the AI “dreams things up when it doesn’t have an answer.” He acknowledged that he should have read the cases that the AI presented to him. He additionally admitted that he was “between research software” at the time he prepared the briefs in this case but had since signed up with Westlaw. He informed the court that he did not intend to use AI going forward.

¶ 49 Mr. Panichi admitted that “the whole thing stems from the fact that [he] barely did any personal work [him]self on this appeal.” He stated that he “was careless” and “reckless when [he] did it” and “was wrong to do that.” Mr. Panichi then stated:

“I don’t have any reason that the court shouldn’t sanction me, except for the fact that I didn’t do it intentionally. I did it carelessly, and recklessly, I hadn’t done it before, and if I’m lucky enough to be able to continue practicing before the appellate court, I’m not going to do it again.”

He acknowledged that while he relied on the legal assistant in his office a great deal, he, as the attorney, was ultimately responsible in this matter. He stated, “[W]hatever happens, I deserve whatever consequences fall, and I’m willing to accept them.” Mr. Panichi asked that no sanctions be imposed against respondent, as he was responsible, and further asked the court to consider allowing him to file an amended brief. He stated that if he were allowed to file an amended brief, he would essentially cite all new cases and read them.

¶ 50 This court informed Mr. Panichi that when it was discovered that the cases cited in his briefs apparently did not exist and did not support the assertions in his briefs, the court felt compelled to leave no stone unturned to determine whether these cases existed. The court noted the research done “was significant and time consuming.” As an example, the court explained that when looking into the citation of “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614,” Westlaw and the Illinois Courts website confirmed that no case matching that citation existed. There were 20 Illinois cases titled “In re M.F.,” but none of those cases contained the quotation included in Mr. Panichi’s reply brief or any similar statement. Moreover, no Second District case existed under case No. 21-0614, though there was a Fourth District case with case No. 21-0614, People v. Taylor, 2022 IL App (4th) 210614-U, which was irrelevant. The quote included in Mr. Panichi’s brief and attributed to “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614,” “incarceration does not preclude a finding of reasonable progress if efforts are made,” did not exist in any case from Illinois, any other state, or any federal court, in its entirety. Even a part of the quote—”incarceration does not preclude”—did not exist in any Illinois cases, but it did exist in 57 cases across the country, most of which were to the effect of “incarceration does not preclude termination of parental rights.” This was the breadth of the work the court did in relation to just one of the eight nonexistent cases Mr. Panichi cited in his brief. The court noted that it was explaining this process to Mr. Panichi to illustrate how seriously the court took this matter, as well as the impact of Mr. Panichi’s actions on the court’s ability to do its other work efficiently.

¶ 51 When asked during the proceedings if he had any infirmities that would contribute to his carelessness in this case and his ability to practice law, Mr. Panichi stated that other than a hearing loss, he had “typical short term memory loss” and was overwhelmed by paperwork, but “to the best of [his] knowledge, [he] retain[s] 80, 90% of [his] faculties and memory on other matters” and believed he is competent to practice law.

¶ 52 On June 27, 2025, this court ordered Mr. Panichi to file an affidavit with a copy of any petition for fees and costs that he filed in the Sangamon County circuit court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 299 (eff. Jan. 1, 2024), along with documentation of his receipt of payment. He did so on June 30, 2025. His affidavit and petition confirmed that he was compensated in the amount of $6,925.62 by the Sangamon County treasurer for his work in connection with his appointment in this appeal.

The result: “For the reasons articulated below, we find that Mr. Panichi violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and order that (1) Mr. Panichi disgorge the payment of $6,925.62 he received for his work on this appeal; (2) Mr. Panichi pay $1,000 as monetary sanctions to the clerk of the Fourth District Appellate Court; and (3) the clerk of the Fourth District Appellate Court send a copy of this opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.”

Comment: This is my opinion. Obviously, the lawyer made two errors. The first was using generative AI without cite checking the brief to determine if the cases cited were real. The second more serious error was trying to claim that he miss cited real cases. The appellate court had to do some extensive work to determine whether the cases were real and were miss cited. They were not miss cited. They simply had names similar to the hallucinated cases. No matter how much we advise lawyers not to use generative AI without doing a full cite check, lawyers are unable to resist this temptation. Do your own work or face embarrassment or worse. I predict that the ARDC will open an investigation and possibly prosecute the lawyer for attempting to mislead the appellate court with his claims that two of the cases were actually just miss cited.

Another Instance of Fake Citations

Another Instance of Fake Citations

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/dec/29/michael-cohen-trump-lawyer-fake-citations

This issue has come up before where a lawyer allegedly uses AI to draft a brief and comes up with fake citations. AI programs are not responsible for the quality of their work. They can’t be sanctioned or punished or fined. But the lawyer who signs said brief most certainly can be sanctioned or fined.

In this particular story, the claim is that Michael Cohen, a disbarred attorney who spent much of his career representing Donald John Trump, gave his lawyer fake citations for some legal brief. Cohen in turn blames the AI program he used.

There is no excuse for this behavior. The lawyer must accept responsibility. He should never have taken any work product from Michael Cohen who is both disbarred and a convicted felon. Sanctions are likely to issue as well as a disciplinary complaint.

No matter how much pressure you are under to get something done on time, do not ask AI to practice law. It cannot do that and you will pay a high price. Instead, get an extension of time or file the brief with a motion for leave to file instanter. Hold yourself accountable or others may be forced to do it for you.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

http://www.clintonlaw.net