ARDC Hearing Panel Recommends Disbarment of Lawyer

The ARDC hearing board has recommended disbarment of an attorney for converting $294,550.87 client funds.

The finding: “Respondent misappropriated at least $294,550.87 from his client, Plain Bay Sales LLC. His taking of the fundswas dishonest because he knew the funds in the account did not belong to him and that he was not authorized to take and use them. He also failed to promptly return those funds to his client when asked to do so.”

How did this occur?

The attorney withdrew funds from an escrow account he had set up for his client. The lawyer testified that he was authorized to withdraw the funds, but the Panel did not believe him. The client accused the lawyer of wrongfully withdrawing funds because the client paid all but one (9 of 10) of the lawyer’s invoices. The client appears to have believed that it was being overcharged. The balance of the unpaid invoice was approximately $27,000, less than one-tenth the amount withdrawn from the escrow account.

The Violation of Rule 1.15(a).

A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Ill. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.15(a). Rule 1.15(a) obligates attorneys holding client or third-party funds to safeguard those funds. In re Woods, 2014PR00181, M.R. 28568 (Mar. 20, 2017)(Hearing Bd. at 19). An attorney violates Rule 1.15(a) where the attorney uses client or third-party funds without authority, thereby causing the balancein the account into which those funds were deposited to fall below the amount the attorney should be holding. Id. Wefind that the Administrator proved that Respondent used, without authority, at least $294,550.87 that he was supposed to be holding for Plain Bay Sales, and therefore that he violated Rule 1.15(a).

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion of the evidence that Respondent and Katie Prudent presented directly conflicting testimony regarding whether or not Respondent was authorized to withdraw funds from the FBO for his own benefit. Consequently, our finding of misconduct rests primarily on our credibility determinations. In short,we must decide if we believe Respondent or Ms. Prudent.

We did not find Respondent’s testimony to be credible for a myriad of reasons. We found him to be evasive during portions of his testimony, particularly during the Administrator’s cross-examination of him, where he seemed to be striving to avoid answering the Administrator’s relatively straightforward questions. (See, e.g., Tr. 396-99.)We also found numerous flaws and inconsistencies in his testimony. …

The Panel found a violation of Rule 1.15(d) because he failed to return the property to the client.

The Violation of Rule 8.4.(c)

As with our finding that Respondent took his client’s funds without authorization, our analysis of whether he did so dishonestly rests primarily on our credibility findings. As we discussed at length above, we did not findRespondent credible. Rather, we believe his shifting explanation for his withdrawal of funds from the FBO account was simply a post hoc justification for taking and using his client’s funds without authorization, which, given his many years of experience, he surely knew he was not permitted to do.

Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that Respondent legitimately believed that Plain Bay Sales owed him additional attorney’s fees beyond what he had invoiced, his unilateral taking of funds from the FBO accountknowing that his client did not authorize him to do so would still be dishonest. See Doyle, 99 CH 100 (Review Bd. at3-4) (affirming Hearing Board’s finding of dishonesty where the attorney took money that did not belong to him without authorization, notwithstanding his argument that he was entitled to the money as fees.)

We find that the evidence demonstrated that Respondent knowingly and intentionally used at least $294,550.87that he should have been holding in the FBO account for Plain Bay Sales. By knowingly using funds that did notbelong to him, without authority to do so, Respondent engaged in dishonest conduct. Accordingly, we find that theAdministrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c).

The Hearing Panel recommended disbarment.

Comment: This is a rare conversion case where the lawyer appeared for the hearing and sought to defend his conduct. The fact that all invoices were paid.

Georgia Supreme Court Unimpressed with Capitol Rioter Pardoned by the President

The Georgia Supreme Court recently considered the case of W. McCall Calhoun, Jr., a member of the Georgia bar since 1990. Calhoun was subject to a bar complaint after he was “convicted of a felony and several misdemeanor federal offenses in connection with his participation in events at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.” The opinion explains that the Georgia Supreme Court “suspended him in an initial disciplinary matter pending the outcome of his appeal based on his violation of Rule 8.4(a)(2) (It shall be a violation of the Bar Rules for a lawyer to ‘be convicted of a felony.’)” After Calhoun was pardoned, the State Bar asked the Supreme Court to remand the disciplinary matter ton conduct a hearing. On remand, Calhoun filed a petition for voluntary discipline. Calhoun asked for a public reprimand. The State Bar agreed that a reprimand was appropriate.

The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the petition for voluntary discipline as follows:

Having reviewed the entire record in this case, we disagree with the parties that a public reprimand is appropriate here. While it is true that we have never directly examined a Rule 8.4(a)(8) violation before, this subsection of Rule 8.4(a) provides discipline for committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer and, therefore, Rule 8.4(a)(8) imposes discipline for conduct similar to that specified in Rule 8.4(a)(2), (3), and (4). Violations of those subsections in general are considered very serious. See, e.g., In the Matter of McCall, 314 Ga. 200, 206 (2022) (holding that “a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) is among the most serious violations with which a lawyer can be charged.”). And while violations of Rule 8.4(a)(2), (3), and (4) do not necessarily require it, they frequently result in disbarment. See In the Matter of Barnes, 320 Ga. 589, 590-91 (2024) (on Special Master’s report and recommendation, disbarring attorney who violated Rule 8.4(a)(2) by being convicted of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer and noting that “disbarment is an appropriate sanction in matters involving felony convictions for crimes of interference with the administration of justice, in this case felony obstruction of police”); In the Matter of Head, 320 Ga. 316, 316 (2024) (on Special Master’s report and recommendation, disbarring attorney who violated Rule 8.4(a)(3) by pleading guilty to a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, with the Special Master defining “moral turpitude” to include actions “done contrary to justice”); In the Matter of Cummings, 291 Ga. 654, 654-55 (2012) (disbarring attorney on notice of discipline who violated Rule 8.4(a)(4) by submitting invoices for work she did not perform and making false allegations of improper conduct against city officials). The cases involving Rule 8.4(a)(2) and (3) violations are particularly relevant here, given that while Calhoun may have ultimately been pardoned for federal offenses, pardons do not prevent disbarment for the underlying activity that formed the basis of the crime that was later pardoned. See Scott v. Leathers, 78 Ga. App. 661, 664 (1949)(“disbarred attorney may not automatically be reinstated either by a special act of the legislature … or an executive pardon” (internal citations omitted)); Payne v. State, 52 Ga. App. 425, 426 (1936) (“reinstatement to the bar [does] not follow automatically from the grant of the pardon.”).[3] See also In the Matter of Beck, 264 Ind. 141, 146-47 (1976) (citing Payne as part of the overwhelming line of authority nationwide to this effect).

Moreover, while it is true that Calhoun has been suspended from practicing law since 2023, it would be improper to impose discipline in partial reliance on an involuntary interim suspension because we do not consider such a suspension to be mitigating. See In the Matter of Warnock, 272 Ga. 2, 4 (2000) (“[w]e disagree with the special master’s conclusion that Warnock’s … interim suspension … [is a] mitigating factor[ ]”). See generally In the Matter of Huber, 320 Ga. 314, 315 (2024) (accepting petition for voluntary surrender of license nunc pro tunc, because attorney had “demonstrated that he voluntarily stopped the practice of law” (emphasis added)).

Even in the absence of his admission here that he violated Rule 8.4(a)(8) based on a felony offense, Calhoun admitted to violating Rule 8.4(a)(8) based on a misdemeanor criminal act, which if not pardoned could have resulted in a Rule 8.4(a)(3) violation. See generally Calhoun I, 317 Ga. 726, 734 (noting that the “Special Master’s determination that Calhoun violated Rule 8.4(a)(3) is premature, as the Special Master made no effort to analyze whether the conduct underlying Calhoun’s misdemeanor convictions involved moral turpitude or related to his fitness to practice law”).

Moreover, as the State Bar noted in its response to the petition for voluntary discipline, the criminal acts committed by Calhoun reflect adversely on his fitness as a lawyer. See Rule 8.4(a)(8). As part of the State Bar’s response to Calhoun’s petition for voluntary discipline, it introduced Calhoun’s social media posts from January 6, 2021, which clearly suggest that he intended to participate, willingly and knowingly, in a violent takeover of the Capitol to overturn the 2020 election and that he sought to interfere with the administration of justice. Calhoun commented on social media that he was part of a group that “physically took control of the Capital [sic] building in a hand to hand hostile takeover”; they “occupied the Capitol and shut down the Government”; he was one of the “first two hundred to rush up the steps and inside after the Vanguard had clashed hard with the police and had made them retreat”; they brought the “Government to its knees”; and they were “all going back armed for war.” FC at 101. In addition, he commented that once in the Capitol building, they were met with a police barricade, which they “push[ed] through,” and that this caused “some people [to] bleed[] pretty badly.” Id. at 100. Even more concerning were his comments directed towards certain members of Congress that the group intended to harm. Calhoun stated that they “stormed upstairs… looking for members of Congress” and that they then:

kicked in Nancy Pelosi’s office door and pushed down the hall towards her inner sanctum, the mob howling with rage — Crazy Nancy probably would have been torn into little pieces, but she was nowhere to be seen — then a swat [sic] team showed, and we retreated back to the rotunda and continued our hostile take over of the Capitol Building.

FC at 102-03.

If Calhoun was as involved as his posts indicate, then it is hard for us to see how anything less than disbarment can be accepted here. Accordingly, we reject the petition for voluntary discipline and remand this matter for further proceedings. See ITMO Joshi, 315 Ga. 477, 483-84 (2023) (rejecting petition for voluntary discipline and remanding the matter for consideration of additional serious allegations).

Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.“

Georgia has been a bulwark of American democracy. The Georgia state authorities, all Republicans, certified Biden’s win in the state in 2020 and resisted numerous calls by the President to reverse the result or say the election was stolen. The ruling by the Georgia Supreme Court is consistent with that law and order tradition. This is a well written and thoughtful opinion by a court that takes attorney discipline seriously, even when the politics has changed. I welcome this decision by the Georgia Supreme Court and thank them for showing a degree of intellectual honesty and courage rarely shown these days.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

Source https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2207534337628310514&q=in+the+matter+of+w.+McCall+calhoun&hl=en&as_sdt=40000006&as_ylo=2026

Georgia Accepts Surrender of Law License

On February 3, 2026, the Georgia Supreme Court accepted the voluntary surrender of a law license by a lawyer who forged a court order. The case first came to the Georgia Supreme Court on a petition for a three-year suspension, a suspension the court rejected and remanded. On remand, the attorney petitioned to voluntarily surrender his law license.

Here is the description of the facts:

In early 2020, York represented a client who was arrested and charged with misdemeanor family violence against her husband. She was released on bond on the condition that she not contact her husband, but she was arrested a second time based on an allegation that she had violated the no-contact condition. Thereafter, she was again released on bond with the added conditions that she wear an electronic monitoring device on her ankle and pay a monthly monitoring fee of $347.52. 

York forged the signatures of a judge and an assistant district attorney on a court order dated March 4, 2020 that purportedly authorized the removal of the monitoring device from the client’s ankle. As a result, he was charged with felony forgery, and he entered into a 36-month Pretrial Diversion Agreement (“PDA”) with the district attorney’s office to OCGA § 15-18-80, requiring him, for the duration of the PDA, to (1) refrain from drug and alcohol use; (2) submit to random drug tests; (3) continue counseling with a psychologist until released; (4) continue counseling with a substance abuse counselor until released; (5) attend at least one weekly drug/alcohol support group meeting; (6) attend monthly legal mentoring sessions; (7) follow the Bar’s recommendations; and (8) “not practice law until reinstated by the State Bar of Georgia.” 

Comment: Good grief.

 S25Y0932. IN THE MATTER OF PAUL JASON YORK. 

New York Court Sanctions Lawyer for Hallucinated Citations

In a foreclosure case a defense lawyer used hallucinated citations in a brief. Result: $5,000 sanction. The case, as the court notes, was routine.

“Where this appeal becomes unconventional, however, is that defendant’s opening brief cites six cases which do not exist. Plaintiff identified these fabricated cases as possibly being the product of artificial intelligence (hereinafter AI), and moved for an order seeking, among other things, sanctions against defendant and defense counsel. Defendant claimed the nonexistent cases were citation or formatting errors that he would correct in his reply brief, and then opposed the motion for sanctions with more fake cases and interpretations for existing cases that are at best strenuously attenuated, and at worst entirely inapposite. Defendant’s subsequent reply brief acknowledged that his “citation of fictitious cases is a serious error” and that they are “problematic,” but failed to offer any corrections or further explanation as previously stated. He then proceeded to include more fake cases and false legal propositions in two subsequent letters to this Court that requested judicial notice of a bankruptcy stay. In examining the propriety of defendant’s previously filed papers, more nonexistent cases were discovered in a motion that granted affirmative relief to defendant. Defense counsel reluctantly conceded during oral argument that he used AI in the preparation of his papers and, although he told the Court that he checked his papers, the filings themselves demonstrate otherwise. In total, defendant’s five filings during this appeal include no less than 23 fabricated cases, as well as many other blatant misrepresentations of fact or law from actual cases.

Although other state and federal courts have had the occasion to address the misuse of AI in legal papers, this Court has not yet had that opportunity. In doing so, we recognize that, as did the shift from digest books to online legal databases, generative artificial intelligence (hereinafter GenAI) represents a new paradigm for the legal profession, one which is not inherently improper, but rather has the potential to offer benefits to attorneys and the public — particularly in promoting access to justice, saving costs for clients and assisting courts with efficient and accurate administration of justice (see Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 FRD 489, 492-493 [D Wyo 2025]; Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F Supp 3d 443, 448 [SD NY 2023]).[4] At the same time, attorneys and litigants must be aware of the dangers that GenAI presents to the legal profession. At the forefront of that peril are AI “hallucinations,” which occur when an AI database generates incorrect or misleading sources of information due to a “variety of factors, including insufficient training data, incorrect assumptions made by the model, or biases in the data used to train the model” (What are AI Hallucinations?,https://cloud.google.com/discover/what-are-ai-hallucinations [last accessed Jan. 6, 2026]; see generally United States v. Google LLC, ___ F Supp 3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 2523010, *15, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 170459, *74 [D DC, Sept. 2, 2025, Nos. 20-cv-3010 (APM), 20-cv-3715 (APM)]).[5] Hallucinated cases may look like a real case because they include familiar-looking reporter information, but their citations lead to cases with different names, in different courts and on different topics — or even to no case at all (see Sanders v. United States, 176 Fed Cl 163, 168-169 [Fed Cl 2025]). Even where GenAI provides accurate case citations, it nonetheless may misrepresent the holdings of the cited cases — often in favor of the user supplying the query (see Green Bldg. Initiative, Inc. v. Peacock, 350 FRD 289, 292 [D Ore 2025]; Kruglyak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 774 F Supp 3d 767, 770 [WD Va 2025]; see also Matter of Richburg, 671 BR 918, 924 n 11 [Bankr D SC 2025]).[6]

Courts throughout the country which have been confronted with AI-generated authorities have concluded that filing papers containing hallucinated cases and fabricated legal authorities may be sanctionable (see generally OTG New York, Inc. v. OTTOGI Am., Inc., 2025 WL 2671460, *2-3, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 183358, *7-8 [D NJ, Sept. 18, 2025, No. 24-cv-07209 (BRM) (JRA)]). This includes where the fake citations stand for accurate legal principles (see Ader v. Ader, 87 Misc 3d 1213[A], *2 [Sup Ct, NY County 2025]; see also United States v. McGee, ___ F Supp 3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 2888065, at *7, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 201350, * 19; Johnson v. Dunn, 2025 WL 2086116, *16, US Dist LEXIS 141805, *45-46 [ND Ala, July 23, 2025, No. 2:21-cv-1701-AMM]), as there are many harms associated with the submission of fake cases that extend beyond merely wasting the time and money of the opposing party, but also in taking up the court’s resources to evaluate and resolve the deception (see Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F Supp 3d at 448).

In New York, courts have discretion to award costs or impose financial sanctions against an attorney or party for engaging in frivolous conduct (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[a], [b]; WFE Ventures, Inc. v. GBD Lake Placid, LLC, 197 AD3d 824, 836 [3d Dept 2021]). “[C]onduct is frivolous if: (1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]). “In determining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous, the court shall consider, among other issues the circumstances under which the conduct took place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct, and whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, should have been apparent, or was brought to the attention of counsel or the party” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]; see Matter of Minister, Elders & Deacons of Refm. Prot. Dutch Church of City of N.Y. v. 198 Broadway, 76 NY2d 411, 414 [1990]). Moreover, rule 3.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer” (Rules of Prof Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 3.3[a][1]). Sanctions may be appropriate for frivolous and meritless appeals (see Bell v. State of New York, 96 NY2d 811, 812 [2001]), and are a common consequence for misuses of judicial process which unnecessarily divert “the time and attention of . . . [the] Judges of this State” (Matter of Minister, Elders & Deacons of Refm. Prot. Dutch Church of City of N.Y. v. 198 Broadway, 76 NY2d at 415; see generally Engel v. CBS, Inc., 93 NY2d 195, 207 [1999]; Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F Supp 3d at 448).

Here, defendant submitted at least 23 fabricated legal authorities across five filings during the pendency of this appeal.[7] He has also misrepresented the holdings of several real cases as being dispositive in his favor — when they were not.[8] It is axiomatic that submission of fabricated legal authorities is completely without merit in law and therefore constitutes frivolous conduct (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][1]). It cannot be said that fabricated legal authorities constitute “existing law” so as to provide a nonfrivolous ground for extending, modifying or reversing existing law (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][1]; see generally Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 FRD at 495; Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F Supp 3d at 461). Defense counsel acknowledged during oral argument that the papers were his own, and, nevertheless, “[b]y signing a paper, an attorney or party certifies that, to the best of that person’s knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the presentation of the paper or the contentions therein are not frivolous” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1a[b][1]). However, the excuse for fabricated legal authorities offered by defendant in his papers is incredible. Moreover, during oral argument defense counsel estimated that 90% of the citations he used were accurate, which, even if it were true, is simply unacceptable by any measure of candor to any court (see Rules of Prof Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 3.3[a][1]). Where we are most troubled is that more than half of the fake cases offered by defendant came after he was on notice of such issue, whereby his reliance on fabricated legal authorities grew more prolific as this appeal proceeded — despite it being apparent to him that such conduct lacked a legal basis (see Ader v. Ader, 87 Misc 3d 1213[A], *1; see also 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]; Rules of Prof Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 3.3[a][1]). Rather than taking remedial measures or expressing remorse, defense counsel essentially doubled down during oral argument on his reliance of fake legal authorities as not “germane” to the appeal.[9]

Turning to the appropriate sanction, courts must consider that sanctions are both retributive, in that they punish past conduct, but are also “goal oriented, in that they are useful in deterring future frivolous conduct not only by the particular parties, but also by the [b]ar at large” (Levy v. Carol Mgt. Corp., 260 AD2d 27, 34 [1st Dept 1999]). In doing so, courts around the country have imposed sanctions ranging from warnings to tens of thousands of dollars to attorneys who have submitted AI hallucinated legal authorities and false propositions (see e.g. Cojom v. Roblen, LLC, 2025 WL 3205930, *4, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 225325, *9-10 [D Conn, Nov. 17, 2025, No. 3:23-CV-1669 (JCH)] [involving three nonexistent cases; total sanction $500]; Hall v. Academy Charter Sch., 2025 WL 2256653, *5-6, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 152628, *14-16[ED NY, Aug. 7, 2025, No. 2:24-cv-08630-JMW] [involving three nonexistent cases; warning]; Lacey v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 2025 WL 1363069, *5, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 90370, *13 [CD Cal, May 5, 2025, No. CV 24-5205 FMO (MAAx)] [involving nine incorrect citations and two authorities that did not exist by attorneys in two law firms; total sanctions $31,100]). Such broad range reflects a constellation of factors surrounding the conduct of the attorney or party offering such fabricated legal authorities, including the number of fake cases or propositions, whether there were fake quotes, if the submitter continued to use or create more fabricated authorities across other filings in the same proceeding after being on notice of the misconduct, there was an admission of the error, there was remorse and the extent of the impact that the fabricated legal authorities had on the proceedings. Considering these factors, courts in cases involving comparable misconduct by defense counsel have imposed significant sanctions (see e.g. Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P., 114 Cal App 5th 426, 449, 336 Cal Rptr 3d 897, 912 [Cal Ct App 2025] [involving 21 fabricated case citations and quotations by attorney; total sanction $10,000]; Mid Cent. Operating Engrs. Health & Welfare Fund v. HoosierVac LLC, 2025 WL 1511211, *2, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 100748, *3-4 [SD Ind, May 28, 2025, No. 2:24-cv-00326-JPH-MJD] [involving six nonexistent cases across multiple filings; total sanction $6,000]; Kruse v. Karlen, 692 SW3d 43, 50-54 [Mo Ct App 2024] [involving 22 fabricated case citations and multiple statutory misstatements by attorney; total sanction $10,000]).

Accordingly, recognizing this as the first appellate-level case in New York addressing sanctions for the misuse of GenAI, we find the imposition of a monetary sanction on defense counsel Joshua A. Douglass in the amount of $5,000 to be appropriate under the circumstances, with the further goal of deterring future frivolous conduct by defendant and the bar at large (see Levy v. Carol Mgt. Corp., 260 AD2d at 34). To be clear, attorneys and litigants are not prohibited from using GenAI to assist with the preparation of court submissions. The issue arises when attorneys and staff are not sufficiently trained on the dangers of such technology, and instead erroneously rely on it without human oversight. As with the work from a paralegal, intern or another attorney, the use of GenAI in no way abrogates an attorney’s or litigant’s obligation to fact check and cite check every document filed with a court. To do otherwise may be sanctionable, depending on the facts and particular circumstances of each case.”

Citation: 2026 NY Slip Op 00040

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, Respondent,
v.
Jean LeTennier, Also Known as Jean Michel LeTennier and Jean M. LeTennier, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

Pro Se Litigant Cautioned About Hallucinated Case Citations

Two days before Christmas, a district court in Nebraska cautioned a pro se litigant about using generative AI in his legal memoranda.

In the motion to reconsider, Leber raises the same arguments the Court rejected in his motion for partial final judgment. In “support” of his arguments, Leber repeatedly cites to a case which appears to be a hallucination of artificial intelligence, despite Leber’s certification that he has “reviewed and verified the accuracy of all content, citations, and legal authority referenced” in his filing (Filing No. 68-1).[1] The Court had previously warned Leber about this in its previous order. And Leber’s pro se status does not excuse him from “comply[ing] with court rules and directives.” See Soliman v. Johanns, 412 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005). Leber is again instructed to verify the accuracy of all content, citations, and legal authority in his filings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); NECivR 7.1(d)(5) (providing that “[a]ny brief not in compliance with this subsection may be stricken”— without further notice—”in the sole discretion of the court” and that a “material misrepresentation in the certificate of compliance” may also result in “sanctions against the person signing the document”).

The court denied the motion to reconsider. The citation is Leber v. Bryan Medical Center, D. Nebraska 2025, 8:25 cv 401.

ARDC Hearing Board Recommends Two-Year Suspension for Conversion of Client Funds

The Hearing Board has recommended a two-year suspension of an attorney who converted client funds to keep a an extra-marital relationship secret from his family. The lawyer must make restitution to affected clients as well. To his credit the lawyer admitted wrongdoing and apologized for his behavior. The respondent ran a successful real estate law practice before he got into trouble.

Respondent testified, “The root cause of this case is an extramarital relationship which turned extortionate, to the extent that I had to choose between satisfying the blackmailer or admitting to my family that I had cheated.” He felt “forced to make the Hobson’s choice of violating my professional ethics or breaking up my family to the detriment of all of us,” especially Respondent’s disabled adult son whom he and his wife cared for. (Tr. 16). Respondent presented several emails dated between October 2022 and November 2024, purporting to be from his paramour to him. (Resp. Exs. 1-6). He interpreted these emails as threats to reveal his infidelity if he did not continue to give her money. (Tr. 42, 46-57).

The respondent represented himself in the case and, given the circumstances, did an excellent job. He admitted wrongdoing and apologized for his actions. This is the correct way to handle a disciplinary case of this type and the respondent did a good job representing himself. In re Link, 24 PR 00058.

Tennessee Considering Amendments to Rule 5.4

The State of Tennessee is considering allowing non lawyers to own law firms. This is a big step in the slow but steady pursuit of law firm ownership by private equity companies. Rule 5.4(a) prohibits the sharing of fees with a non lawyer. Rule 5.4.(b) prohibits non lawyer ownership of law firms. The Tennessee Supreme Court issued an order seeking comment on the question. The order recites the usual phrases about access to justice. Generally, access to justice is a real issue, but many of those who cannot obtain counsel have cases that lawyers won’t accept because (a) there is no prospect for payment; or (b) the client wishes to pursue goals or objectives that are illegal or plainly wrong. It is highly doubtful that private equity firms will increase access to justice.

Non lawyer ownership of law firms means that the lawyer would share fees with non lawyers, a violation of Rule 5.4. That rule maintains the current status of the legal profession. Ownership by non lawyers inevitably means that ethical standards will slip and that lawyers will focus on the business people rather than their clients.

Arizona eliminated Rule 5.4 in 2021.

Another Chapter In the Saga of Generative AI

Despite the warnings and sanctions and news stories lawyers continue to use Generative AI to draft legal memoranda. Because AI models work in ways we don’t fully understand they sometimes make up citations to fake cases. One more such case dropped this week. Boston v. Williams, 1:23-cv-00752-WMR, N.D. Georgia, is one such case. The opening paragraph is as follows:

During its review of the Plaintiffs’ response brief [Doc. 57] in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court discovered that 17 of the 24 cases cited by Plaintiffs’ counsel either did not exist, did not support the proposition for which they were cited, or misquoted the authority. It appeared to the Court that at least some of the purported cases were artificial intelligence (“AI”) generated “hallucinations.” See United States v. Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (identifying “the markings of a hallucinated case created by generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools,” including case names that appear to be real but do not exist); Mavy v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-25-00689-PHX-KML (ASB) 2025 WL 2355222, at * 1 (D. Arizona, Aug. 14, 2025).

When the court made inquiries of counsel, counsel apologized and said she was very busy and had her daughter draft the brief. The court found probable cause for a violation of Rule 11(b) and set a hearing for the court to determine if the rule was, in fact, violated.

Given the number of these cases, the public embarrassment the lawyers have faced, and the sanctions that will inevitably ensue, I am of the opinion that nothing will stop lazy lawyers from using AI to draft briefs.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

Colorado Discipline Case Is An Important Reminder About Reviews

In the age of the internet, lawyers are subject to online reviews by clients and former clients. I have received several reviews myself that I did not enjoy reading. Some of them were by people who I never represented or spoke with. Where lawyers get into trouble is when they respond to an online review with some commentary. A recent Colorado discipline case of Bernadette Teresa Gonzales, 24 PDJ 094, August 29, 2025 is a reminder of the ethical issues that can arise when you respond to a review in an unwise manner. The Opinion states:

Finally, in 2020, a former client posted a negative and disparaging review of Gonzales on her firm’s Facebook page. Gonzales posted a public reply in which she assailed the client as a terrible mother, described the client’s child as “worthless” and “entitled,” and implied that the client and her family were not truthful and lacked integrity. Through this conduct, Gonzales violated Colo. RPC 1.6(a) (a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent) and Colo. RPC 1.9(c) (a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client).

This is important to understand that you should (a) never respond to a review in an angry manner or in an angry frame of mind. Simply respond that you respectfully disagree with the review and leave it at that. If you have a question about how to respond, better to call a lawyer who can give impartial legal advice.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

The L