Two days before Christmas, a district court in Nebraska cautioned a pro se litigant about using generative AI in his legal memoranda.
In the motion to reconsider, Leber raises the same arguments the Court rejected in his motion for partial final judgment. In “support” of his arguments, Leber repeatedly cites to a case which appears to be a hallucination of artificial intelligence, despite Leber’s certification that he has “reviewed and verified the accuracy of all content, citations, and legal authority referenced” in his filing (Filing No. 68-1).[1] The Court had previously warned Leber about this in its previous order. And Leber’s pro se status does not excuse him from “comply[ing] with court rules and directives.” See Soliman v. Johanns, 412 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005). Leber is again instructed to verify the accuracy of all content, citations, and legal authority in his filings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); NECivR 7.1(d)(5) (providing that “[a]ny brief not in compliance with this subsection may be stricken”— without further notice—”in the sole discretion of the court” and that a “material misrepresentation in the certificate of compliance” may also result in “sanctions against the person signing the document”).
The court denied the motion to reconsider. The citation is Leber v. Bryan Medical Center, D. Nebraska 2025, 8:25 cv 401.
The Hearing Board has recommended a two-year suspension of an attorney who converted client funds to keep a an extra-marital relationship secret from his family. The lawyer must make restitution to affected clients as well. To his credit the lawyer admitted wrongdoing and apologized for his behavior. The respondent ran a successful real estate law practice before he got into trouble.
Respondent testified, “The root cause of this case is an extramarital relationship which turned extortionate, to the extent that I had to choose between satisfying the blackmailer or admitting to my family that I had cheated.” He felt “forced to make the Hobson’s choice of violating my professional ethics or breaking up my family to the detriment of all of us,” especially Respondent’s disabled adult son whom he and his wife cared for. (Tr. 16). Respondent presented several emails dated between October 2022 and November 2024, purporting to be from his paramour to him. (Resp. Exs. 1-6). He interpreted these emails as threats to reveal his infidelity if he did not continue to give her money. (Tr. 42, 46-57).
The respondent represented himself in the case and, given the circumstances, did an excellent job. He admitted wrongdoing and apologized for his actions. This is the correct way to handle a disciplinary case of this type and the respondent did a good job representing himself. In re Link, 24 PR 00058.
The State of Tennessee is considering allowing non lawyers to own law firms. This is a big step in the slow but steady pursuit of law firm ownership by private equity companies. Rule 5.4(a) prohibits the sharing of fees with a non lawyer. Rule 5.4.(b) prohibits non lawyer ownership of law firms. The Tennessee Supreme Court issued an order seeking comment on the question. The order recites the usual phrases about access to justice. Generally, access to justice is a real issue, but many of those who cannot obtain counsel have cases that lawyers won’t accept because (a) there is no prospect for payment; or (b) the client wishes to pursue goals or objectives that are illegal or plainly wrong. It is highly doubtful that private equity firms will increase access to justice.
Non lawyer ownership of law firms means that the lawyer would share fees with non lawyers, a violation of Rule 5.4. That rule maintains the current status of the legal profession. Ownership by non lawyers inevitably means that ethical standards will slip and that lawyers will focus on the business people rather than their clients.
Despite the warnings and sanctions and news stories lawyers continue to use Generative AI to draft legal memoranda. Because AI models work in ways we don’t fully understand they sometimes make up citations to fake cases. One more such case dropped this week. Boston v. Williams, 1:23-cv-00752-WMR, N.D. Georgia, is one such case. The opening paragraph is as follows:
During its review of the Plaintiffs’ response brief [Doc. 57] in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court discovered that 17 of the 24 cases cited by Plaintiffs’ counsel either did not exist, did not support the proposition for which they were cited, or misquoted the authority. It appeared to the Court that at least some of the purported cases were artificial intelligence (“AI”) generated “hallucinations.” See United States v. Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (identifying “the markings of a hallucinated case created by generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools,” including case names that appear to be real but do not exist); Mavy v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-25-00689-PHX-KML (ASB) 2025 WL 2355222, at * 1 (D. Arizona, Aug. 14, 2025).
When the court made inquiries of counsel, counsel apologized and said she was very busy and had her daughter draft the brief. The court found probable cause for a violation of Rule 11(b) and set a hearing for the court to determine if the rule was, in fact, violated.
Given the number of these cases, the public embarrassment the lawyers have faced, and the sanctions that will inevitably ensue, I am of the opinion that nothing will stop lazy lawyers from using AI to draft briefs.
In the age of the internet, lawyers are subject to online reviews by clients and former clients. I have received several reviews myself that I did not enjoy reading. Some of them were by people who I never represented or spoke with. Where lawyers get into trouble is when they respond to an online review with some commentary. A recent Colorado discipline case of Bernadette Teresa Gonzales, 24 PDJ 094, August 29, 2025 is a reminder of the ethical issues that can arise when you respond to a review in an unwise manner. The Opinion states:
Finally, in 2020, a former client posted a negative and disparaging review of Gonzales on her firm’s Facebook page. Gonzales posted a public reply in which she assailed the client as a terrible mother, described the client’s child as “worthless” and “entitled,” and implied that the client and her family were not truthful and lacked integrity. Through this conduct, Gonzales violated Colo. RPC 1.6(a) (a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent) and Colo. RPC 1.9(c) (a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client).
This is important to understand that you should (a) never respond to a review in an angry manner or in an angry frame of mind. Simply respond that you respectfully disagree with the review and leave it at that. If you have a question about how to respond, better to call a lawyer who can give impartial legal advice.
Recently, the legal profession blog, hosted by typepad, shut down. This is a huge loss to all of us in the profession who relied upon it for the last twenty years to notify us of important professional responsibility decisions in the U.S. and Canada. My thanks to Professor Fritsch who worked on this blog for 25+ years and made us all better lawyers and students of the profession.
The ARDC Hearing Board recommended a one-year suspension for an attorney who engaged in frivolous litigation and assisted a client in committing bankruptcy fraud. In re Xydakis, 2021PR00104. The order is 81 pages long. I have done my best to summarize the key findings of the order and most important rule violations.
One of the charges asserted that the Respondent engaged in frivolous litigation on behalf of a client, Marshall Spiegel, who was the Secretary of the Board of a condominium association. “Count I charged Respondent with (1) bringing or defending a proceeding, or asserting or controverting an issue therein, with no basis for doing so that is not frivolous; (2) making statements of material fact or law to atribunal which the lawyer knows are false; (3) using means in representing a client that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person; (4) engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and (5) making statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the integrity of a judge, in violation of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1, 3.3(a)(1), 4.4(a), 8.4(d), and 8.2(a), respectively, arising from his bringing and maintaining lawsuits on behalf of his client against a condominium association board and other individuals and entities.”
The Hearing Board summarized the litigation as follows:
In the fall of 2015, the president of the board of directors of the 1618 Sheridan Road Condominium Association (“Association”) resigned. At that time, Marshall Spiegel was serving as secretary of theAssociation’s board and Valerie Hall was serving as treasurer. Following the president’s resignation, Spiegel declared himself acting president, over Hall’s objections. (Ans. at par. 2.)
On October 22, 2015, Respondent filed a complaint on behalf of Spiegel, the Association, and Chicago Title Trust Co., seeking to remove Hall from the Association’s board of directors. The complaint alleged that,because Hall’s condominium unit was owned by a trust rather than by Hall herself, she was not considered a unitowner and therefore could not be a board member. The lawsuit, filed in the Chancery Division of Cook County Circuit Court, was docketed as case number 15 CH 15594. (Ans. at par. 4; Adm. Ex. 1.)
On October 26, 2015, Respondent filed a second lawsuit on behalf of the same plaintiffs for defamation,invasion of privacy, and breach of contract against Hall. The second lawsuit, filed in the Law Division of CookCounty Circuit Court, was docketed as case number 15 L 10817, and, like the first, sought to remove Hall from the Association’s board. It also added a new defendant and additional counts, including allegations that Hall wrongfully accused Spiegel of stealing her suitcases and filed a false police report in which she accused Spiegel of taking lawn furniture. (Ans. at par. 6; Adm. Ex. 3.)
On October 30, 2015, Respondent filed a first amended complaint in case number 15 L 10817, adding two new defendants and additional counts. (Ans. at par. 7; Adm. Ex. 4.) On November 2, 2015, Hall filed an answer to the first amended complaint, and attached the deed to her condominium unit. She also filed acounterclaim in which she sought a declaration that, among other things, she was a unit owner and therefore qualified to sit on the Association board; that all of the board’s actions following the former president’s resignation were proper; and that Respondent was not the Association’s authorized legal counsel and therefore had no authority to act on behalf of the Association. (Ans. at par. 8; Resp. Ex. 57.) Also on November 2, 2015, Respondent voluntarily dismissed case number 15 CH 15594. (Ans. at par. 5.)
On November 24, 2015, Respondent filed a second amended complaint in case number 15 L 10817, removing the Association as a plaintiff and adding an additional defendant and new counts, including allegations that one of the defendant unit owners spied on Spiegel and moved large water cooler bottles in front of Spiegel’s door. (Adm. Ex. 7.) On December 2, 2015, Respondent filed a counter and third-party complaint onbehalf of the plaintiffs in case number 15 L 10817 against Hall, her counsel, and the Association’s counsel,alleging that they interfered with Spiegel’s business expectancy with Respondent by filing a counterclaim that caused Spiegel’s insurance carrier to refuse to hire Respondent to defend Spiegel, which caused Spiegel to have to expend his own funds. The next day, Respondent filed a third amended complaint against the same five defendants named in the second amended complaint but adding additional counts, including allegations that one of the defendants installed horizontal blinds without prior board approval. (Ans. at par. 9; Adm. Exs. 8, 9.)
On December 31, 2015, the Association filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive Relief against Spiegel in the Chancery Division of Cook County Circuit Court, docketed as case number 15 CH 18825. (Ans.at par. 11.) On January 11, 2016, the Association moved the court for a temporary restraining order (TRO) torestrain Spiegel from continuing to prevent the board from functioning. The court granted the Association’s TRO. (Ans. at pars. 11-13; Adm. Ex. 10.)
On February 8, 2016, Respondent filed a fourth amended complaint in case number 15 L 10817, which alleged 25 counts against 10 defendants, including Hall’s counsel and the Association’s counsel. As to theattorney-defendants, the fourth amended complaint contained the same allegations regarding interference with business expectancy that were raised in the earlier- filed counter and third-party complaint. (Ans. at pars. 15, 16; Adm. Ex. 17.)
On April 8, 2016, Respondent filed an additional lawsuit in the Law Division of Cook County CircuitCourt, which was docketed as case number 16 L 3564. (Ans. at par. 17.) In that lawsuit, Respondent brought claims on behalf of Spiegel against his neighbors, Corrine and William McClintic, alleging that the McClintics were seeking to rent their unit in the 1618 Sheridan Road building when they were not permitted to do so under the condominium declarations, and that, as a result, Spiegel suffered at least $50,000 in damages. Respondent later filed a first amended complaint in that matter, adding additional defendants and counts. (Ans. at par. 18; Adm. Exs. 18, 19.)
On May 27, 2016, the Association, the Association board, and other residents who were parties to the Spiegel litigation moved to consolidate the three active Cook County cases. On September 28, 2016, the trialcourt consolidated cases 15 CH 18825 and 16 L 3564 into case 15 L 10817. (Ans. at par. 19.)
On June 14, 2017, Judge Moira Johnson granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss all 25 counts of thefourth amended complaint in the 15 L 10817 case on the basis that none of the claims stated a cause of action, andordered Respondent to seek leave of the court to replead any amended complaint. Judge Johnson also struck all33 counts of the first amended complaint in case number 16 L 3564. (Ans. at par. 20; Adm. Ex. 22 at 70-79; Adm. Ex. 23.).”
Eventually the case was transferred to Judge Brennan who awarded sanctions exceeding $1.0 million against Respondent and his client. Sadly the conduct did not cease. “Following entry of the orders imposing sanctions on Spiegel and Respondent, a number of news outlets and online publications ran stories about the sanctions awards. In April 2020, Respondent filed nine separate complaints on behalf of The Law Offices of John Xydakis, P.C. and himself, individually, against various publications, alleging that their reporting about the sanctions award against him was defamatory. One of thecomplaints was against the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin. The Chicago Daily Law Bulletin’s article quoted attorneys John Schriver and Eugene Murphy, whom Respondent also named as defendants in that lawsuit. In May 2021, the court granted a motion to dismiss filed by Schriver and his law firm, and the case was dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. The remaining eight cases were either dismissed for want of prosecution or voluntarily dismissed by Respondent. (Ans. at pars. 43-53; Adm. Exs. 59-60, 62, 64, 66-70, 72-73, 75.)”
The Respondent also accused Judge Brennan of engaging in ex parte communications. These allegations were found to be false. “The record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever that Judge Brennan engaged in ex parte communications. Even Respondent’s own testimony shows that, at most, he became suspicious that JudgeBrennan may have communicated with another attorney when, at a hearing in February 2018, she told him that he had not listened to Judge Johnson or anyone else, and then, in another hearing in March 2018, first said thatshe had not spoken with counsel at all and then said that she had not spoken with counsel about the case. (See Tr. 1092, 1094-95.)
But mere suspicion is an insufficient basis for an attack on the integrity of a judge. “A reasonable beliefmust be based on objective facts. Thus, subjective belief, suspicion, speculation, or conjecture does notconstitute a reasonable belief.” In re Walker, 2014PR00132, M.R. 28453 (March 20, 2017) (Hearing Bd. at 21); see also Greanias, 01 SH 117 (Hearing Bd. at 43, 57) (attorney had “no factual or evidentiary basis” for her allegations, which were “no more than conjecture and personal belief;” she therefore made the allegations with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity). Moreover, itis clear from even a cursory reading of the transcript of the February 2018 hearing that Judge Brennan was referring to Respondent’s failure to abide by previous judges’ rulings when she said he did not listen to Judge Johnson or anyone else.
In addition, at the March 2018 hearing, and in stipulated testimony in this matter, Judge Brennan unequivocally denied that she had engaged in ex parte communications with any of the defense counsel. Similarly, Gene Murphy, the defense counsel with whom Respondent claims Judge Brennan communicated, denied having any ex parte communications with Judge Brennan or any of her staff. He explained that he may have had brief conversations with the judge’s clerk about administrative matters, but never talked about the substance of the case with the judge or any of her staff. He further testified that he would never do such a thing.We found Murphy to be credible and accept his testimony that he never engaged in ex parte communications with Judge Brennan or any of her staff.
The documentary evidence presented by Respondent does not alter our finding. At most, it shows that there were a few short phone calls between Murphy and Judge Brennan’s chambers, and that Murphy notedconversations with “judge’s clerk” on his billing statements. That evidence is consistent with Murphy’s testimony that he occasionally contacted Judge Brennan’s chambers about administrative matters, such as when a motion would be heard.
Because there is no objective evidence in the record that Judge Brennan engaged in ex parte communications, we find that Respondent had no reasonable basis for believing his statements to be true. He therefore recklessly disregarded the truth in making his false accusation, and in so doing, violated Rule 8.2(a).”
The Hearing Board found violations of Rule 3.1. “We find that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that, as of November 2015 if not earlier, Respondent knew that his attack on Hall’s unit ownership and eligibility to serve on the Association board was legally and factually baseless; yet, he maintained those claims against Hall until Judge Brennan denied him leave to file the fifth amended complaint in February 2018. By this conduct, he violated Rule 3.3(a)(1).”
The Board also found a violation of Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Based upon our findings that Respondent violated Rule 3.1, and based upon the totality of thecircumstances relating to Respondent’s filings and tactics in the Spiegel litigation, we also find that he engaged inconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by wasting the time, money, and other resources of opposingparties, opposing counsel, and the judicial system by bringing and pursuing baseless and frivolous claims. It is apparent from the court documents and transcripts in the record that Respondent’s excessive and oppressive litigation tactics, particularly his filing of the motion seeking leave to file the fifth amended complaint, required the parties and court to expend resources to address his motion and various filings. Among other things, the defendants were required to prepare written responses to and attend another lengthy hearing on the motion for leaveto file the fifth amended complaint, and the court was required to hold a hearing and handle a subsequent motionfor reconsideration. We therefore find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d).
Comment: the Respondent was and is clearly a talented lawyer. Somehow, in my opinion, he lost sight of his role as an advocate and became so committed to winning the case at any cost that he lost sight of the rules. How is it that someone with extensive courtroom experience loses sight of the rules and embarks on a campaign of frivolous litigation and abuse of the judiciary? There must have been multiple clues delivered to him that his behavior was not appropriate, yet he persisted.
As I have previously reported, Jenner & Block won a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Executive Order targeting Jenner & Block. On July 21, 2025, the United States appealed that injunction as well as the grant of summary judgment in favor of Jenner & Block. No briefs on appeal have been filed. These are very important cases. I did not expect Jenner & Block to back down and they did not.
Lawyers continued to use AI to generate briefs and other legal pleadings. Somehow they have not learned yet that the AI can hallucinate cases (make cases up) if you ask it to draft a brief. An Illinois lawyer recently used generative AI in a brief for the appellate court and then tried to deflect responsibility when he was questioned about it.
The case is In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App 4th 241427. The discussion of the transgression is fairly extensive:
¶ 42 The circuit court of Sangamon County appointed Mr. Panichi on November 4, 2024, to represent respondent-appellant in this accelerated appeal from the termination of respondent’s parental rights filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). After an in-depth review of the briefs, this court recognized that Mr. Panichi cited eight apparently nonexistent cases in respondent’s opening and reply briefs. In one instance, he provided a direct quote from one of these cases. Concerned that respondent’s briefs contained citations to apparently nonexistent cases, this court, on its own motion, ordered Mr. Panichi to file copies of “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614″; “In re A.G., 2022 IL App (1st) 220119″; “In re R.C., 195 Ill. App. 3d 827 (1st Dist. 1990)”; “In re R.D.S., 2021 IL App (2d) 200092″; “In re M.H., Jr., 196 Ill. App. 3d 976 (1st Dist. 1990)”; “In re Brandon E., 382 Ill. App. 3d 389 (2d Dist. 2008)”; “In re K.L.P., 381 Ill. App. 3d 817 (4th Dist. 2008)”; and “In re Ca. B., 386 Ill. App. 3d 507 (2d Dist. 2008).” We further ordered Mr. Panichi to appear before this court personally and show cause why he should not be sanctioned.
¶ 43 On June 16, 2025, Mr. Panichi filed a two-page response to this court’s rule to show cause entitled “Verified Memorandum and Response to June 10, 2025, Order re Rule 375 Sanctions.” He stated in paragraph 2(a) of his response that “the following two cases are valid, published Illinois Appellate Court decisions and were properly cited,” and he cited “In re Brandon A., 395 Ill. App. 3d 224 (4th Dist. 2009),” and “In re Adoption of K.L.P., 316 Ill. App. 3d 110 (4th Dist. 2000).” In paragraph 2(b), he stated that “the following case is a valid published decision but was incorrectly cited in the brief,” and he cited “In re M.F., 304 Ill. App. 3d 236 (5th Dist. 1999).” In paragraph 2(c) of his response, he admitted that the “remaining five citations contained in the Appellant’s Brief were determined to be invalid or nonexistent.” He attached copies of the first three decisions referenced in his response.
¶ 44 Mr. Panichi appeared before this court personally on June 18, 2025. The proceedings were recorded. He acknowledged that he was familiar with the principles of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct 1, 2020) and the principles of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010 Rules 1.1, 3.1, 3.3 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010), and Rule 8.4 (eff. July 1, 2024). He stated that he had been appointed to handle this appeal by the circuit court of Sangamon County and was compensated for his work at the rate of $150 per hour, for a total of $6,925. He did not intend to submit any further invoices for this case. He later addressed this amount, explaining that it “was more than [he] usually charge[s]” and this case “was out of the ordinary in terms of time spent” because his office “did some exceptional work trying to get some other information before the court” by filing “a brief trying to open up the proofs,” but he did not remember the matter exactly.
¶ 45 Regarding his response in paragraph 2(a), the court pointed out to Mr. Panichi that despite his claim that Brandon A., 395 Ill. App. 3d 224, and Adoption of K.L.P., 316 Ill. App. 3d 110, were “valid” cases that “were properly cited,” he had actually cited in his brief “In re Brandon E., 382 Ill. App. 3d 389 (2d Dist. 2008),” and “In re K.L.P., 381 Ill. App. 3d 817 (4th Dist. 2008),” which were completely different citations. (We also noted that Adoption of K.L.P. is a Second District case, not a Fourth District case, as Mr. Panichi wrote in his response.) The court further observed that neither Brandon A. nor Adoption of K.L.P. supports the propositions for which “Brandon E.” and “K.L.P.” were originally cited in his opening brief. Mr. Panichi stated that he was not currently familiar with the content of the cases but claimed that he had been so at one time. He admitted that he did not read either of these decisions before filing his response to the court’s rule to show cause. He later admitted that he misread the court’s rule to show cause as citing “Brandon A.,” when it cited “Brandon E.” He acknowledged that he did not list a citation for “Brandon E.” in his response and never looked up whether “Brandon E.” existed.
¶ 46 Regarding his response in paragraph 2(b), the court noted during the hearing that M.F., 304 Ill. App. 3d 236, the case Mr. Panichi claimed to have intended to cite, did not contain the quotation for which he cited “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614,” in his reply brief. Mr. Panichi admitted that he did not know where he obtained the quotation and did not believe it was accurate. The court stated that Mr. Panichi may have persisted in misleading the court in his statements in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of his response.
¶ 47 Mr. Panichi later explained that his miscitation in his briefs of the three cases he attached to his response to the rule to show cause “might be an example of poor lawyering, poor arguing, stretching principles, I don’t have an answer for that.” However, he then claimed that “to the best of [his] knowledge, [these cases] were cited for the appropriate principles.” He admitted, though, that he had read only one of the three cases he attached to his response and could not remember which one. He further explained that he believed that the court’s rule to show cause asked only for him to identify which cases existed, not to argue how those cases applied.
¶ 48 The court then turned to Mr. Panichi’s response in paragraph 2(c) and asked how those five admittedly nonexistent citations came to appear in his brief. Mr. Panichi initially clarified that he did not claim to have an “excuse,” just an “explanation.” He also informed the court that he had already notified Judge Karen Tharp, who appointed him as counsel in this appeal, as well as his private clients whose appeals were pending, about these proceedings. He then admitted that in preparing the briefs and conducting research in this case, he used artificial intelligence (AI) to write a draft of the brief, then “looked it over and [he] did not read the cases that were in support of the brief.” He further explained that at the time he filed the briefs in this case, he was “extremely busy” and “was not thorough enough.” He stated that his use of AI was prompted by “a perfect storm” of “temptation of AI out there at a time when [he] was busy and trying to meet deadlines.” He had since learned about AI “hallucinations,” in which the AI “dreams things up when it doesn’t have an answer.” He acknowledged that he should have read the cases that the AI presented to him. He additionally admitted that he was “between research software” at the time he prepared the briefs in this case but had since signed up with Westlaw. He informed the court that he did not intend to use AI going forward.
¶ 49 Mr. Panichi admitted that “the whole thing stems from the fact that [he] barely did any personal work [him]self on this appeal.” He stated that he “was careless” and “reckless when [he] did it” and “was wrong to do that.” Mr. Panichi then stated:
“I don’t have any reason that the court shouldn’t sanction me, except for the fact that I didn’t do it intentionally. I did it carelessly, and recklessly, I hadn’t done it before, and if I’m lucky enough to be able to continue practicing before the appellate court, I’m not going to do it again.”
He acknowledged that while he relied on the legal assistant in his office a great deal, he, as the attorney, was ultimately responsible in this matter. He stated, “[W]hatever happens, I deserve whatever consequences fall, and I’m willing to accept them.” Mr. Panichi asked that no sanctions be imposed against respondent, as he was responsible, and further asked the court to consider allowing him to file an amended brief. He stated that if he were allowed to file an amended brief, he would essentially cite all new cases and read them.
¶ 50 This court informed Mr. Panichi that when it was discovered that the cases cited in his briefs apparently did not exist and did not support the assertions in his briefs, the court felt compelled to leave no stone unturned to determine whether these cases existed. The court noted the research done “was significant and time consuming.” As an example, the court explained that when looking into the citation of “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614,” Westlaw and the Illinois Courts website confirmed that no case matching that citation existed. There were 20 Illinois cases titled “In re M.F.,” but none of those cases contained the quotation included in Mr. Panichi’s reply brief or any similar statement. Moreover, no Second District case existed under case No. 21-0614, though there was a Fourth District case with case No. 21-0614, People v. Taylor, 2022 IL App (4th) 210614-U, which was irrelevant. The quote included in Mr. Panichi’s brief and attributed to “In re M.F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210614,” “incarceration does not preclude a finding of reasonable progress if efforts are made,” did not exist in any case from Illinois, any other state, or any federal court, in its entirety. Even a part of the quote—”incarceration does not preclude”—did not exist in any Illinois cases, but it did exist in 57 cases across the country, most of which were to the effect of “incarceration does not preclude termination of parental rights.” This was the breadth of the work the court did in relation to just one of the eight nonexistent cases Mr. Panichi cited in his brief. The court noted that it was explaining this process to Mr. Panichi to illustrate how seriously the court took this matter, as well as the impact of Mr. Panichi’s actions on the court’s ability to do its other work efficiently.
¶ 51 When asked during the proceedings if he had any infirmities that would contribute to his carelessness in this case and his ability to practice law, Mr. Panichi stated that other than a hearing loss, he had “typical short term memory loss” and was overwhelmed by paperwork, but “to the best of [his] knowledge, [he] retain[s] 80, 90% of [his] faculties and memory on other matters” and believed he is competent to practice law.
¶ 52 On June 27, 2025, this court ordered Mr. Panichi to file an affidavit with a copy of any petition for fees and costs that he filed in the Sangamon County circuit court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 299 (eff. Jan. 1, 2024), along with documentation of his receipt of payment. He did so on June 30, 2025. His affidavit and petition confirmed that he was compensated in the amount of $6,925.62 by the Sangamon County treasurer for his work in connection with his appointment in this appeal.
The result: “For the reasons articulated below, we find that Mr. Panichi violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and order that (1) Mr. Panichi disgorge the payment of $6,925.62 he received for his work on this appeal; (2) Mr. Panichi pay $1,000 as monetary sanctions to the clerk of the Fourth District Appellate Court; and (3) the clerk of the Fourth District Appellate Court send a copy of this opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.”
Comment: This is my opinion. Obviously, the lawyer made two errors. The first was using generative AI without cite checking the brief to determine if the cases cited were real. The second more serious error was trying to claim that he miss cited real cases. The appellate court had to do some extensive work to determine whether the cases were real and were miss cited. They were not miss cited. They simply had names similar to the hallucinated cases. No matter how much we advise lawyers not to use generative AI without doing a full cite check, lawyers are unable to resist this temptation. Do your own work or face embarrassment or worse. I predict that the ARDC will open an investigation and possibly prosecute the lawyer for attempting to mislead the appellate court with his claims that two of the cases were actually just miss cited.
