In Most States Sharing Fees With a Nonlawyer is prohibited.

In the Matter of Discipline of William H. Jackson, III (Nev. 2026)

Background

The Nevada Supreme Court approved a conditional admission agreement disciplining attorney William H. Jackson, III for sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer. Jackson paid Hernando Alberto Heredia — operating through a business called “Tus Defensores” — for referring a personal injury case to Jackson. The payment came out of Jackson’s attorney fees from the client’s settlement and exceeded the reasonable cost of advertising for a single matter.

Rules Violated

  • RPC 5.4(a) — Professional independence of a lawyer (fee-sharing with nonlawyers)
  • RPC 7.2(a) — Attorney advertising

Analytical Framework

The Court applied a four-factor test drawn from In re Discipline of Lerner, 124 Nev. 1232 (2008):

  1. Duty violated — Duties owed to the profession
  2. Mental state — Knowing violation
  3. Injury — Actual, moderate injury to the profession
  4. Aggravating/mitigating factors (see below)

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

The court found several aggravating factors, (1) a prior disciplinary offense; (2) the selfish motive; and (3) the fact that the lawyer had substantial experience in his practice. In mitigation, the lawyer was cooperative and made full disclosure and was remorseful. The prior offense occurred a long time ago.

Discipline Imposed

  • Six-month-and-one-day suspension, stayed for 24 months, conditioned on:
    • 12 additional CLE hours in legal ethics
    • No professional association with Heredia or his entities
    • Engagement of a law practice mentor with monthly State Bar reports
    • Maintaining good standing and no future misconduct
    • $1,000 fine (due within 30 days)
    • $2,500 in disciplinary proceeding costs (due within 30 days)

Key Takeaway

This case illustrates that Nevada treats referral fee arrangements with nonlawyer lead-generation businesses as serious professional misconduct. Even where mitigating factors exist, a knowing violation of the fee-sharing prohibition warrants suspension as the baseline sanction. Practitioners should be particularly cautious about payments to nonlawyer referral sources that exceed what would constitute legitimate advertising costs, as that distinction appeared to be a critical fact here.

If you have a question about something related to legal ethics, contact us. It is always better to get advice before proceeding into questionable territory. We can often help.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

ARDC Review Board Recommends Suspension of Immigration Lawyer

ARDC Review Board Recommends Suspension of Immigration Lawyer

Given the government’s focus on immigration enforcement, lawyers in the immigration area should expect to see more disciplinary enforcement. What would draw the interest of the disciplinary authorities are cases where the lawyer neglected immigration cases or took funds from clients and did not complete the work. The ARDC review board recommended a two-year suspension of an attorney. This decision is from the Review Board. It is a recommendation. The Review Board reviews recommendations of the ARDC Hearing Board. The Illinois Supreme Court has the final say on all disciplinary matters.

Summary: In re Mahdis Azimi — ARDC Review Board Report (Feb. 2026)

Background

Mahdis Azimi, an Illinois immigration attorney admitted in 2015, faced a ten-count disciplinary complaint arising from misconduct in ten client matters between September 2021 and October 2023. She operated a solo practice while simultaneously holding a full-time administrative position at Loyola University School of Law.

Misconduct Found

The Hearing Board found violations across all ten counts, including:

  • Failing to file immigration petitions in seven matters
  • Making false representations to clients in multiple cases (claiming filings had been made when they had not)
  • Ignoring client communications
  • Failing to refund unearned fees in six cases
  • Failing to surrender client files in four cases
  • Depositing client funds into her operating account rather than a trust account
  • Failing to comply with the Administrator’s subpoena for four client files
  • Making a false statement during a sworn statement to the Administrator
  • Providing false testimony at the disciplinary hearing itself

Key Aggravating Factors

  • Prior discipline for nearly identical misconduct (90-day suspension in 2022), with the current misconduct beginning while that prior case was pending
  • A persistent pattern of dishonesty, not attributable to her mental health diagnoses (ADHD, PTSD, anxiety, depression) per the Administrator’s unrebutted psychiatric expert, Dr. Rone
  • Failure to accept full responsibility
  • Lack of credibility as a witness on key issues
  • No restitution made; no trust account ever opened

Mental Health

Azimi raised mental health as a mitigating factor. Dr. Rone acknowledged her diagnoses could explain disorganization but concluded the pattern of dishonesty was not a symptom of those conditions. Dr. Rone recommended years of dialectical behavioral therapy and found Azimi’s current treatment inadequate and her prognosis for ethical practice poor absent significant intervention. Azimi presented no rebuttal expert, having been barred from doing so after missing disclosure deadlines.

Procedural Rulings Affirmed

The Review Board upheld the Hearing Board Chair’s rulings barring Azimi’s expert witness (due to non-compliance with disclosure deadlines), allowing Dr. Rone’s testimony, and permitting the Administrator’s closing argument on lack of remorse. No due process violation was found.

One Exception — Count VII

The Review Board found the Administrator failed to prove Azimi cashed the client money orders at issue in Count VII, and therefore vacated the Rule 1.15(a) (misuse of funds) finding on that count only. All six other violations in Count VII were affirmed.

Sanction

  • Hearing Board recommended: 3-year suspension, UFO
  • Review Board recommended: 2-year suspension, UFO (until further order of court)

The Review Board found a three-year suspension unnecessarily long, but agreed a UFO provision was essential given Azimi’s recidivism, dishonesty pattern, and the psychiatric expert’s conclusion that she remains unfit to practice. To seek reinstatement, she must affirmatively demonstrate rehabilitation, ethical fitness, restitution, and that her mental health treatment has been effective.

Comment: in the immigration area, the client may be vulnerable to deportation. Few of these clients will have the ability to file a legal malpractice lawsuit if they have been deported. For that reason, disciplinary authorities will view these cases as good targets for enforcement. Please keep this in mind if you do this type of work.

ARDC Hearing Board Recommends Harsh Sanction For Failure To Register With the Bar and Certify MCLE Compliance

ARDC Hearing Board Recommends Harsh Sanction For Failure To Register With the Bar and Certify MCLE Compliance

In re Robert Kent Gray, Jr. (No. 2025PR00035)

Gray, a licensed Illinois attorney since 2002, was removed from the master roll on December 1, 2024 for failing to complete his mandatory CLE hours — earning only 4 of the required 30 credits by the initial deadline and none during the grace period. He was reinstated on January 8, 2025 at 4:00 p.m., after finally completing his hours and paying a $400 reinstatement fee.


Misconduct

During the period of removal, Gray engaged in multiple violations:

  • Unauthorized practice of law (Rule 5.5(a)) — On January 7, he caused three trial subpoenas to be issued and emailed exhibits to opposing counsel. On January 8, he appeared in court on behalf of clients, including a corporate defendant that legally required licensed counsel.
  • False statement to a tribunal (Rule 3.3(a)) — When Judge Wright asked whether he was authorized to practice, Gray stated he believed he was and that his credentials were “just waiting for something to process.” The Board found this knowingly false, given that he had checked his MyMCLE account 23 times in the prior days and knew reinstatement required both transcript reporting and fee payment — neither of which had occurred by 10:30 a.m. that day.
  • Criminal act (Rule 8.4(b)) — Judge Wright found Gray guilty of direct criminal contempt and fined him $200. Gray admitted this in his Answer, making it conclusive evidence of the violation.
  • Dishonest conduct (Rule 8.4(c)) — Flowing directly from the Rule 3.3(a) violation.
  • Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (Rule 8.4(d)) — His improper appearance delayed his clients’ potentially dispositive motion to dismiss by nearly a month and caused the court to expend needless resources on a contempt proceeding.

Mitigation & Aggravation

Mitigation: None. Gray’s unsworn statements about his father’s death and diligence in completing CLE credits were not presented as testimony and, in any event, would not have constituted legal mitigation given that he missed both the initial and grace period deadlines by wide margins.

Aggravation (substantial):

  • Experienced attorney (licensed since 2002; subject to CLE requirements for nearly 20 years)
  • Received at least 16 MCLE notices before removal; ignored them
  • Knowingly engaged in an irresponsible course of conduct, not a momentary lapse
  • Risk of harm to clients from delayed proceedings
  • No remorse; refused to acknowledge wrongdoing
  • Blamed CLE providers, the MCLE Board, and the ARDC for delays of his own making
  • Filed meritless pleadings and made unsubstantiated misconduct charges against Administrator’s counsel
  • Failed to fully cooperate in the disciplinary proceeding
  • Prior discipline: One-year suspension in 2018 for strikingly similar violations — unauthorized practice while removed from the master roll, false statements to a tribunal, dishonesty, and prejudicing the administration of justice

Recommendation

Majority (Nair, Edmond): The Board recommended a one-year suspension. The Board distinguished three factually analogous cases (JamesWittWiley) that each resulted in six-month suspensions, finding Gray’s misconduct more egregious due to his express dishonesty to the judge, the criminal contempt finding, and his significant recidivism. The majority declined to add an “until further order” (UFO) provision, noting Gray attended his hearing and showed marginally more cooperation than in his prior proceeding.

Dissent (Shiffman): 18-month suspension. The prior one-year suspension demonstrably failed to deter Gray’s recidivism, and a longer suspension is both justified and appropriate.

Comment: this is an experienced lawyer who failed to complete the 30 hours of continuing legal education that Illinois requires every two years and failed certify that he had completed his continuing legal education coursework. In my opinion, he made his situation much worse by failing to inform a judge that he was not, in fact, licensed to practice law. Attending CLE is time-consuming, but you have to follow the rules to remain licensed.

California Proposes Amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct re Artificial Intelligence

California Proposes Amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct re Artificial Intelligence

California is proposing new comments to the Rules of Professional Conduct to deal with artificial intelligence. These edits to the comments are the result of numerous decisions where lawyers used AI to create briefs and memoranda without checking to see if the citations were, in fact, real ones. Telling lawyers not to do this has not worked. California makes another attempt by proposing new comments to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Summary: California Proposed Amended Rules on Artificial Intelligence

The California State Bar is proposing amendments to six Rules of Professional Conduct to address lawyers’ use of artificial intelligence. The changes are targeted additions to existing rules rather than wholesale rewrites. Here is a rule-by-rule breakdown:


Rule 1.1 — Competence

The core rule text is unchanged. Two new comments are added:

  • Comment [1] expands the existing duty to keep abreast of legal developments to explicitly include AI, requiring lawyers to understand the “benefits and risks” of AI tools.
  • Comment [2] (new) requires lawyers to independently review, verify, and exercise professional judgmentover any AI-generated output used in client representation.

Rule 1.4 — Communication with Clients

Again, the rule text is unchanged. A new Comment [5] requires that when AI use presents a significant risk or materially affects the scope, cost, manner, or decision-making of a representation, the lawyer must communicate sufficient information about that AI use to allow the client to make informed decisions. The duty is contextual — lawyers must assess novelty of the technology, associated risks, scope of representation, and client sophistication.


Rule 1.6 — Confidentiality

A new Comment [2] significantly expands the definition of “reveal” as it applies to confidential information. Inputting client data into an AI tool now constitutes a potential disclosure of confidential information if it creates a material risk that the information could be accessed, retained, or used by the system or other users inconsistently with the duty of confidentiality. This is perhaps the most practically significant amendment.


Rule 3.3 — Candor Toward the Tribunal

A new Comment [3] directly addresses the problem of AI-generated legal citations — a clear response to high-profile incidents of lawyers submitting fabricated AI-generated case citations. It states that the duty of candor requires lawyers to verify the accuracy and existence of all cited authorities, including those generated or assisted by AI, before submission to any tribunal.


Rule 5.1 — Responsibilities of Managerial and Supervisory Lawyers

Comment [1] is amended to add governance of AI use to the list of internal policies that managing lawyers must implement. Firm-wide AI policies are thus now treated as a component of a manager’s baseline supervisory obligations under the Rules.


Rule 5.3 — Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants

The comment is amended to require that lawyers supervising nonlawyer staff provide instruction on AI use in the provision of legal services, alongside other ethical obligations. This is particularly relevant given the growing use of AI tools by paralegals and other support staff.


Key Takeaways

All amendments are comment-level additions — the black-letter rule text is largely preserved. Taken together, the proposed rules create an integrated framework: lawyers must understand AI (1.1), supervise its use (5.1, 5.3), protect client data when using it (1.6), disclose significant AI use to clients (1.4), and verify AI-generated legal authority before filing (3.3). Non-compliance with any of these obligations could form the basis for a disciplinary proceeding.

My comment: We all make mistakes. You should check any work that has your name on it for accuracy, even work by trusted colleagues. There is no reason to embarrass yourself by submitting a brief with false citations. If you screwed up, call me and I can often help you clean up the mess.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

State v. Hannah Renee Payne – Hallucinated Citations

State v. Hannah Renee Payne – Hallucinated Citations

This is an appeal from a criminal trial. The Georgia Supreme Court appears to have noticed that the prosecutor’s memorandum and proposed order (denying Ms. Payne a new trial) was prepared with hallucinated citations and was prepared by artificial intelligence. The case is an important one. Under Georgia law, if you are convicted of murder you receive a life sentence.

Hannah Payne was sentenced to life in prison for murder. She intervened after she witnessed a traffic collision and attempted to make a citizen’s arrest of a man who had engaged in reckless driving and had caused an accident. During the confrontation she shot the reckless driver who died. The jury apparently found that her actions were unreasonable and she was convicted of murder and sentenced to natural life in prison. The prosecutor apparently cited nonexistent cases in her briefs in the trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court. Unfortunately for the State, the trial court cited the nonexistent cases in its order denying Ms. Payne a new trial.

Ms. Payne’s appeal presents real issues. Did she have the right to do a citizen’s arrest of the victim? Were her actions in the altercation reasonable? Obviously, she has a right to pursue her appeal. There is a nonzero chance that the hallucinated citations played a role in the conviction of Ms. Payne and in the trial court’s decision to deny her new trial motion. She may still lose the appeal, but she is fortunate that the prosecutor made an obvious error in using artificial intelligence to draft briefs. This gives her appeal, which has some merit in my view, a chance of success. There is a group of people who believe that everyone charged with a crime is guilty. I do not share that view. Ms. Payne may have acted reasonably in drawing a gun to make a citizen’s arrest of a reckless driver. Her conviction may be unjust. Her sentence of life in prison is clearly unjust, but that is Georgia law. Without the prosecutor’s use of hallucinated cases, the conviction would have been affirmed and no one would have paid any attention to this case. A young woman’s life would be completely wasted behind bars.

The prosecutor will, no doubt, face discipline for the hallucinated case citations. That isn’t the real story. The real story is how few criminal cases actually receive the scrutiny they deserve.

Here are citations to some of the news stories covering this case:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/did-phantom-cases-end-murder-205550482.html

https://www.ajc.com/news/2026/03/chief-justice-presses-clayton-prosecutor-about-citing-cases-that-dont-exist/

https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/clayton-county/georgia-supreme-court-weighs-new-trial-woman-convicted-killing-driver-after-crash/TRAIXVOZJ5HPDKCPXEJ4XGITKY/

No Matter How Bad It Is, Always Participate In the Disciplinary Process

No Matter How Bad It Is, Always Participate In the Disciplinary Process

The Georgia Supreme Court accepted a Special Master’s recommendation to disbar a lawyer, William Joseph Cloud. The court noted that the lawyer failed to respond to disciplinary complaints arising from two client matters. Cloud, who had been administratively suspended in 2021 for failing to pay bar dues, was deemed to have admitted all factual allegations because he defaulted in the disciplinary proceedings.

Facts: In one matter a tattoo‑business client paid Cloud $2,500 to pursue litigation; after Cloud became ineligible to practice he failed to notify the court or client, ignored discovery, and the client suffered a default judgment and paid a $500 sanction before hiring new counsel. In the other matter a client entrusted Cloud $12,000 to redeem property sold at tax sale; Cloud never used or returned the funds and the client lost the opportunity to reclaim the property.

Rule violations and harm: The court found (by default) multiple ethics breaches, including abandonment of client matters, failures to communicate, mishandling and conversion of client funds, practicing while ineligible, and dishonesty. The misconduct caused actual harm — monetary loss and litigational prejudice — and was deemed knowing rather than merely negligent.

The court cited certain aggravating factors: conversion of client funds, pattern of neglect, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in practice. The only mitigating factor was a clean disciplinary record prior to these matters.

The Georgia Supreme Court accepted the Special Master’s recommendation and ordered Cloud disbarred.

Comments: Always participate in the process. Acknowledge that you made a mistake, even if you are going to face a severe sanction. Then you can at least apply for reinstatement or get on with your life in another trade or business. We can often help you resolve a matter, even an awful one, if you participate, say are sorry and try to make it right.

ARDC Hearing Board Recommends Disbarment for Conversion of Funds

ARDC Hearing Board Recommends Disbarment for Conversion of Funds

This is a case where the respondent attorney withdrew funds from an escrow account he set up for a client. The withdrawals were in excess of the amounts of his invoices.

“The Administrator charged Respondent in a two-count complaint with dishonestly misappropriating and failing to return over $294,000 in client or third-party funds, in violation of Rules 1.15(a), 1.15(d), and 8.4(c); and, in an unrelated matter, using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person in connection with Respondent’s interactions with his opposing counsel, in violation of Rule 4.4. The Hearing Board found that the Administrator proved that Respondent engaged in the charged misconduct and recommended that Respondent be disbarred…

Rule 1.15(a)

A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Ill. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.15(a). Rule 1.15(a) obligates attorneys holding client or third-party funds to safeguard those funds. In re Woods, 2014PR00181, M.R. 28568 (Mar. 20, 2017) (Hearing Bd. at 19). An attorney violates Rule 1.15(a) where the attorney uses client or third-party funds without authority, thereby causing the balance in the account into which those funds were deposited to fall below the amount the attorney should be holding. Id. We find that the Administrator proved that Respondent used, without authority, at least $294,550.87 that he was supposed to be holding for Plain Bay Sales, and therefore that he violated Rule 1.15(a).

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion of the evidence that Respondent and Katie Prudent presented directly conflicting testimony regarding whether or not Respondent was authorized to withdraw funds from the FBO for his own benefit. Consequently, our finding of misconduct rests primarily on our credibility determinations. In short, we must decide if we believe Respondent or Ms. Prudent.

We did not find Respondent’s testimony to be credible for a myriad of reasons. We found him to be evasive during portions of his testimony, particularly during the Administrator’s cross-examination of him, where he seemed to be striving to avoid answering the Administrator’s relatively straightforward questions. (See, e.g., Tr. 396-99.)

We also found numerous flaws and inconsistencies in his testimony. For example, in his May 24, 2021 response letter to the ARDC, he described the events that led to his purported conversation with Ms. Prudent where she supposedly authorized him to pay himself fees from the FBO account. In that letter, Respondent stating that Ms. Prudent only sent a partial payment for the bill dated July 3, 2019 and never paid the bill dated February 4, 2020, and he then he contacted her and complained about not getting paid promptly, after which they entered into the oral agreement allowing him to pay his fees from the FBO account. (Adm. Ex. 1 at 1.) But at his hearing, he called his letter inaccurate and claimed that the oral agreement occurred in August 2018. It seems obvious to us that Respondent revised the purported oral-agreement date because his withdrawals from the FBO account actually began in January 2019, more than a year before the oral-agreement date he provided in the May 24, 2021 letter.

On that point, we note that the reason Respondent provided in his letter to the ARDC as well as in his hearing testimony for wanting to withdraw funds from the FBO account was that he was not getting paid promptly. However, his office manager’s affidavit and his own testimony established that he was paid promptly through Invoice 7, dated June 10, 2019. It was not until Invoice 8 and Invoice 9, dated July 3, 2019 and October 2, 2019, respectively – more than six months after Respondent began withdrawing funds from the FBO account – that Plain Bay Sales made partial payments and took several months to pay the bills in full.

Furthermore, it defies common sense that Respondent would continue to send invoices and receive payment on those invoices while, at the same time, he was also taking money out of the FBO account purportedly in payment of additional legal work that was not included on the invoices. Yet, he did that for more than a year.

In addition, all but two of Respondent’s withdrawals from the FBO account were round numbers (e.g., $5,000, $7,500, $12,000, $25,000, etc.), as contrasted with the amounts charged on the invoices (e.g., $14,920, $17,280, $27,120, etc.), which adds to our skepticism that the withdrawals were for legal fees. Moreover, the only withdrawal amounts that were not round numbers were ostensibly payments for Invoice 8 and Invoice 10. As for Invoice 8, not only did that transfer occur a mere 13 days after Respondent issued it, but it is clear from the documentary evidence that Plain Bay Sales paid off that invoice over four payments, one of which Respondent received the day before he made his withdrawal. We also note that the double payment for Invoice 8 is clearly noted on the FBO account log attached to Holmes’ affidavit; yet, Respondent never attempted to refund any portion of the double payment to Plain Bay Sales. And as for Invoice 10, we find it wholly implausible that Respondent would withdraw purported fees of $33,890 on February 3, 2020 but then also send an invoice for an additional $27,520 a day later on February 4, 2020.

Respondent’s explanation for withdrawing funds from the FBO account at the same time that he was sending invoices and receiving payments for those invoices is equally implausible. He suggested that he used two different billing methods – one that involved sending the invoices and one that involved keeping track of his additional legal work and corresponding fees on a notepad and then occasionally crediting bills that were paid by subtracting them from the notepad-recorded fees. Further adding to our skepticism about Respondent’s explanation, Respondent testified that his handwritten time and billing notes that corresponded to his FBO account withdrawals were the only documents he destroyed following his termination from the case.

We further note that, based upon Respondent’s withdrawals from the FBO account and assuming he was still billing $400 per hour for his work, he would have worked over 700 hours and earned over $294,000 in fees, in addition to the 424 hours worked and $169,620 in fees he invoiced for (including Invoice 10). Considering all of the evidence regarding the work Respondent actually performed, the invoices he sent and received payment for, and the amounts he withdrew from the FBO, the math simply does not add up, literally and figuratively.

Finally, Respondent did not invoice for work after February 4, 2020. He also made no withdrawals from the FBO account after June 4, 2020, at which point the balance in the account was $936.49. Yet, he claims to have continued working on the matter without charging any fees until he was terminated on January 11, 2021. Given Respondent’s self-professed concern that he was not being paid timely and sufficiently for the work he was doing on the matter, it defies logic that he would continue working on the matter for free for six months. The more likely scenario is that his withdrawals had already depleted the FBO account by June 2020 and there was not much more he could take.

For these reasons, we find Respondent’s testimony about his withdrawals from the FBO account to be entirely not credible. We do not believe his claim that he withdrew money from the FBO account to pay his legal fees that he legitimately earned, nor that Ms. Prudent authorized him to do so.

Based primarily upon our credibility determinations, as well as the voluminous documentary evidence, we find that Ms. Prudent did not authorize Respondent to withdraw funds from the FBO account to pay his legal fees or for any other purpose. We therefore find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent used, without authority, $294,550.87 that he was supposed to be holding for Plain Bay Sales, and therefore that he violated Rule 1.15(a).

Comment: In re John Joseph Pappas, 2022 PR 00080.

Georgia Supreme Court Unimpressed with Capitol Rioter Pardoned by the President

Georgia Supreme Court Unimpressed with Capitol Rioter Pardoned by the President

The Georgia Supreme Court recently considered the case of W. McCall Calhoun, Jr., a member of the Georgia bar since 1990. Calhoun was subject to a bar complaint after he was “convicted of a felony and several misdemeanor federal offenses in connection with his participation in events at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.” The opinion explains that the Georgia Supreme Court “suspended him in an initial disciplinary matter pending the outcome of his appeal based on his violation of Rule 8.4(a)(2) (It shall be a violation of the Bar Rules for a lawyer to ‘be convicted of a felony.’)” After Calhoun was pardoned, the State Bar asked the Supreme Court to remand the disciplinary matter ton conduct a hearing. On remand, Calhoun filed a petition for voluntary discipline. Calhoun asked for a public reprimand. The State Bar agreed that a reprimand was appropriate.

The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the petition for voluntary discipline as follows:

Having reviewed the entire record in this case, we disagree with the parties that a public reprimand is appropriate here. While it is true that we have never directly examined a Rule 8.4(a)(8) violation before, this subsection of Rule 8.4(a) provides discipline for committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer and, therefore, Rule 8.4(a)(8) imposes discipline for conduct similar to that specified in Rule 8.4(a)(2), (3), and (4). Violations of those subsections in general are considered very serious. See, e.g., In the Matter of McCall, 314 Ga. 200, 206 (2022) (holding that “a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) is among the most serious violations with which a lawyer can be charged.”). And while violations of Rule 8.4(a)(2), (3), and (4) do not necessarily require it, they frequently result in disbarment. See In the Matter of Barnes, 320 Ga. 589, 590-91 (2024) (on Special Master’s report and recommendation, disbarring attorney who violated Rule 8.4(a)(2) by being convicted of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer and noting that “disbarment is an appropriate sanction in matters involving felony convictions for crimes of interference with the administration of justice, in this case felony obstruction of police”); In the Matter of Head, 320 Ga. 316, 316 (2024) (on Special Master’s report and recommendation, disbarring attorney who violated Rule 8.4(a)(3) by pleading guilty to a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, with the Special Master defining “moral turpitude” to include actions “done contrary to justice”); In the Matter of Cummings, 291 Ga. 654, 654-55 (2012) (disbarring attorney on notice of discipline who violated Rule 8.4(a)(4) by submitting invoices for work she did not perform and making false allegations of improper conduct against city officials). The cases involving Rule 8.4(a)(2) and (3) violations are particularly relevant here, given that while Calhoun may have ultimately been pardoned for federal offenses, pardons do not prevent disbarment for the underlying activity that formed the basis of the crime that was later pardoned. See Scott v. Leathers, 78 Ga. App. 661, 664 (1949)(“disbarred attorney may not automatically be reinstated either by a special act of the legislature … or an executive pardon” (internal citations omitted)); Payne v. State, 52 Ga. App. 425, 426 (1936) (“reinstatement to the bar [does] not follow automatically from the grant of the pardon.”).[3] See also In the Matter of Beck, 264 Ind. 141, 146-47 (1976) (citing Payne as part of the overwhelming line of authority nationwide to this effect).

Moreover, while it is true that Calhoun has been suspended from practicing law since 2023, it would be improper to impose discipline in partial reliance on an involuntary interim suspension because we do not consider such a suspension to be mitigating. See In the Matter of Warnock, 272 Ga. 2, 4 (2000) (“[w]e disagree with the special master’s conclusion that Warnock’s … interim suspension … [is a] mitigating factor[ ]”). See generally In the Matter of Huber, 320 Ga. 314, 315 (2024) (accepting petition for voluntary surrender of license nunc pro tunc, because attorney had “demonstrated that he voluntarily stopped the practice of law” (emphasis added)).

Even in the absence of his admission here that he violated Rule 8.4(a)(8) based on a felony offense, Calhoun admitted to violating Rule 8.4(a)(8) based on a misdemeanor criminal act, which if not pardoned could have resulted in a Rule 8.4(a)(3) violation. See generally Calhoun I, 317 Ga. 726, 734 (noting that the “Special Master’s determination that Calhoun violated Rule 8.4(a)(3) is premature, as the Special Master made no effort to analyze whether the conduct underlying Calhoun’s misdemeanor convictions involved moral turpitude or related to his fitness to practice law”).

Moreover, as the State Bar noted in its response to the petition for voluntary discipline, the criminal acts committed by Calhoun reflect adversely on his fitness as a lawyer. See Rule 8.4(a)(8). As part of the State Bar’s response to Calhoun’s petition for voluntary discipline, it introduced Calhoun’s social media posts from January 6, 2021, which clearly suggest that he intended to participate, willingly and knowingly, in a violent takeover of the Capitol to overturn the 2020 election and that he sought to interfere with the administration of justice. Calhoun commented on social media that he was part of a group that “physically took control of the Capital [sic] building in a hand to hand hostile takeover”; they “occupied the Capitol and shut down the Government”; he was one of the “first two hundred to rush up the steps and inside after the Vanguard had clashed hard with the police and had made them retreat”; they brought the “Government to its knees”; and they were “all going back armed for war.” FC at 101. In addition, he commented that once in the Capitol building, they were met with a police barricade, which they “push[ed] through,” and that this caused “some people [to] bleed[] pretty badly.” Id. at 100. Even more concerning were his comments directed towards certain members of Congress that the group intended to harm. Calhoun stated that they “stormed upstairs… looking for members of Congress” and that they then:

kicked in Nancy Pelosi’s office door and pushed down the hall towards her inner sanctum, the mob howling with rage — Crazy Nancy probably would have been torn into little pieces, but she was nowhere to be seen — then a swat [sic] team showed, and we retreated back to the rotunda and continued our hostile take over of the Capitol Building.

FC at 102-03.

If Calhoun was as involved as his posts indicate, then it is hard for us to see how anything less than disbarment can be accepted here. Accordingly, we reject the petition for voluntary discipline and remand this matter for further proceedings. See ITMO Joshi, 315 Ga. 477, 483-84 (2023) (rejecting petition for voluntary discipline and remanding the matter for consideration of additional serious allegations). Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.

Georgia has been a bulwark of American democracy. The Georgia state authorities, all Republicans, certified Biden’s win in the state in 2020 and resisted numerous calls by the President to reverse the result or say the election was stolen. The ruling by the Georgia Supreme Court is consistent with that law and order tradition. This is a well written and thoughtful opinion by a court that takes attorney discipline seriously, even when the politics has changed. I welcome this decision by the Georgia Supreme Court and thank them for showing a degree of intellectual honesty and courage rarely shown these days.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

Source https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2207534337628310514&q=in+the+matter+of+w.+McCall+calhoun&hl=en&as_sdt=40000006&as_ylo=2026