In the Matter of Discipline of William H. Jackson, III (Nev. 2026)
Background
The Nevada Supreme Court approved a conditional admission agreement disciplining attorney William H. Jackson, III for sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer. Jackson paid Hernando Alberto Heredia — operating through a business called “Tus Defensores” — for referring a personal injury case to Jackson. The payment came out of Jackson’s attorney fees from the client’s settlement and exceeded the reasonable cost of advertising for a single matter.
Rules Violated
RPC 5.4(a) — Professional independence of a lawyer (fee-sharing with nonlawyers)
RPC 7.2(a) — Attorney advertising
Analytical Framework
The Court applied a four-factor test drawn from In re Discipline of Lerner, 124 Nev. 1232 (2008):
Duty violated — Duties owed to the profession
Mental state — Knowing violation
Injury — Actual, moderate injury to the profession
Aggravating/mitigating factors (see below)
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
The court found several aggravating factors, (1) a prior disciplinary offense; (2) the selfish motive; and (3) the fact that the lawyer had substantial experience in his practice. In mitigation, the lawyer was cooperative and made full disclosure and was remorseful. The prior offense occurred a long time ago.
Discipline Imposed
Six-month-and-one-day suspension, stayed for 24 months, conditioned on:
12 additional CLE hours in legal ethics
No professional association with Heredia or his entities
Engagement of a law practice mentor with monthly State Bar reports
Maintaining good standing and no future misconduct
$1,000 fine (due within 30 days)
$2,500 in disciplinary proceeding costs (due within 30 days)
Key Takeaway
This case illustrates that Nevada treats referral fee arrangements with nonlawyer lead-generation businesses as serious professional misconduct. Even where mitigating factors exist, a knowing violation of the fee-sharing prohibition warrants suspension as the baseline sanction. Practitioners should be particularly cautious about payments to nonlawyer referral sources that exceed what would constitute legitimate advertising costs, as that distinction appeared to be a critical fact here.
If you have a question about something related to legal ethics, contact us. It is always better to get advice before proceeding into questionable territory. We can often help.
Gray, a licensed Illinois attorney since 2002, was removed from the master roll on December 1, 2024 for failing to complete his mandatory CLE hours — earning only 4 of the required 30 credits by the initial deadline and none during the grace period. He was reinstated on January 8, 2025 at 4:00 p.m., after finally completing his hours and paying a $400 reinstatement fee.
Misconduct
During the period of removal, Gray engaged in multiple violations:
Unauthorized practice of law (Rule 5.5(a)) — On January 7, he caused three trial subpoenas to be issued and emailed exhibits to opposing counsel. On January 8, he appeared in court on behalf of clients, including a corporate defendant that legally required licensed counsel.
False statement to a tribunal (Rule 3.3(a)) — When Judge Wright asked whether he was authorized to practice, Gray stated he believed he was and that his credentials were “just waiting for something to process.” The Board found this knowingly false, given that he had checked his MyMCLE account 23 times in the prior days and knew reinstatement required both transcript reporting and fee payment — neither of which had occurred by 10:30 a.m. that day.
Criminal act (Rule 8.4(b)) — Judge Wright found Gray guilty of direct criminal contempt and fined him $200. Gray admitted this in his Answer, making it conclusive evidence of the violation.
Dishonest conduct (Rule 8.4(c)) — Flowing directly from the Rule 3.3(a) violation.
Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (Rule 8.4(d)) — His improper appearance delayed his clients’ potentially dispositive motion to dismiss by nearly a month and caused the court to expend needless resources on a contempt proceeding.
Mitigation & Aggravation
Mitigation: None. Gray’s unsworn statements about his father’s death and diligence in completing CLE credits were not presented as testimony and, in any event, would not have constituted legal mitigation given that he missed both the initial and grace period deadlines by wide margins.
Aggravation (substantial):
Experienced attorney (licensed since 2002; subject to CLE requirements for nearly 20 years)
Received at least 16 MCLE notices before removal; ignored them
Knowingly engaged in an irresponsible course of conduct, not a momentary lapse
Risk of harm to clients from delayed proceedings
No remorse; refused to acknowledge wrongdoing
Blamed CLE providers, the MCLE Board, and the ARDC for delays of his own making
Filed meritless pleadings and made unsubstantiated misconduct charges against Administrator’s counsel
Failed to fully cooperate in the disciplinary proceeding
Prior discipline: One-year suspension in 2018 for strikingly similar violations — unauthorized practice while removed from the master roll, false statements to a tribunal, dishonesty, and prejudicing the administration of justice
Recommendation
Majority (Nair, Edmond): The Board recommended a one-year suspension. The Board distinguished three factually analogous cases (James, Witt, Wiley) that each resulted in six-month suspensions, finding Gray’s misconduct more egregious due to his express dishonesty to the judge, the criminal contempt finding, and his significant recidivism. The majority declined to add an “until further order” (UFO) provision, noting Gray attended his hearing and showed marginally more cooperation than in his prior proceeding.
Dissent (Shiffman): 18-month suspension. The prior one-year suspension demonstrably failed to deter Gray’s recidivism, and a longer suspension is both justified and appropriate.
Comment: this is an experienced lawyer who failed to complete the 30 hours of continuing legal education that Illinois requires every two years and failed certify that he had completed his continuing legal education coursework. In my opinion, he made his situation much worse by failing to inform a judge that he was not, in fact, licensed to practice law. Attending CLE is time-consuming, but you have to follow the rules to remain licensed.
The Georgia Supreme Court accepted a Special Master’s recommendation to disbar a lawyer, William Joseph Cloud. The court noted that the lawyer failed to respond to disciplinary complaints arising from two client matters. Cloud, who had been administratively suspended in 2021 for failing to pay bar dues, was deemed to have admitted all factual allegations because he defaulted in the disciplinary proceedings.
Facts: In one matter a tattoo‑business client paid Cloud $2,500 to pursue litigation; after Cloud became ineligible to practice he failed to notify the court or client, ignored discovery, and the client suffered a default judgment and paid a $500 sanction before hiring new counsel. In the other matter a client entrusted Cloud $12,000 to redeem property sold at tax sale; Cloud never used or returned the funds and the client lost the opportunity to reclaim the property.
Rule violations and harm: The court found (by default) multiple ethics breaches, including abandonment of client matters, failures to communicate, mishandling and conversion of client funds, practicing while ineligible, and dishonesty. The misconduct caused actual harm — monetary loss and litigational prejudice — and was deemed knowing rather than merely negligent.
The court cited certain aggravating factors: conversion of client funds, pattern of neglect, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in practice. The only mitigating factor was a clean disciplinary record prior to these matters.
The Georgia Supreme Court accepted the Special Master’s recommendation and ordered Cloud disbarred.
Comments: Always participate in the process. Acknowledge that you made a mistake, even if you are going to face a severe sanction. Then you can at least apply for reinstatement or get on with your life in another trade or business. We can often help you resolve a matter, even an awful one, if you participate, say are sorry and try to make it right.
On February 3, 2026, the Georgia Supreme Court accepted the voluntary surrender of a law license by a lawyer who forged a court order. The case first came to the Georgia Supreme Court on a petition for a three-year suspension, a suspension the court rejected and remanded. On remand, the attorney petitioned to voluntarily surrender his law license.
Here is the description of the facts:
In early 2020, York represented a client who was arrested and charged with misdemeanor family violence against her husband. She was released on bond on the condition that she not contact her husband, but she was arrested a second time based on an allegation that she had violated the no-contact condition. Thereafter, she was again released on bond with the added conditions that she wear an electronic monitoring device on her ankle and pay a monthly monitoring fee of $347.52.
York forged the signatures of a judge and an assistant district attorney on a court order dated March 4, 2020 that purportedly authorized the removal of the monitoring device from the client’s ankle. As a result, he was charged with felony forgery, and he entered into a 36-month Pretrial Diversion Agreement (“PDA”) with the district attorney’s office to OCGA § 15-18-80, requiring him, for the duration of the PDA, to (1) refrain from drug and alcohol use; (2) submit to random drug tests; (3) continue counseling with a psychologist until released; (4) continue counseling with a substance abuse counselor until released; (5) attend at least one weekly drug/alcohol support group meeting; (6) attend monthly legal mentoring sessions; (7) follow the Bar’s recommendations; and (8) “not practice law until reinstated by the State Bar of Georgia.”
The ARDC Hearing Board recommended a one-year suspension for an attorney who engaged in frivolous litigation and assisted a client in committing bankruptcy fraud. In re Xydakis, 2021PR00104. The order is 81 pages long. I have done my best to summarize the key findings of the order and most important rule violations.
One of the charges asserted that the Respondent engaged in frivolous litigation on behalf of a client, Marshall Spiegel, who was the Secretary of the Board of a condominium association. “Count I charged Respondent with (1) bringing or defending a proceeding, or asserting or controverting an issue therein, with no basis for doing so that is not frivolous; (2) making statements of material fact or law to atribunal which the lawyer knows are false; (3) using means in representing a client that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person; (4) engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and (5) making statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the integrity of a judge, in violation of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1, 3.3(a)(1), 4.4(a), 8.4(d), and 8.2(a), respectively, arising from his bringing and maintaining lawsuits on behalf of his client against a condominium association board and other individuals and entities.”
The Hearing Board summarized the litigation as follows:
In the fall of 2015, the president of the board of directors of the 1618 Sheridan Road Condominium Association (“Association”) resigned. At that time, Marshall Spiegel was serving as secretary of theAssociation’s board and Valerie Hall was serving as treasurer. Following the president’s resignation, Spiegel declared himself acting president, over Hall’s objections. (Ans. at par. 2.)
On October 22, 2015, Respondent filed a complaint on behalf of Spiegel, the Association, and Chicago Title Trust Co., seeking to remove Hall from the Association’s board of directors. The complaint alleged that,because Hall’s condominium unit was owned by a trust rather than by Hall herself, she was not considered a unitowner and therefore could not be a board member. The lawsuit, filed in the Chancery Division of Cook County Circuit Court, was docketed as case number 15 CH 15594. (Ans. at par. 4; Adm. Ex. 1.)
On October 26, 2015, Respondent filed a second lawsuit on behalf of the same plaintiffs for defamation,invasion of privacy, and breach of contract against Hall. The second lawsuit, filed in the Law Division of CookCounty Circuit Court, was docketed as case number 15 L 10817, and, like the first, sought to remove Hall from the Association’s board. It also added a new defendant and additional counts, including allegations that Hall wrongfully accused Spiegel of stealing her suitcases and filed a false police report in which she accused Spiegel of taking lawn furniture. (Ans. at par. 6; Adm. Ex. 3.)
On October 30, 2015, Respondent filed a first amended complaint in case number 15 L 10817, adding two new defendants and additional counts. (Ans. at par. 7; Adm. Ex. 4.) On November 2, 2015, Hall filed an answer to the first amended complaint, and attached the deed to her condominium unit. She also filed acounterclaim in which she sought a declaration that, among other things, she was a unit owner and therefore qualified to sit on the Association board; that all of the board’s actions following the former president’s resignation were proper; and that Respondent was not the Association’s authorized legal counsel and therefore had no authority to act on behalf of the Association. (Ans. at par. 8; Resp. Ex. 57.) Also on November 2, 2015, Respondent voluntarily dismissed case number 15 CH 15594. (Ans. at par. 5.)
On November 24, 2015, Respondent filed a second amended complaint in case number 15 L 10817, removing the Association as a plaintiff and adding an additional defendant and new counts, including allegations that one of the defendant unit owners spied on Spiegel and moved large water cooler bottles in front of Spiegel’s door. (Adm. Ex. 7.) On December 2, 2015, Respondent filed a counter and third-party complaint onbehalf of the plaintiffs in case number 15 L 10817 against Hall, her counsel, and the Association’s counsel,alleging that they interfered with Spiegel’s business expectancy with Respondent by filing a counterclaim that caused Spiegel’s insurance carrier to refuse to hire Respondent to defend Spiegel, which caused Spiegel to have to expend his own funds. The next day, Respondent filed a third amended complaint against the same five defendants named in the second amended complaint but adding additional counts, including allegations that one of the defendants installed horizontal blinds without prior board approval. (Ans. at par. 9; Adm. Exs. 8, 9.)
On December 31, 2015, the Association filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive Relief against Spiegel in the Chancery Division of Cook County Circuit Court, docketed as case number 15 CH 18825. (Ans.at par. 11.) On January 11, 2016, the Association moved the court for a temporary restraining order (TRO) torestrain Spiegel from continuing to prevent the board from functioning. The court granted the Association’s TRO. (Ans. at pars. 11-13; Adm. Ex. 10.)
On February 8, 2016, Respondent filed a fourth amended complaint in case number 15 L 10817, which alleged 25 counts against 10 defendants, including Hall’s counsel and the Association’s counsel. As to theattorney-defendants, the fourth amended complaint contained the same allegations regarding interference with business expectancy that were raised in the earlier- filed counter and third-party complaint. (Ans. at pars. 15, 16; Adm. Ex. 17.)
On April 8, 2016, Respondent filed an additional lawsuit in the Law Division of Cook County CircuitCourt, which was docketed as case number 16 L 3564. (Ans. at par. 17.) In that lawsuit, Respondent brought claims on behalf of Spiegel against his neighbors, Corrine and William McClintic, alleging that the McClintics were seeking to rent their unit in the 1618 Sheridan Road building when they were not permitted to do so under the condominium declarations, and that, as a result, Spiegel suffered at least $50,000 in damages. Respondent later filed a first amended complaint in that matter, adding additional defendants and counts. (Ans. at par. 18; Adm. Exs. 18, 19.)
On May 27, 2016, the Association, the Association board, and other residents who were parties to the Spiegel litigation moved to consolidate the three active Cook County cases. On September 28, 2016, the trialcourt consolidated cases 15 CH 18825 and 16 L 3564 into case 15 L 10817. (Ans. at par. 19.)
On June 14, 2017, Judge Moira Johnson granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss all 25 counts of thefourth amended complaint in the 15 L 10817 case on the basis that none of the claims stated a cause of action, andordered Respondent to seek leave of the court to replead any amended complaint. Judge Johnson also struck all33 counts of the first amended complaint in case number 16 L 3564. (Ans. at par. 20; Adm. Ex. 22 at 70-79; Adm. Ex. 23.).”
Eventually the case was transferred to Judge Brennan who awarded sanctions exceeding $1.0 million against Respondent and his client. Sadly the conduct did not cease. “Following entry of the orders imposing sanctions on Spiegel and Respondent, a number of news outlets and online publications ran stories about the sanctions awards. In April 2020, Respondent filed nine separate complaints on behalf of The Law Offices of John Xydakis, P.C. and himself, individually, against various publications, alleging that their reporting about the sanctions award against him was defamatory. One of thecomplaints was against the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin. The Chicago Daily Law Bulletin’s article quoted attorneys John Schriver and Eugene Murphy, whom Respondent also named as defendants in that lawsuit. In May 2021, the court granted a motion to dismiss filed by Schriver and his law firm, and the case was dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. The remaining eight cases were either dismissed for want of prosecution or voluntarily dismissed by Respondent. (Ans. at pars. 43-53; Adm. Exs. 59-60, 62, 64, 66-70, 72-73, 75.)”
The Respondent also accused Judge Brennan of engaging in ex parte communications. These allegations were found to be false. “The record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever that Judge Brennan engaged in ex parte communications. Even Respondent’s own testimony shows that, at most, he became suspicious that JudgeBrennan may have communicated with another attorney when, at a hearing in February 2018, she told him that he had not listened to Judge Johnson or anyone else, and then, in another hearing in March 2018, first said thatshe had not spoken with counsel at all and then said that she had not spoken with counsel about the case. (See Tr. 1092, 1094-95.)
But mere suspicion is an insufficient basis for an attack on the integrity of a judge. “A reasonable beliefmust be based on objective facts. Thus, subjective belief, suspicion, speculation, or conjecture does notconstitute a reasonable belief.” In re Walker, 2014PR00132, M.R. 28453 (March 20, 2017) (Hearing Bd. at 21); see also Greanias, 01 SH 117 (Hearing Bd. at 43, 57) (attorney had “no factual or evidentiary basis” for her allegations, which were “no more than conjecture and personal belief;” she therefore made the allegations with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity). Moreover, itis clear from even a cursory reading of the transcript of the February 2018 hearing that Judge Brennan was referring to Respondent’s failure to abide by previous judges’ rulings when she said he did not listen to Judge Johnson or anyone else.
In addition, at the March 2018 hearing, and in stipulated testimony in this matter, Judge Brennan unequivocally denied that she had engaged in ex parte communications with any of the defense counsel. Similarly, Gene Murphy, the defense counsel with whom Respondent claims Judge Brennan communicated, denied having any ex parte communications with Judge Brennan or any of her staff. He explained that he may have had brief conversations with the judge’s clerk about administrative matters, but never talked about the substance of the case with the judge or any of her staff. He further testified that he would never do such a thing.We found Murphy to be credible and accept his testimony that he never engaged in ex parte communications with Judge Brennan or any of her staff.
The documentary evidence presented by Respondent does not alter our finding. At most, it shows that there were a few short phone calls between Murphy and Judge Brennan’s chambers, and that Murphy notedconversations with “judge’s clerk” on his billing statements. That evidence is consistent with Murphy’s testimony that he occasionally contacted Judge Brennan’s chambers about administrative matters, such as when a motion would be heard.
Because there is no objective evidence in the record that Judge Brennan engaged in ex parte communications, we find that Respondent had no reasonable basis for believing his statements to be true. He therefore recklessly disregarded the truth in making his false accusation, and in so doing, violated Rule 8.2(a).”
The Hearing Board found violations of Rule 3.1. “We find that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that, as of November 2015 if not earlier, Respondent knew that his attack on Hall’s unit ownership and eligibility to serve on the Association board was legally and factually baseless; yet, he maintained those claims against Hall until Judge Brennan denied him leave to file the fifth amended complaint in February 2018. By this conduct, he violated Rule 3.3(a)(1).”
The Board also found a violation of Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Based upon our findings that Respondent violated Rule 3.1, and based upon the totality of thecircumstances relating to Respondent’s filings and tactics in the Spiegel litigation, we also find that he engaged inconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by wasting the time, money, and other resources of opposingparties, opposing counsel, and the judicial system by bringing and pursuing baseless and frivolous claims. It is apparent from the court documents and transcripts in the record that Respondent’s excessive and oppressive litigation tactics, particularly his filing of the motion seeking leave to file the fifth amended complaint, required the parties and court to expend resources to address his motion and various filings. Among other things, the defendants were required to prepare written responses to and attend another lengthy hearing on the motion for leaveto file the fifth amended complaint, and the court was required to hold a hearing and handle a subsequent motionfor reconsideration. We therefore find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d).
Comment: the Respondent was and is clearly a talented lawyer. Somehow, in my opinion, he lost sight of his role as an advocate and became so committed to winning the case at any cost that he lost sight of the rules. How is it that someone with extensive courtroom experience loses sight of the rules and embarks on a campaign of frivolous litigation and abuse of the judiciary? There must have been multiple clues delivered to him that his behavior was not appropriate, yet he persisted.
Lawyers continued to use AI to generate briefs and other legal pleadings. Somehow they have not learned yet that the AI can hallucinate cases (make cases up) if you ask it to draft a brief. An Illinois lawyer recently used generative AI in a brief for the appellate court and then tried to deflect responsibility when he was questioned about it.
The case is In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App 4th 241427. The discussion of the transgression is fairly extensive:
¶ 42 The circuit court of Sangamon County appointed Mr. Panichi on November 4, 2024, to represent respondent-appellant in this accelerated appeal from the termination of respondent’s parental rights filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). After an in-depth review of the briefs, this court recognized that Mr. Panichi cited eight apparently nonexistent cases in respondent’s opening and reply briefs. In one instance, he provided a direct quote from one of these cases. Concerned that respondent’s briefs contained citations to apparently nonexistent cases, this court, on its own motion, ordered Mr. Panichi to file copies of “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614″; “In re A.G., 2022 IL App (1st) 220119″; “In re R.C., 195 Ill. App. 3d 827 (1st Dist. 1990)”; “In re R.D.S., 2021 IL App (2d) 200092″; “In re M.H., Jr., 196 Ill. App. 3d 976 (1st Dist. 1990)”; “In re Brandon E., 382 Ill. App. 3d 389 (2d Dist. 2008)”; “In re K.L.P., 381 Ill. App. 3d 817 (4th Dist. 2008)”; and “In re Ca. B., 386 Ill. App. 3d 507 (2d Dist. 2008).” We further ordered Mr. Panichi to appear before this court personally and show cause why he should not be sanctioned.
¶ 43 On June 16, 2025, Mr. Panichi filed a two-page response to this court’s rule to show cause entitled “Verified Memorandum and Response to June 10, 2025, Order re Rule 375 Sanctions.” He stated in paragraph 2(a) of his response that “the following two cases are valid, published Illinois Appellate Court decisions and were properly cited,” and he cited “In re Brandon A., 395 Ill. App. 3d 224 (4th Dist. 2009),” and “In re Adoption of K.L.P., 316 Ill. App. 3d 110 (4th Dist. 2000).” In paragraph 2(b), he stated that “the following case is a valid published decision but was incorrectly cited in the brief,” and he cited “In re M.F., 304 Ill. App. 3d 236 (5th Dist. 1999).” In paragraph 2(c) of his response, he admitted that the “remaining five citations contained in the Appellant’s Brief were determined to be invalid or nonexistent.” He attached copies of the first three decisions referenced in his response.
¶ 44 Mr. Panichi appeared before this court personally on June 18, 2025. The proceedings were recorded. He acknowledged that he was familiar with the principles of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct 1, 2020) and the principles of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010 Rules 1.1, 3.1, 3.3 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010), and Rule 8.4 (eff. July 1, 2024). He stated that he had been appointed to handle this appeal by the circuit court of Sangamon County and was compensated for his work at the rate of $150 per hour, for a total of $6,925. He did not intend to submit any further invoices for this case. He later addressed this amount, explaining that it “was more than [he] usually charge[s]” and this case “was out of the ordinary in terms of time spent” because his office “did some exceptional work trying to get some other information before the court” by filing “a brief trying to open up the proofs,” but he did not remember the matter exactly.
¶ 45 Regarding his response in paragraph 2(a), the court pointed out to Mr. Panichi that despite his claim that Brandon A., 395 Ill. App. 3d 224, and Adoption of K.L.P., 316 Ill. App. 3d 110, were “valid” cases that “were properly cited,” he had actually cited in his brief “In re Brandon E., 382 Ill. App. 3d 389 (2d Dist. 2008),” and “In re K.L.P., 381 Ill. App. 3d 817 (4th Dist. 2008),” which were completely different citations. (We also noted that Adoption of K.L.P. is a Second District case, not a Fourth District case, as Mr. Panichi wrote in his response.) The court further observed that neither Brandon A. nor Adoption of K.L.P. supports the propositions for which “Brandon E.” and “K.L.P.” were originally cited in his opening brief. Mr. Panichi stated that he was not currently familiar with the content of the cases but claimed that he had been so at one time. He admitted that he did not read either of these decisions before filing his response to the court’s rule to show cause. He later admitted that he misread the court’s rule to show cause as citing “Brandon A.,” when it cited “Brandon E.” He acknowledged that he did not list a citation for “Brandon E.” in his response and never looked up whether “Brandon E.” existed.
¶ 46 Regarding his response in paragraph 2(b), the court noted during the hearing that M.F., 304 Ill. App. 3d 236, the case Mr. Panichi claimed to have intended to cite, did not contain the quotation for which he cited “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614,” in his reply brief. Mr. Panichi admitted that he did not know where he obtained the quotation and did not believe it was accurate. The court stated that Mr. Panichi may have persisted in misleading the court in his statements in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of his response.
¶ 47 Mr. Panichi later explained that his miscitation in his briefs of the three cases he attached to his response to the rule to show cause “might be an example of poor lawyering, poor arguing, stretching principles, I don’t have an answer for that.” However, he then claimed that “to the best of [his] knowledge, [these cases] were cited for the appropriate principles.” He admitted, though, that he had read only one of the three cases he attached to his response and could not remember which one. He further explained that he believed that the court’s rule to show cause asked only for him to identify which cases existed, not to argue how those cases applied.
¶ 48 The court then turned to Mr. Panichi’s response in paragraph 2(c) and asked how those five admittedly nonexistent citations came to appear in his brief. Mr. Panichi initially clarified that he did not claim to have an “excuse,” just an “explanation.” He also informed the court that he had already notified Judge Karen Tharp, who appointed him as counsel in this appeal, as well as his private clients whose appeals were pending, about these proceedings. He then admitted that in preparing the briefs and conducting research in this case, he used artificial intelligence (AI) to write a draft of the brief, then “looked it over and [he] did not read the cases that were in support of the brief.” He further explained that at the time he filed the briefs in this case, he was “extremely busy” and “was not thorough enough.” He stated that his use of AI was prompted by “a perfect storm” of “temptation of AI out there at a time when [he] was busy and trying to meet deadlines.” He had since learned about AI “hallucinations,” in which the AI “dreams things up when it doesn’t have an answer.” He acknowledged that he should have read the cases that the AI presented to him. He additionally admitted that he was “between research software” at the time he prepared the briefs in this case but had since signed up with Westlaw. He informed the court that he did not intend to use AI going forward.
¶ 49 Mr. Panichi admitted that “the whole thing stems from the fact that [he] barely did any personal work [him]self on this appeal.” He stated that he “was careless” and “reckless when [he] did it” and “was wrong to do that.” Mr. Panichi then stated:
“I don’t have any reason that the court shouldn’t sanction me, except for the fact that I didn’t do it intentionally. I did it carelessly, and recklessly, I hadn’t done it before, and if I’m lucky enough to be able to continue practicing before the appellate court, I’m not going to do it again.”
He acknowledged that while he relied on the legal assistant in his office a great deal, he, as the attorney, was ultimately responsible in this matter. He stated, “[W]hatever happens, I deserve whatever consequences fall, and I’m willing to accept them.” Mr. Panichi asked that no sanctions be imposed against respondent, as he was responsible, and further asked the court to consider allowing him to file an amended brief. He stated that if he were allowed to file an amended brief, he would essentially cite all new cases and read them.
¶ 50 This court informed Mr. Panichi that when it was discovered that the cases cited in his briefs apparently did not exist and did not support the assertions in his briefs, the court felt compelled to leave no stone unturned to determine whether these cases existed. The court noted the research done “was significant and time consuming.” As an example, the court explained that when looking into the citation of “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614,” Westlaw and the Illinois Courts website confirmed that no case matching that citation existed. There were 20 Illinois cases titled “In re M.F.,” but none of those cases contained the quotation included in Mr. Panichi’s reply brief or any similar statement. Moreover, no Second District case existed under case No. 21-0614, though there was a Fourth District case with case No. 21-0614, People v. Taylor, 2022 IL App (4th) 210614-U, which was irrelevant. The quote included in Mr. Panichi’s brief and attributed to “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614,” “incarceration does not preclude a finding of reasonable progress if efforts are made,” did not exist in any case from Illinois, any other state, or any federal court, in its entirety. Even a part of the quote—”incarceration does not preclude”—did not exist in any Illinois cases, but it did exist in 57 cases across the country, most of which were to the effect of “incarceration does not preclude termination of parental rights.” This was the breadth of the work the court did in relation to just one of the eight nonexistent cases Mr. Panichi cited in his brief. The court noted that it was explaining this process to Mr. Panichi to illustrate how seriously the court took this matter, as well as the impact of Mr. Panichi’s actions on the court’s ability to do its other work efficiently.
¶ 51 When asked during the proceedings if he had any infirmities that would contribute to his carelessness in this case and his ability to practice law, Mr. Panichi stated that other than a hearing loss, he had “typical short term memory loss” and was overwhelmed by paperwork, but “to the best of [his] knowledge, [he] retain[s] 80, 90% of [his] faculties and memory on other matters” and believed he is competent to practice law.
¶ 52 On June 27, 2025, this court ordered Mr. Panichi to file an affidavit with a copy of any petition for fees and costs that he filed in the Sangamon County circuit court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 299 (eff. Jan. 1, 2024), along with documentation of his receipt of payment. He did so on June 30, 2025. His affidavit and petition confirmed that he was compensated in the amount of $6,925.62 by the Sangamon County treasurer for his work in connection with his appointment in this appeal.
The result: “For the reasons articulated below, we find that Mr. Panichi violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and order that (1) Mr. Panichi disgorge the payment of $6,925.62 he received for his work on this appeal; (2) Mr. Panichi pay $1,000 as monetary sanctions to the clerk of the Fourth District Appellate Court; and (3) the clerk of the Fourth District Appellate Court send a copy of this opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.”
Comment: This is my opinion. Obviously, the lawyer made two errors. The first was using generative AI without cite checking the brief to determine if the cases cited were real. The second more serious error was trying to claim that he miss cited real cases. The appellate court had to do some extensive work to determine whether the cases were real and were miss cited. They were not miss cited. They simply had names similar to the hallucinated cases. No matter how much we advise lawyers not to use generative AI without doing a full cite check, lawyers are unable to resist this temptation. Do your own work or face embarrassment or worse. I predict that the ARDC will open an investigation and possibly prosecute the lawyer for attempting to mislead the appellate court with his claims that two of the cases were actually just miss cited.
Comment: the people who run large law firms live in fear of their partners and clients. The decision to cave in to Trump Administration demands is in line with the people I remember at the large law firms. They made those decisions even though they knew acceptance of Trump demands would impair their professional independence. By firing Simpson Thatcher, Microsoft has done what clients should be expected to do, terminate gutless advocates. Remember all decisions by large firms are done out of fear, not principle.
An Illinois lawyer was suspended for one year and until further order of court because he practiced law in Michigan without a license and did not tell his employer the truth. The Hearing Board summarized its findings in this fashion:
The allegations deemed admitted establish that Respondent made false statements to his employer, a Michigan law firm, about the status of his admission to the Michigan bar, by stating he had applied for admission when he had not and that his application had been delayed when he had not actually submitted an application. In addition, Respondent held him himself out to Michigan clients as authorized to practice law when he had not been admitted to practice in Michigan and had been removed from the master roll of attorneys authorized to practice law in Illinois due to his failure to complete his Illinois registration. By this conduct, Respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c)* of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010) (Counts I and II), and practiced law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, in violation of Rule 5.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010) (Count II).
The lawyer’s failure to participate in the discipline process undoubtedly made his situation much worse. This is an unfortunate story but the discipline is correct in that he was practicing without a license.
The ARDC Hearing Board recently decided the case of Thomas Gordon Maag, 2023 PR 00054. The case began as a claim that the lawyer had failed to diligently represent a client, to comply with requests for information and to surrender client files when requested. After he was contacted by the ARDC, the lawyer allegedly “knowingly fabricated[ed] and backdat[ed] a letter to client which falsely represented that he sent client the client files on December 20, 2022.”
The clients retained the lawyer in 2019 to handle three different matters. The clients provided a retainer but the lawyer never filed suit. The Hearing Board found the the lawyer violated Rules 1.4 (communication) and 1.3 (diligence) because he did not file any lawsuits or advance the client matters to conclusion and failed to communicate with his clients. The Hearing Board also found that the lawyer failed to take measures to return the client files to the Ambroses under Rule 1.16(d).
The more serious charge is that the lawyer engaged in dishonest conduct. The Hearing Board found as follows:
“We find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in dishonest conduct by knowingly backdating the client letter that the [Clients] found in their mailbox in January 2023, falsely stating in the letter that he had included Client’s entire client files, making the letter appear to have been damaged and delivered by the U.S. Postal Service, and falsely stating to the Administrator that he mailed Client his entire client files. We find that Respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(c) and 8.1(a).” Rule 8.1 prohibits an attorney from making a false statement in a disciplinary matter.
The Hearing Board recommended a suspension of two years and until further order of court. The panel’s opinion contains this paragraph: “Finally, Respondent was dishonest with the Hearing Board. He gave false testimony, including claiming that he sent a demand letter to the hot tub company in early 2020, denying that he received most of the Ambroses’ communications in 2020 to 2022, fabricating the April 28, 2022, conversation with Michael, and asserting that he did not backdate the December 20, 2022, closing letter. He also presented two false exhibits: the fabricated Memo to File, and an email which was admitted and later stricken because Respondent’s version was missing 11 words, despite his insistence that it was a true and correct copy.”
Comments: in the digital age attorney regulators are becoming more capable of detecting fabricated evidence submitted by lawyers to avoid discipline. Obviously, if you make a mistake, you must own up to it and admit it honestly and truthfully.
This issue has come up before where a lawyer allegedly uses AI to draft a brief and comes up with fake citations. AI programs are not responsible for the quality of their work. They can’t be sanctioned or punished or fined. But the lawyer who signs said brief most certainly can be sanctioned or fined.
In this particular story, the claim is that Michael Cohen, a disbarred attorney who spent much of his career representing Donald John Trump, gave his lawyer fake citations for some legal brief. Cohen in turn blames the AI program he used.
There is no excuse for this behavior. The lawyer must accept responsibility. He should never have taken any work product from Michael Cohen who is both disbarred and a convicted felon. Sanctions are likely to issue as well as a disciplinary complaint.
No matter how much pressure you are under to get something done on time, do not ask AI to practice law. It cannot do that and you will pay a high price. Instead, get an extension of time or file the brief with a motion for leave to file instanter. Hold yourself accountable or others may be forced to do it for you.
