Lawyer Disqualified But Continues to File Pleadings – Appellate Court Affirms Dismissal of Case

Rallo v. Dublino, 2026 IL App (1st) 251950-U

This is a Rule 23 case where a lawyer was disqualified by the Court but continued to file pleadings despite the order. The trial court struck the complaint and the Appellate Court affirmed.

Statement of Facts

In 2006, defendant Vincenzo Dublino and attorney David T. Rallo formed Coin Operated Equipment, Inc. (COE), a company that places licensed gambling machines at locations in Chicago. Dublino was president and David was general counsel. According to Dublino’s affidavit, David suggested raising capital through loans from his sons, Joseph and Peter Rallo, and he alone negotiated those loans. Dublino attested that he never communicated directly with either son and relied on David to handle the transaction for COE. In 2008, each son invested $50,000, with a promised 12% annual return. David also negotiated a $100,000 loan from a couple named Stern and took a 15% finder’s fee, paying himself $30,000. (¶¶ 3, 5–6.)

The interest payments stopped in January 2020, and the principal was never returned. (¶ 3.)

Procedural History

Original pleadings and disqualification. On January 30, 2023, David filed a first amended complaint on behalf of Joseph and Peter against Dublino, alleging fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. Dublino moved to dismiss. The sons then sought leave to file a second amended complaint adding claims under the Illinois Securities Law of 1953. While that motion was pending, Dublino moved to disqualify David under Rule 1.9(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, arguing that David’s prior representation of Dublino in negotiating these very loans was substantially related to the current suit. The plaintiffs filed no response. On September 27, 2023, the court entered an agreed order granting disqualification and stating that David “withdraws as attorney of record for Plaintiffs.” (¶¶ 3–8.)

Pro se filings. Joseph and Peter never retained new counsel and appeared pro se. (¶ 9.)

Third amended complaint (December 1, 2023). It added the sons in their capacities as trustees of their respective trusts. Dublino moved to dismiss under section 2-619 because non-attorneys cannot represent trusts. He also noted that the pleading had been e-filed through David’s account and appeared to have been prepared by him. (¶¶ 10–11.)
Fourth amended complaint (April 1, 2024). It dropped the trusts. It was later dismissed without prejudice by agreed order on July 17, 2024. (¶¶ 12–13.)

Sanctions motion. On June 25, 2024, Dublino moved for a rule to show cause, to strike discovery, and for sanctions against the plaintiffs and David. The motion relied on several points (¶¶ 14–15):

The post-disqualification filings matched David’s drafting style.
On June 18, 2024, David emailed defense counsel announcing that he had become the sons’ “administrative assistant” and would communicate, e-file, and serve papers on their behalf. He also encouraged counsel to contact him directly.
Between June 18 and 21, David emailed interrogatories, requests to admit, and requests to produce. Some of these referenced private conversations between David and Dublino that the sons could not have known about.

Dublino argued that David had ghostwritten the discovery and sought dismissal with prejudice. Separately, Joseph served bank subpoenas seeking records of Dublino, his wife Rachel, and Rachel’s Café, LLC. At the Zoom hearing on Dublino’s emergency motion to quash, the court quashed the subpoenas as invalidly issued. (¶ 16.)

Fifth amended complaint (July 29, 2024). About a month after the sanctions motion was filed, the sons and David filed a fifth amended complaint. It added David as a plaintiff based on the sons’ purported assignment to him of 20% of their claims. It also named Rachel Dublino in the caption, although no count was pleaded against her. (¶ 17.)

Evidentiary hearing and dismissal. The court held an evidentiary hearing on September 19, 2024. No transcript appears in the record. On March 18, 2025, the court dismissed the fifth amended complaint with prejudice, relying on four findings (¶¶ 18–23):

David’s emails and discovery showed continued involvement in the case.
David testified that nothing in the disqualification order barred him from advising his sons. He asserted attorney-client privilege over his post-disqualification conversations with them.
During the Zoom hearing, David could be heard off-camera prompting Joseph’s answers.
The assignment adding David as a plaintiff had no apparent purpose other than keeping him in the case.

The court found “deliberate and contumacious disregard” of the disqualification order and saw “no prospect for effective compliance or remediation.” It held that the sons’ acquiescence justified subjecting them to the consequences of David’s conduct. (¶ 23.)

Bystander’s reports. On appeal, the plaintiffs submitted proposed bystander’s reports in the form of affidavits from Joseph, David, and Peter. The trial court refused to certify them because they omitted several material events (¶¶ 34–38):

David’s testimony that he had prepared the documents before disqualification, which contradicted Joseph’s testimony that Joseph prepared them himself.
David’s testimony that the order did not bar him from giving legal advice.
David’s assertion of privilege over post-disqualification conversations.
David’s attempt to examine Dublino on the merits of the case.

Appellants’ Arguments on Appeal and the Court’s Disposition

1. Characterization as contempt. The plaintiffs treated the dismissal as a finding of indirect civil or criminal contempt. The court rejected that framing. The order never found contempt. It rested instead on the court’s inherent authority to control its docket under Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., 166 Ill. 2d 48 (1995). Review was therefore for a clear abuse of discretion under the Santiago v. E.W. Bliss Co., 2012 IL 111792, ¶ 20 standard, which requires two things: a clear record of willful, continuing disregard of the court’s authority, and a finding that lesser sanctions are inadequate. (¶¶ 24–25.)

2. The order only required withdrawal of the appearance. The plaintiffs argued that the order did not enjoin David from discussing the case with his sons. They relied on the principle that injunctions cannot be implied and must state clearly what is prohibited, citing People v. Wilcox, 5 Ill. 2d 222 (1955). The court held the order was unambiguous. Disqualifying David “as the Plaintiffs’ attorney” necessarily barred all further legal representation, including legal advice, because an attorney’s role is to provide representation and advice, citing Wildey v. Paulsen, 385 Ill. App. 3d 305 (2008). (¶¶ 29–30.)

3. Insufficient evidence of legal advice. The plaintiffs made three points (¶¶ 31–43):

No evidence showed what David actually discussed with his sons.
His emails were sent in an administrative capacity.
Nothing showed the court could identify David’s voice on the Zoom call, or that any prompting had legal significance.

The court held that without a transcript or certified bystander’s report, it must presume the findings had an adequate factual basis, citing Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389 (1984). The plaintiffs also forfeited any challenge to two further findings by not addressing them in their brief under Rule 341(h)(7): David’s privilege assertion over post-disqualification communications, and the assignment. Given 18 months of continued representation with the sons’ acquiescence, the court found no abuse of discretion.

4. Refusal to certify the bystander’s reports. The plaintiffs argued the trial court refused certification without explanation and without a hearing. The court disagreed on each point (¶¶ 33, 38–42):

The trial court’s order expressly identified the omissions.
A trial judge may refuse to certify an inaccurate report, citing Allen v. Lin, 356 Ill. App. 3d 405 (2005), and Stehl v. Dose, 83 Ill. App. 3d 440 (1980).
The appellants bore the burden of requesting a hearing and did not do so, citing Feldman v. Munizzo, 16 Ill. App. 2d 58 (1957).
The proper remedy for a refusal to certify is mandamus, which the plaintiffs never pursued, citing Silverstein v. Grellner, 15 Ill. App. 3d 695 (1973).

Under Rule 323(c), uncertified reports are not properly part of the record.

5. Rule 137(e) permitted David’s assistance. The plaintiffs argued that Rule 137(e) authorizes attorneys to help self-represented litigants draft and review documents without appearing. The argument was forfeited because it was first raised in the motion to reconsider, citing Evanston Insurance Co. v. Riseborough, 2014 IL 114271, ¶ 36. It also failed on the merits. Rule 137(e) only relieves an attorney of the need to file an appearance. It creates no exception to Rule 1.9(a) and cannot excuse willful disobedience of a disqualification order. (¶¶ 45–47.)

6. Unconstitutional prior restraint. The plaintiffs argued that restricting David’s communications with his sons violated the First Amendment. This argument was forfeited because it was not raised below. On the merits, the court found the order was narrowly tailored to compelling state interests: enforcing duties to former clients, preventing misuse of confidential information, and preserving public confidence and the integrity of proceedings. The court cited Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, Kemner v. Monsanto Co., LaSalle National Bank v. Triumvera, and In re Estate of Wright. (¶¶ 48–49.)

Observations

Several points may be useful for ethics and malpractice work. First, the order treats a Rule 1.9(a) disqualification as a bar on any legal advice about the matter, not just on appearing as counsel of record, even without express language to that effect. Second, it rejects Rule 137(e) limited-scope ghostwriting as a way around a disqualification. Third, it imputes a disqualified attorney’s misconduct to clients who acquiesce in it, supporting dismissal with prejudice. Procedurally, it is a clear reminder that appellants must secure a transcript or certified bystander’s report, and that mandamus is the remedy when a trial court refuses certification.

Additionally, there was no attempt by the appellant to argue that the disqualification was in error. The appellants would have presented a stronger record if they had appealed the disqualification.

This case says: “Once you are out, you are out.” I believe this is the correct legal rule. It defeats the purposes of the administration of justice to allow a disqualified lawyer to remain involved in the proceedings acting as an advocate.

Hearing Board Recommends Suspension for Frivolous Pleadings

Overview

In recent years, it appears that there are more cases raising the issue of frivolous pleadings by lawyers. This case follows the pattern: the lawyer files unfounded pleadings and then doubles down when confronted with objections and concerns.

In re Michael P. Coghlan, Comm’n No. 2024PR00057 (Ill. ARDC Hr’g Bd., filed Sept. 15, 2026), is a two-count disciplinary matter arising from an attorney’s conduct in federal litigation he filed against a school district and in the legal malpractice action his former client later brought against him. The Hearing Board found all charges proved by clear and convincing evidence and recommended an 18-month suspension, to continue until further order of the Court.

Facts

The District 428 litigation. Michael Coghlan represented James Mason on a theory that DeKalb School District No. 428 permitted non-residents to enroll and thereby violated the civil rights of district taxpayers, who were forced to subsidize their education. He filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois in October 2017, before Judge Frederick Kapala with Magistrate Judge Iain Johnston. Thomas Lester of Hinshaw & Culbertson appeared for the defendants and told Coghlan from the outset that the case belonged in state court and that comity and the Tax Injunction Act barred federal jurisdiction.

The FOIA motions. At a January 23, 2018 status, Judge Johnston told Coghlan plainly that he does not entertain state FOIA disputes and that such matters belong with the Attorney General or the circuit court. Between February and June 2018 Coghlan nonetheless served four more FOIA requests on the district, and in July 2018 filed five motions — Rule 37 sanctions, declaratory judgment on the validity of his FOIA requests, an injunction compelling production, limited depositions and interrogatories, and a motion alleging a conflict of interest between Lester and his client. At the July 24, 2018 hearing, Judge Johnston repeated that state FOIA was not his to enforce, invoked comity and federalism, and suggested Coghlan take a voluntary dismissal and refile in state court if he lacked what he needed. Coghlan filed an amended complaint on July 31, 2018, then withdrew the pending motions on August 16 as moot.

The “way around it” exchange. At that same August 16, 2018 hearing, Lester asked whether the plaintiff intended to stand on the complaint or proceed through successive amendments. Judge Johnston observed that Rule 15 could permit multiple amendments but that “there is a way around that,” and Lester agreed. Coghlan was present in open court for the exchange, which was transcribed.

Dismissal and fee award. After Judge Kapala’s unexpected retirement, the case was reassigned in May 2019 to Judge Pallmeyer, who dismissed on September 5, 2019 — comity barred the claims, and the TIA deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the requested injunctive relief. She described Coghlan’s reliance on Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1 (2015), as “inapt.” Mason discharged Coghlan in October 2019 and retained Foster & Buick, which withdrew the reconsideration motion and dismissed a premature appeal. On March 29, 2021, the court awarded defendants $136,476.60 in fees, finding the attempt to litigate state taxation issues in federal court “frivolous and without grounds from the outset.”

The accusations. On July 5, 2019, Coghlan sent Lester a “Rule 11 Sanctions Notice” asserting that the August 2018 courtroom colloquy gave “the appearance of an out of court ex parte communication about the procedures for circumventing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.” Lester brought the letter to Judge Johnston’s attention at an October 19, 2019 hearing; Coghlan, pressed three times to explain how a conversation he personally attended could appear ex parte, maintained the accusation. In a May 29, 2020 email to Mason’s new counsel, he wrote that delay made it “look like the judge knows the school is wrong and that the school attorney tried to ‘cook the books.'” Testimony established that the continuances were routine — the magistrate judge had nothing to do while a dispositive motion was pending before a district judge who had just inherited a retired colleague’s docket.

The malpractice action. Mason sued Coghlan in DeKalb County in May 2021 for malpractice and unreasonable fees. The case went from Judge Waller (substitution) to Judge Voiland to Judge Klein. Coghlan’s filings included a “reply affidavit” attaching a police report and State Police Firearm Disposition Record concerning Mason, a Facebook photograph of Judges Rowland and Pallmeyer at a Hinshaw reception, and a “Corruptionpedia” screenshot. Later pleadings alleged judicial retaliation for his purported Rule 8.3 reporting, a pattern of misconduct “consistent with US v. Murphy,” and that Judge Buick used extrajudicial influence to make her associate judges protect her husband’s firm. A February 24, 2023 pleading attached a “collocation” diagram depicting fourteen individuals — four judges, opposing counsel, Mason’s successive lawyers, and ARDC intake counsel Guzman — as participants in a conspiracy. At a June 22, 2023 hearing he accused Foster of emerging from Judge Klein’s chambers, a claim contradicted by the judge, Foster, and Pioli. At an August 25, 2023 hearing he invoked Operation Greylord, Murphy, and LeFevour, and when Judge Klein asked whether he was accusing her of participating in a criminal enterprise, he answered: “The evidence accused you.”

Procedural History

The Administrator filed a two-count complaint on August 29, 2024.

Count I (District 428 litigation): Rules 3.1 (frivolous proceedings), 8.2(a) (reckless statements concerning a judge’s integrity), and 8.4(c) (dishonesty).
Count II (malpractice defense): Rules 4.4(a) (means with no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden), 8.2(a), and 8.4(c).

Coghlan’s answer was stricken in its entirety on October 29, 2024 for failure to comply with Commission Rule 233 and 735 ILCS 5/2-610. His amended answer was stricken on January 10, 2025 for the same reason, the Chair noting “improper lengthy narratives, a diagram with photographs, and extraneous statements.” His third answer again largely responded “neither admit nor deny.” Rather than permit a fourth attempt, the Chair entered an order on February 27, 2025 deeming admitted the allegations not properly answered.

The hearing spanned five days — August 25–26, October 9, and November 24, 2025, and January 9, 2026 — before a panel of Heather A. McPherson (Chair), Michael V. Casey, and Marc S. Needlman. Rory P. Quinn appeared for the Administrator. Coghlan represented himself. The Administrator called six witnesses; Coghlan testified over a day and a half. The Report and Recommendation was filed September 15, 2026.

Disposition

Findings. The Board found every charge proved. On Rule 3.1 it applied the objective standard — whether a reasonably prudent attorney acting in good faith would have brought the action — and held that neither the federal filing nor the four FOIA motions had an objectively reasonable basis, expressly rejecting Brohl as authority. It carved out one narrow exception: because a party may challenge opposing counsel’s representation where it adversely affects the party’s interests, see Jones v. Brown-Marino, 2017 IL App (1st) 152852, the Board declined to find the conflict-of-interest motion frivolous. On Rule 8.2(a), the Board applied the objective reckless-disregard standard, holding that suspicion, speculation, and conjecture cannot supply a reasonable belief. It declined to treat the ex parte allegations as an additional Rule 8.2(a) predicate in Count I because they fell outside the charging paragraph. On Rule 8.4(c), it found the after-the-fact characterization of the “Rule 11 Sanctions Notice” as a mandatory Rule 8.3 report “patently disingenuous” — the document never mentions Rule 8.3, and his claim of confidential reporting was irreconcilable with his claimed duty to report to the tribunal.

Mitigation. No prior discipline; civic and veterans’ organization service. His service as an assistant state’s attorney and elected State’s Attorney was expressly held not mitigating — given that role, he should have known better.

Aggravation. Conduct during the disciplinary proceeding mirrored the underlying misconduct and expanded to attacks on the Illinois Supreme Court, the ARDC, the Hearing Board, and the Administrator’s counsel; repeated inability or unwillingness to comply with basic rules of practice; misconduct spanning at least five years across numerous filings and appearances; and a complete absence of remorse — asked at the close of hearing whether he regretted the collocation diagram, he answered that it was “100 percent appropriate.” His voluntary retirement was given no weight, since re-registration under Ill. S. Ct. R. 756(a)(6) and (i) requires no fitness showing.

Sanction. The Administrator sought three years and until further order. The Board found the three-year comparators — Amu, Denison, and Jackson — materially more egregious, and found this conduct worse than the six-month cases (Cohn, Hoffman) but less severe in scope and gravity than the two-year cases (Walker, Greanias). It recommended suspension for 18 months and until further order of the Court, the UFO component grounded in its conclusion that Coghlan would likely repeat the conduct and should be required to prove fitness before resuming practice.

This is a Hearing Board recommendation only, subject to Review Board proceedings and final action by the Supreme Court.

Comment: Opponents often give feedback on your legal work. Much of that feedback may be meritless, but some of it is not, particularly when the judge agrees.

ARDC Recommends Two-Year Suspension for Trust Account Errors

In re Jeffrey Gunderson, 2025PR00051 was decided by the Hearing Board. This is a case where the lawyer made serious accounting and bookkeeping errors in maintaining his trust account, but was able to save his law license because no clients were harmed and because the lawyer introduced substantial mitigating evidence of good conduct. The Hearing Board recommended a two year suspension. This is a case where good defense work contributed to saving the law license.

Procedural History

August 28, 2025 — Administrator filed a 21-count complaint against respondent.
October 31, 2025 — Respondent filed an answer, admitting many factual allegations but denying the misconduct charges.
Pre-hearing — The chair granted the Administrator’s oral motion to (1) strike allegations regarding wire transfers after January 2023 from paragraph 133, (2) amend the January 2023 wire transfer date to January 13, 2023, and (3) amend charging paragraph 147(a) regarding the characterization of the Real View account transfer.
May 28–29, 2026 — Hearing held before a panel consisting of Rhonda Sallée (chair), Cristin K.M. Duffy, and Michael Silver. Evette L. Ocasio and Richard C. Gleason, II represented the Administrator; James A. Doppke represented respondent.
Evidence presented: Two fact witnesses plus respondent (as an adverse witness) for the Administrator; respondent testified on his own behalf and called three character witnesses. Administrator’s Exhibits 1–8 and 12–29 admitted; respondent offered no exhibits.
September 11, 2026 — Report and Recommendation filed and certified by Michelle M. Thome, Clerk of the ARDC.

Charges

Counts I–XIX: Knowing, dishonest conversion of client/third-party funds (Rules 1.15(a) and 8.4(c)) — one investment-fund matter ($175,000) and eighteen real estate earnest-money transactions.
Count XX: Commingling client/third-party funds with personal funds (Rules 1.15(a)/1.15(b)).
Count XXI: Failure to maintain required trust account records (Rules 1.15(a)/1.15A(b)).

Key Findings

The Hearing Board found all charges proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Count I: Respondent received $175,000 in investor funds via his “Real View” account (never an actual IOLTA account) and used most of it for personal/business expenses (credit card debt, loan payments, an unrelated settlement) before eventually repaying it in two installments. The Board rejected as not credible his claim that the client’s principal had authorized him to keep ~$100,000 as fees/investment proceeds.
Counts II–XIX: A recurring pattern across numerous real estate closings — respondent deposited earnest money into non-trust accounts (personal, operating, or “Real View”) that were then depleted below required holding amounts before closing, often to cover unrelated personal or business expenses, with funds replenished from other clients’ incoming earnest money.
Count XX: Extensive commingling documented via bank records (e.g., $380,500 in wires and $137,371.34 in checks representing client funds deposited into his personal account; $422,609 in checks into his operating account; $99,099.97 of personal funds deposited into his IOLTA account).
Count XXI: Respondent admitted he failed to keep contemporaneous client ledgers and required three-way reconciliations from January 2022 to November 2023.
The Board found respondent not credible and not candid regarding his claimed authorization to use the $175,000 and his explanation for repaying it in two installments — treated as an aggravating factor.

Mitigation and Aggravation

Mitigation: No prior discipline in 20 years; disorganization following departure of a law partner and paralegal; substantial pro bono work (~30% of practice), community/volunteer involvement; no client complaints or actual financial harm; three character witnesses attesting to honesty (though two expressed reservations about the allegations). This was excellent work by defense counsel.

Aggravation: Nearly two years of sustained misconduct that continued even after the ARDC was notified of an IOLTA overdraft; lack of candor before the Board.

Citing In re Elias as the closest comparator, the Board recommended a two-year suspension, with completion of the ARDC Professionalism Seminar required before reinstatement. The Board rejected the Administrator’s request for a three-year suspension and rejected respondent’s request for a shorter, probation-eligible term, reasoning that probation “suggests a problem that can be fixed,” whereas respondent had already closed his trust account and no longer holds client funds — making probation superfluous rather than corrective.

In my opinion the penalty is too harsh given that there was no client harm.

Georgia Supreme Court Suspends Lawyer for Two Years for Neglect of Client Matter

In the Matter of Ramon David Sammons, Jr., No. S26Y0848 (Ga. Aug. 11, 2026) (per curiam)

Disposition: 24-month suspension, with conditions on reinstatement.

A Georgia lawyer was suspended for two years for abandoning a client whose case he took. He will need to show that his mental health issues, including depression, have been treated before he can be reinstated. The court found some degree of mitigation because the lawyer notified the disciplinary authorities of the violation. In Georgia, the Supreme Court reviews the findings of a Special Master who is retained to hear evidence and make factual and credibility findings. in this case the Supreme Court accepted the findings of the Special Master.

Procedural posture: Third time before the Court. (1) First remand: Court vacated a default judgment because Sammons wasn’t actually in default when it entered. (2) Second remand: Special Master recommended accepting Sammons’s petition for voluntary discipline (public reprimand), but the Court rejected it without prejudice because his claimed mitigation (depression/anxiety since age 18, therapy, medication) wasn’t supported by any evidence in the record. (3) This decision: on second remand, a new Special Master granted summary judgment to the State Bar and recommended a 24-month suspension; Sammons filed no exceptions.

Underlying misconduct (Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4): Retained in 2017 on contingency to pursue a personal injury claim for an elderly dementia patient (through her daughter) against a nursing home. Sammons received the medical records, told the daughter he’d completed the demand letter — then went silent. He ignored her repeated calls and emails for roughly six months, including one flagging that the statute of limitations was about to run, and never responded. The limitations period expired and the claim died. (An unauthorized-practice count under Rule 5.5(a) was dismissed without prejudice earlier in the proceedings and isn’t at issue here.)

The Defense: The lawyer defended on the ground that he had untreated mental illness. The lawyer failed to prove up that defense with proper medical testimony, however. The lawyer did participate in the process, but that was insufficient to avoid discipline.

Mental state finding: Initial disregard deemed negligent, but the Special Master found Sammons’s later, more serious conduct — continued silence, failure to correct his bar-registration address (which caused the original service/default problem), and general avoidance — was “knowing,” inferred from the circumstances under Rule 1.0(o).

Aggravating factors (ABA Std. 9.22): dishonest/selfish motive (abandoning the case to avoid admitting the missed deadline); a two-year pattern of misconduct; multiple rule violations; bad-faith obstruction of the disciplinary process itself (ignoring orders, the grievance, and the Bar’s investigation notice; baseless denials of his own emails); vulnerability of the client/victim; his substantial experience practicing law; and no restitution or effort to rectify the harm.

Mitigation: The Special Master didn’t disbelieve his mental-health claims, but his failure to submit any corroborating evidence (despite being ordered to and given the opportunity) sharply undercut their weight — this is what moved the case from “likely reprimand” to suspension/disbarment territory. The only real credit given: no prior discipline, and some acceptance of responsibility via the voluntary-discipline petition.

Sanction analysis: Applying ABA Standard 4.4 (duty of diligence), the Court agreed the harm (destroying the client’s claim by abandonment) would typically warrant disbarment absent mitigation — citing In the Matter of Bell and In the Matter of Starling. But because Sammons’s mitigation, though poorly supported, wasn’t disbelieved and his record was otherwise clean, the Court followed the Special Master’s recommendation and imposed suspension rather than disbarment, citing comparable cases (Whiteside – 3 months; Golub – 12 months; Jaconetti – 36 months with conditions; Bagwell – 24 months with conditions, closely analogous on facts).

Reinstatement conditions: Petition to the Review Board must include a licensed psychologist/psychiatrist’s written certification of competency to practice; if reinstated, Sammons must undergo a Law Practice Management Program evaluation and implement its recommendations within six months, with proof submitted to the Bar’s General Counsel.

If you run into trouble, call an experienced attorney to discuss what to do next. There are often pathways to curing the problem or mitigating the discipline if you act promptly and appropriately. Counsel is the way to go here. We can often help if you don’t wait too long to contact us.

Check AI outputs twice

Tov Realty, LLC v. Suarez, 355 Conn. 902 (2026).

Background: Attorney Ian G. Gottlieb and his firm, GLG Law, LLC, filed applications for certification to appeal and subsequent briefs in two consolidated cases (Tov Realty v. Suarez and Kosel Equity v. MacGregor). Both filings contained hallucinated case citations generated by ChatGPT—roughly seven erroneous or unverified citations in total.

Where the lawyer went wrong:

Verified once, then let AI touch the work unchecked. Gottlieb did his initial legal research properly, using LexisNexis and Shepard’s to confirm the citations in his rough drafts were accurate. His mistake was pasting those already-verified drafts into ChatGPT afterward, purely to improve organization and prose quality.
Assumed the AI wouldn’t alter substance. He didn’t anticipate that ChatGPT would add new citations or alter existing ones while “editing.” Because the AI’s changes didn’t disturb the underlying legal propositions (which remained correct), nothing about the output looked wrong on its face.
No second verification pass. This is the core failure: neither Gottlieb nor the law firm colleagues who reviewed the documents before filing re-ran citation checks after the ChatGPT edit. The court stressed that a competent verification process has to catch changes introduced at any stage of drafting, not just the first draft.
Discovery came from opposing/amici parties, not internal review. The errors surfaced only after amici curiae (represented by the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization) flagged the fabricated citations—not through the firm’s own safeguards.

Legal basis: The court held this violated Rule 1.1 (competence) of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct, citing a growing body of authority (McCarthy v. DEA (3d Cir. 2026), Park v. Kim (2d Cir. 2024), State v. Coleman(Ohio App. 2026), among others) holding that filing AI-hallucinated citations breaches the duty of competent representation regardless of intent to deceive.

Mitigating factors: No dishonest/selfish motive, full cooperation with the disciplinary process, candid admission, sincere contrition, no prior discipline, and prompt filing of errata sheets once notified.

Sanctions imposed:

6 additional CLE hours in ethics/law office management (3 specifically on generative AI use), on top of the standard 12-hour annual requirement
$1,000 donation each (Gottlieb and the firm) to the CT Bar Institute
A compliance report to the Appellate Clerk within six months, with a courtesy copy to the Statewide Grievance Committee (not a referral)
Compliance with reciprocal discipline in any other jurisdiction where he’s admitted

The court also used the opinion to flag Connecticut’s newly adopted practice rules (Practice Book §§ 4-9(b), 4-2(b), 62-6(d), 85-2(11)) requiring independent verification of any AI-generated citations or authorities in court filings, and noted—without deciding—that competence in this area also implicates privilege, confidentiality, and work-product concerns when using public AI platforms.

Comment: here the lawyer handled the disciplinary process admirably.

Florida Reprimands Chesebro

The Florida Supreme Court was much kinder to Kenneth Chesebro than other courts have been, giving him a reprimand for 2020 election misconduct. The Florida Bar v. Kenneth Chesebro (SC2024-1528, June 11, 2026):

Background Chesebro pled guilty in Georgia state court to conspiracy to file a false document (O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20.1), stemming from his role in the 2020 “false electors” scheme — specifically, transmitting a slate of false Georgia electors to the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. He was sentenced to five years of felony probation under Georgia’s First Offender Act. That probation was later terminated early, and under Georgia law (O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60(e)), he was thereby “exonerated of guilt” and deemed never to have had a criminal conviction.

Referee’s Recommendation The referee found Chesebro guilty of misconduct and recommended a 30-day suspension under Florida Standard 7.1(b) (suspension for knowing/intentional misconduct causing injury to the legal system).

Majority Disposition The Court approved the finding of guilt but rejected the 30-day suspension, instead imposing a public reprimand plus a requirement to attend The Florida Bar’s Ethics School. The majority reasoned that while comity doesn’t erase the underlying misconduct, Georgia’s full exoneration under its First Offender Act was a fact the Court could not ignore in fashioning discipline — balancing its duty to regulate Florida lawyers against respect for a sister state’s judgment. The Court also lifted Chesebro’s October 28, 2024 felony suspension and reinstated him to practice immediately, and entered a costs judgment against him for $2,229.37.

Vote: Muñiz, C.J., and Couriel, Grosshans, Francis, and Sasso, JJ., concurred. Tanenbaum, J., concurred in the discipline but dissented as to costs.

Labarga, J., Dissent Justice Labarga argued the majority’s chosen sanction (public reprimand) actually fits Standard 7.1(c) — negligent conduct — not 7.1(b), which the referee applied for knowing/intentional conduct. Since Chesebro admitted to knowingly submitting fraudulent elector documentation to a federal court, and the Georgia discharge doesn’t erase that admitted act, Labarga viewed a reprimand as inconsistent with the Standards and disproportionate to the gravity of “fraud upon the court” — one of the most serious ethical breaches a lawyer can commit. He would not have gone below the referee’s recommended 30-day suspension.

Comment: the best argument in favor of this reprimand is that these issues have been litigated ad nauseam.

ARDC Alleges Plagiarism

The ARDC has filed a complaint against an Illinois lawyer alleging that he plagiarized an opinion letter by another lawyer. A client requested an opinion letter on gaming law. I have removed the names of the lawyers involved because these are charges and they have not been proven. The original complaint can be found on the ARDC website.

Filed: May 21, 2026 | Rule Charged: Illinois RPC 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation

Background

Respondent is a Chicago attorney licensed since 1993.

The Alleged Misconduct

In May 2024, an online gaming company retained Respondent to provide a written legal opinion analyzing federal laws applicable to its product, for a $5,000 flat fee. He delivered an initial seven-page opinion. The client then requested a revised opinion adding a state-by-state analysis of gaming laws, for an additional $2,500, plus a $1,500 certificate of counsel attesting to the opinion’s applicability.

Rather than authoring the state-by-state analysis himself, Respondent obtained a 181-page confidential legal opinion written in 2023 by a lawyer with Duane Morris LLP for a different client. That document was marked both confidential/attorney work product and copyright Duane Morris 2023.

Respondent then systematically stripped the Duane Morris identifying information — removing the firm’s letterhead, deleting copyright notations on every page, substituting his own name and his client’s name for the name of the Duane Morris lawyer, and replacing the Duane Morris lawyer’s signature with his own — and delivered it to his client as his own original work product on June 12, 2024. He simultaneously executed a certification representing the opinion as the work of The Casino Law Group.

Key Aggravating Facts

Respondent knew the opinion would be passed to the client’s banks and payment processors, who would rely on it to assess the legality of the client’s product
He never sought Duane Morris’ permission to use the opinion
The deliberate, systematic removal of identifying information demonstrates knowing and intentional conduct

Charge

A single count of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation under Illinois RPC 8.4(c), premised on both the false representations of authorship and the plagiarism of the Duane Morris opinion.

Relief Sought

Referral to a Hearing Board panel for findings of fact and a discipline recommendation.

Comments: Plagiarism is easy to prove. You just line up the two documents and compare them. We all make mistakes, but please don’t rush your work product. Rushing to complete an assignment is always a mistake. Take your time. Do your best. Or decline the matter if you are not able to do it. Charging him with “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” under Rule 8.4(c) is harsh, as lawyers commonly copy other legal work when writing pleadings.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

In Most States Sharing Fees With a Nonlawyer is prohibited.

In the Matter of Discipline of William H. Jackson, III (Nev. 2026)

Background

The Nevada Supreme Court approved a conditional admission agreement disciplining attorney William H. Jackson, III for sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer. Jackson paid Hernando Alberto Heredia — operating through a business called “Tus Defensores” — for referring a personal injury case to Jackson. The payment came out of Jackson’s attorney fees from the client’s settlement and exceeded the reasonable cost of advertising for a single matter.

Rules Violated

RPC 5.4(a) — Professional independence of a lawyer (fee-sharing with nonlawyers)
RPC 7.2(a) — Attorney advertising

Analytical Framework

The Court applied a four-factor test drawn from In re Discipline of Lerner, 124 Nev. 1232 (2008):

Duty violated — Duties owed to the profession
Mental state — Knowing violation
Injury — Actual, moderate injury to the profession
Aggravating/mitigating factors (see below)

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

The court found several aggravating factors, (1) a prior disciplinary offense; (2) the selfish motive; and (3) the fact that the lawyer had substantial experience in his practice. In mitigation, the lawyer was cooperative and made full disclosure and was remorseful. The prior offense occurred a long time ago.

Discipline Imposed

Six-month-and-one-day suspension, stayed for 24 months, conditioned on:
- 12 additional CLE hours in legal ethics
- No professional association with Heredia or his entities
- Engagement of a law practice mentor with monthly State Bar reports
- Maintaining good standing and no future misconduct
- $1,000 fine (due within 30 days)
- $2,500 in disciplinary proceeding costs (due within 30 days)

Key Takeaway

This case illustrates that Nevada treats referral fee arrangements with nonlawyer lead-generation businesses as serious professional misconduct. Even where mitigating factors exist, a knowing violation of the fee-sharing prohibition warrants suspension as the baseline sanction. Practitioners should be particularly cautious about payments to nonlawyer referral sources that exceed what would constitute legitimate advertising costs, as that distinction appeared to be a critical fact here.

If you have a question about something related to legal ethics, contact us. It is always better to get advice before proceeding into questionable territory. We can often help.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

ARDC Review Board Recommends Suspension of Immigration Lawyer

Given the government’s focus on immigration enforcement, lawyers in the immigration area should expect to see more disciplinary enforcement. What would draw the interest of the disciplinary authorities are cases where the lawyer neglected immigration cases or took funds from clients and did not complete the work. The ARDC review board recommended a two-year suspension of an attorney. This decision is from the Review Board. It is a recommendation. The Review Board reviews recommendations of the ARDC Hearing Board. The Illinois Supreme Court has the final say on all disciplinary matters.

Summary: In re Mahdis Azimi — ARDC Review Board Report (Feb. 2026)

Background

Mahdis Azimi, an Illinois immigration attorney admitted in 2015, faced a ten-count disciplinary complaint arising from misconduct in ten client matters between September 2021 and October 2023. She operated a solo practice while simultaneously holding a full-time administrative position at Loyola University School of Law.

Misconduct Found

The Hearing Board found violations across all ten counts, including:

Failing to file immigration petitions in seven matters
Making false representations to clients in multiple cases (claiming filings had been made when they had not)
Ignoring client communications
Failing to refund unearned fees in six cases
Failing to surrender client files in four cases
Depositing client funds into her operating account rather than a trust account
Failing to comply with the Administrator’s subpoena for four client files
Making a false statement during a sworn statement to the Administrator
Providing false testimony at the disciplinary hearing itself

Key Aggravating Factors

Prior discipline for nearly identical misconduct (90-day suspension in 2022), with the current misconduct beginning while that prior case was pending
A persistent pattern of dishonesty, not attributable to her mental health diagnoses (ADHD, PTSD, anxiety, depression) per the Administrator’s unrebutted psychiatric expert, Dr. Rone
Failure to accept full responsibility
Lack of credibility as a witness on key issues
No restitution made; no trust account ever opened

Mental Health

Azimi raised mental health as a mitigating factor. Dr. Rone acknowledged her diagnoses could explain disorganization but concluded the pattern of dishonesty was not a symptom of those conditions. Dr. Rone recommended years of dialectical behavioral therapy and found Azimi’s current treatment inadequate and her prognosis for ethical practice poor absent significant intervention. Azimi presented no rebuttal expert, having been barred from doing so after missing disclosure deadlines.

Procedural Rulings Affirmed

The Review Board upheld the Hearing Board Chair’s rulings barring Azimi’s expert witness (due to non-compliance with disclosure deadlines), allowing Dr. Rone’s testimony, and permitting the Administrator’s closing argument on lack of remorse. No due process violation was found.

One Exception — Count VII

The Review Board found the Administrator failed to prove Azimi cashed the client money orders at issue in Count VII, and therefore vacated the Rule 1.15(a) (misuse of funds) finding on that count only. All six other violations in Count VII were affirmed.

Sanction

Hearing Board recommended: 3-year suspension, UFO
Review Board recommended: 2-year suspension, UFO (until further order of court)

The Review Board found a three-year suspension unnecessarily long, but agreed a UFO provision was essential given Azimi’s recidivism, dishonesty pattern, and the psychiatric expert’s conclusion that she remains unfit to practice. To seek reinstatement, she must affirmatively demonstrate rehabilitation, ethical fitness, restitution, and that her mental health treatment has been effective.

Comment: in the immigration area, the client may be vulnerable to deportation. Few of these clients will have the ability to file a legal malpractice lawsuit if they have been deported. For that reason, disciplinary authorities will view these cases as good targets for enforcement. Please keep this in mind if you do this type of work.

ARDC Hearing Board Recommends Harsh Sanction For Failure To Register With the Bar and Certify MCLE Compliance

In re Robert Kent Gray, Jr. (No. 2025PR00035)

Gray, a licensed Illinois attorney since 2002, was removed from the master roll on December 1, 2024 for failing to complete his mandatory CLE hours — earning only 4 of the required 30 credits by the initial deadline and none during the grace period. He was reinstated on January 8, 2025 at 4:00 p.m., after finally completing his hours and paying a $400 reinstatement fee.

Misconduct

During the period of removal, Gray engaged in multiple violations:

Unauthorized practice of law (Rule 5.5(a)) — On January 7, he caused three trial subpoenas to be issued and emailed exhibits to opposing counsel. On January 8, he appeared in court on behalf of clients, including a corporate defendant that legally required licensed counsel.
False statement to a tribunal (Rule 3.3(a)) — When Judge Wright asked whether he was authorized to practice, Gray stated he believed he was and that his credentials were “just waiting for something to process.” The Board found this knowingly false, given that he had checked his MyMCLE account 23 times in the prior days and knew reinstatement required both transcript reporting and fee payment — neither of which had occurred by 10:30 a.m. that day.
Criminal act (Rule 8.4(b)) — Judge Wright found Gray guilty of direct criminal contempt and fined him $200. Gray admitted this in his Answer, making it conclusive evidence of the violation.
Dishonest conduct (Rule 8.4(c)) — Flowing directly from the Rule 3.3(a) violation.
Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (Rule 8.4(d)) — His improper appearance delayed his clients’ potentially dispositive motion to dismiss by nearly a month and caused the court to expend needless resources on a contempt proceeding.

Mitigation & Aggravation

Mitigation: None. Gray’s unsworn statements about his father’s death and diligence in completing CLE credits were not presented as testimony and, in any event, would not have constituted legal mitigation given that he missed both the initial and grace period deadlines by wide margins.

Aggravation (substantial):

Experienced attorney (licensed since 2002; subject to CLE requirements for nearly 20 years)
Received at least 16 MCLE notices before removal; ignored them
Knowingly engaged in an irresponsible course of conduct, not a momentary lapse
Risk of harm to clients from delayed proceedings
No remorse; refused to acknowledge wrongdoing
Blamed CLE providers, the MCLE Board, and the ARDC for delays of his own making
Filed meritless pleadings and made unsubstantiated misconduct charges against Administrator’s counsel
Failed to fully cooperate in the disciplinary proceeding
Prior discipline: One-year suspension in 2018 for strikingly similar violations — unauthorized practice while removed from the master roll, false statements to a tribunal, dishonesty, and prejudicing the administration of justice

Recommendation

Majority (Nair, Edmond): The Board recommended a one-year suspension. The Board distinguished three factually analogous cases (James, Witt, Wiley) that each resulted in six-month suspensions, finding Gray’s misconduct more egregious due to his express dishonesty to the judge, the criminal contempt finding, and his significant recidivism. The majority declined to add an “until further order” (UFO) provision, noting Gray attended his hearing and showed marginally more cooperation than in his prior proceeding.

Dissent (Shiffman): 18-month suspension. The prior one-year suspension demonstrably failed to deter Gray’s recidivism, and a longer suspension is both justified and appropriate.

Comment: this is an experienced lawyer who failed to complete the 30 hours of continuing legal education that Illinois requires every two years and failed certify that he had completed his continuing legal education coursework. In my opinion, he made his situation much worse by failing to inform a judge that he was not, in fact, licensed to practice law. Attending CLE is time-consuming, but you have to follow the rules to remain licensed.