The ARDC Hearing Board Has Decided Novoselsky II – And Recommended Disbarment

The ARDC Hearing Board has weighed in on the second case that it filed against David Novoselsky, In re David Alan Novoselsky, 2015 PR 00007 (“Novoselsky II”). The Hearing Board has recommended that Novoselsky be disbarred.

The ARDC has been in continuous litigation with David Novoselsky since 2011. In Novoselsky I, decided on September 21, 2015, the Supreme Court ordered a six month suspension. By the time Novoselsky I was decided, the ARDC had already filed Novoselsky II.

The charges in Novoselsky II arose out of the death of Claudia Zvunca. The respondent was alleged to have engaged in a lengthy series of violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct related to the Zvunca litigation, including the filing of multiple frivolous lawsuits against other attorneys involved in the Zvunca litigation. The Hearing Board, after a trial lasting several days, found that the respondent engaged in all of the charged misconduct.

The ARDC recommended disbarment and explained the rationale for its decision as follows:

“In arriving at the appropriate discipline, we consider those circumstances which may mitigate and/or aggravate the misconduct. In re Gorecki, 208 Ill. 2d 350, 360-61, 802 N.E.2d 1194 (2003). We have little to consider in the way of mitigation in this case other than Respondent’s cooperation in these proceedings. While he expressed some regret for certain of his actions, such as remarks made to Judges Zwick and Connors, his contrition did not encompass the misconduct for which he was actually charged, that being his frivolous filings, his efforts to embarrass or burden other counsel, or his dishonest statements.

The aggravating circumstances, on the other hand, are extremely serious and expansive. Notably, Respondent did not recognize his misconduct to be improper, express remorse for his actions, or apologize to the many attorneys whose lives he disrupted. See In re Lewis, 138 Ill. 2d 310, 347-48, 562 N.E.2d 198 (1990).

We also consider the fact that Respondent’s actions were not limited to an isolated instance of misconduct; rather, he engaged in a pattern of wrongdoing which extended over the course of several years. See In re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269, 659 N.E.2d 896 (1995). While only two client matters were involved, Respondent’s initiation of frivolous issues and proceedings complicated those matters to extreme levels and expanded the sphere of litigation to include additional courts and judges at the trial and appellate levels in both federal and state courts.

Respondent’s motivation for engaging in the misconduct, which we see as having been purely for personal gain, is another aggravating factor we consider. As to the Zvunca proceedings, the Administrator argued throughout the hearing that Respondent was attempting to disrupt the existing attorney/client relationships in the wrongful death litigation and insert himself into the proceedings as counsel for the plaintiff in order to reap large fees for himself. We believe this to be true, but in reviewing both the Zvunca and Kuc litigation we conclude his motivation was also rooted in his own over-zealous desire to beat down and out-trick his opponents by any means and at any cost, whether that cost was to his own clients or, ultimately, to himself. His determination to control the proceedings and his refusal to accept defeat was displayed repeatedly by his filing and re-filing of meritless cases, his endless motions for substitution of judges, his specious requests for reconsideration and appeals, and other behavior which a reasonable attorney would recognize as meritless and contumacious. Not only did Respondent not recognize his initial wrongful conduct, the imposition of sanctions seemed to have no effect in reforming his behavior.

With respect to those sanction awards, the evidence showed that Respondent racked up thousands of dollars of sanctions imposed by a federal judge and two separate circuit court judges. Respondent is in bankruptcy and most of the sanction orders remain unsatisfied.

While the foregoing factors are egregious and will impact our ultimate determination, the most disturbing factor that aggravates Respondent’s conduct is the astonishing amount of harm he caused to numerous individuals, including clients and opposing attorneys. See In re Saladino,

71 Ill. 2d 263, 375 N.E.2d 102 (1978) (discipline should be “closely linked to the harm caused or the unreasonable risk created by the

lack of care”).

The list of persons or entities who were damaged by Respondent’s conduct include:

Cristina Zvunca – Respondent’s maneuverings delayed the progression of her case and her recovery. After seizing control of the litigation, he agreed to settle the case for an amount less than what had been discussed by the parties, and for less than the ultimate settlement amount;

Jeanine Stevens, Marina Ammendola and John Cushing – the attorneys spent a vast amount of time responding to Respondent’s motions and lawsuits, paid thousands of dollars in fees to other attorneys to defend them against spurious allegations, suffered increases in their malpractice insurance premiums, and had less time to spend on their other client matters;

Stevens and Ammendola – both testified they continue to suffer embarrassment and answer inquiries about the unfounded allegations made against them, which were not only personal and offensive in nature but, as to Stevens, could have subjected her to an unwarranted investigation by child services or worse;

Gus Santana – incurred attorney’s fees in defending himself against baseless motions and accusations and was embarrassed by the proceedings, which took time away from his other clients;

Eugene Kuc – received bills from Respondent’s firm which included work for the sanctions proceedings against Respondent. Further, he had to reimburse his mother’s estate when payments made to Respondent were not approved by the court and Respondent refused to refund the overage.

James Ayres – had to defend a lawsuit brought by Respondent seeking contribution for the sanctions imposed against Respondent and his law firm, and no longer has a relationship with his family member Eugene Kuc;

Multiple courts – both federal and state judges had their dockets taxed by frivolous litigation that took time away from their other cases. Judges Propes and Connors testified to the tremendous amount of time spent in reviewing pleadings and transcripts.

In addition, as discussed in a previous section, Respondent’s actions played a part in Judge Locallo’s order of September 2009 which removed the key players from the wrongful death litigation. That order was ultimately reversed, causing months of proceedings and the settlement of the case to be unwound.

As a final factor for consideration, Respondent was suspended for six months in 2015 for engaging in misconduct which included, among other things, making dishonest statements and using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden third parties. The misconduct in that case occurred between 2003 and 2011, and was charged in a complaint filed in 2011 and amended in 2012. The Hearing Board report indicates the Administrator was investigating Respondent’s conduct in that case and requesting information from him as early as February 2009. (Hearing Bd. Rpt. at 46, 97). The conduct charged in the present case occurred between mid-2008 and mid-2011.

Prior discipline weighs most heavily against an attorney when he or she commits additional misconduct after the Supreme Court has imposed discipline, thereby indicating a failure to learn from the previous misconduct. In re Starr, 06 CH 78, M.R. 23127 (Sept. 22, 2009) (Review Bd. at 9). Given the timing of the misconduct and prior discipline in the present case, Respondent is not a recidivist in the ordinary sense and therefore his prior discipline merits less weight than in a typical case involving a repeat offender. See In re Starr; In re Brown, 04 CH 73, M.R. 22127 (Mar. 17, 2008) (Review Bd. at 16). The Court has stated, however, that it is appropriate to consider the totality of an attorney’s discipline even when he or she is not a typical recidivist. In re Teichner, 104 Ill. 2d 150, 166-68, 470 N.E.2d 972 (1984). Further, we believe from early 2009 onward, Respondent should have been particularly cognizant of his ethical obligations since he was under investigation for his prior offenses at that time. See In re O’Brien, 2015PR00023, M.R. 28493 (Mar. 20, 2017) (Hearing Bd. at 35). Given the foregoing

circumstances, we conclude Respondent’s earlier discipline deserves some consideration, but the weight we give it is minimal compared to the other aggravating factors.

The Administrator urged us to recommend that Respondent be disbarred and cited several cases in support of her position. Respondent, on the other hand, argued that no misconduct occurred and therefore no sanction is warranted.

The Administrator presented the following cases, which we view as instructive. In In re Zurek, 99 CH 45, M.R. 18164 (Sept. 19, 2002), the attorney was disbarred for misconduct arising out of a dispute with his former employer. After filing frivolous pleadings which led to sanctions, the attorney then made false and unfounded accusations against the judge and opposing counsel. He also made offensive remarks to a deponent during a deposition. The attorney’s misconduct was aggravated by his conduct during the disciplinary proceedings, including filing frivolous pleadings. In In re Konan, 05RC1503, M.R. 20127 (May 20, 2005), a reciprocal discipline case, the attorney was disbarred for pursuing positions that lacked merit, filing an unfounded motion for sanctions, and attempting to mislead the Court. In aggravation, he showed no remorse for conduct which resulted in five sanction orders and a contempt finding, and he had been previously reprimanded. In In re Ditkowsky, 2012PR00014, M.R. 26516 (Mar. 14, 2014) the attorney was suspended for four years until further order of court for making false statements and sending hundreds of emails falsely alleging corruption and criminal conduct by guardians ad item and judges in order to gain an advantage in a guardianship proceeding. The attorney’s previous discipline twenty years earlier was given little weight.

We also considered In re Romanski, 03 CH 90, M.R. 20589 (Jan. 13, 2006) in which the attorney was suspended for three years for advancing a frivolous claim in connection with a personal dispute and then continuing to assert the claim after it was rejected by the court. He also communicated with a represented party, made misrepresentations to the court, and took actions intended to force the removal of a judge, including manufacturing a conflict that would require the judge to recuse himself. The Review Board was especially concerned with the attorney’s attempted manipulation of the court system and his inability to recognize his wrongdoing. (Review Bd. at 15). As in the instant case, the attorney expressed no remorse and refused to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his calculated plan. In contrast to the instant case, the attorney’s actions involved only one dispute, he filed no lawsuits against counsel, and the harm was confined to legal costs of the opposing party and the risk of damage to the judge’s reputation.

We are aware that cases involving frivolous pleadings or actions taken for purposes of harassment, when those actions were not accompanied by dishonesty or severe aggravating circumstances, have resulted in only mild sanctions. See In re Messina, 2014 PR00002, M.R. 28368 (Jan. 13, 2017) (Review Bd. at 22-23). Those cases do not apply here. The calculated scheme employed by Respondent in both the Zvunca and Kuc cases, which resulted in far-reaching and damaging consequences, sets this case apart. In particular, while we recognize the Zvunca case was complicated long before Respondent entered it, the tangled web that ensued was prompted by Respondent, for Respondent. As a result, several courts were burdened, progress in numerous cases was delayed, unnecessary fees were incurred, professional anxiety was induced, and professional and personal time was stolen.

Respondent knowingly engaged in a sustained campaign of unfounded litigation and manipulation and failed to conform his actions to the requirements of the professional rules after adverse rulings by courts. Despite his testimony that he has now changed and will no longer engage in destructive behavior, his failure to be deterred by sanctions and his recent activity in a federal case in Wisconsin speak to the contrary. In light of the misconduct that occurred and the relevant case law, and in order to protect the public and the integrity of the profession, we conclude that disbarment is warranted.

Accordingly, we recommend that Respondent David Alan Novoselsky be disbarred.”

Update on September 21, 2020, the Illinois Supreme Court entered an order disbarring Novoselsky.

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ARDC Review Board Recommends Four Month Suspension for Lawyer Who Forged Documents

This is a hard fought disciplinary case in which a lawyer was found to have fabricated documents and sent them to clients. In re Robert Ronald Czarnik, 2016 PR 00131. The ARDC Review Board recommended that the respondent attorney be suspended for four months for that misconduct.

It is noteworthy that the ARDC initially charged more acts of misconduct than Czarnik was found to have engaged in. His defense pointed out credibility problems with some of the witness testimony against him.

The respondent was engaged to assist a client in obtaining building permits. The ARDC alleged, and the Hearing Board and Review Board found, that the respondent fabricated building permits for clients.

SBA also retained LCC to obtain E&T agreements for potential cell phone towers in Monmouth, Illinois and Morton, Illinois. LCC assigned to Respondent the responsibility for obtaining the E&T agreements, which would allow SBA to test whether the sites would be suitable for its purpose before executing leases for the property.

Respondent testified that he delegated the task of getting the E&T agreements to Laugesen, and that he routinely had his team get signatures on E&T agreements and that Laugesen had done so before. He testified that he followed up with Laugesen and thought the agreements had been signed.

Laugesen testified that he recalled working on the Monmouth site but thought the work was limited to zoning matters and did not include an E&T agreement, but he was not certain. He testified that he did not believe he had been given any tasks with respect to the Morton E&T agreement but acknowledged that he might have been involved with that agreement.

On October 9, 2014, Respondent sent an e-mail to an SBA employee with a document that purported to be an E&T agreement for the Monmouth site, and which SBA executed on October 10. The name “Ken Helms,” with the title “Director,” was signed and printed in the place for the signature of the property owner. Ken Helms is the City of Monmouth’s Director of Information and Technology. He did not sign the document or authorize anyone else to sign it.

Also on October 9, 2014, Respondent communicated with SBA employees via e-mail and indicated that, the day prior, he had mailed a document that purported to be an E&T

agreement for the Morton site, and which SBA executed on October 10. On that document, in the place for the property owner’s signature, the name “L. Hall” was signed with the name “Lindsey Hall” and the title “Principal” printed underneath. Lindsey Hall was a school district superintendent employed by the Morton school district on whose property the Morton site was located. Hall did not sign the document or authorize anyone else to sign it.

Diane Marsh, a forensic document examiner and handwriting expert, examined the signatures and printing on the purported E&T agreements, and compared that writing with known handwriting from Respondent. She testified at hearing that it was highly probable that Respondent had placed the signatures and printing on the purported Monmouth and Morton E&T agreements.

Respondent acknowledged sending the documents to SBA, but denied signing the documents or knowing that the signatures had been fabricated.

This quotation appears in the opinion of the ARDC Review Board. Of further note, the ARDC had a computer forensic examiner examine the respondent’s computer. The results of that examination were also admitted in evidence. In seminars, the ARDC will explain that if you lie to them about a document you created, they have the ability to locate and do a forensic examination of your computer.

ARDC Hearing Board Recommends Suspension of One Year For Lawyer Who Altered Firm’s Billing System

The ARDC Hearing Board recommended a one-year suspension for a lawyer who was found to have altered his firm’s billing system to improve his billings. The Hearing Board found as follows:

Sometime prior to May 2014, Respondent inadvertently discovered that his Juris profile allowed him to make changes to origination credits from his office computer. He testified he told his colleague Ryan Shpritz of his discovery and showed Shpritz how to make a change, but he did not tell Shpritz he intended to make changes. (Ans. at par. 8; Tr. 221, 268-70).
Respondent acknowledged that between May 2014 and April 2018 he made changes to origination credits. In addition to deleting an attorney with whom he was sharing origination credit, he also completely changed some origination credits from another attorney’s name to his own name. In making the changes, he considered how the client came to KSN. For example, when an inactive client came back to KSN through his efforts, he felt he should receive origination credit. In some instances he changed the origination credit in his favor, and then changed it back because he knew his actions were wrong. Respondent did not recall how many times he made changes, but acknowledged the KSN records reflect it was more than 200 times over a four-year period. (Ans. at par. 9; Tr. 220-23, 239, 252, 270-73).
Respondent testified he began making changes, even though he knew he had no authority to do so, because he was frustrated that his concerns were not addressed and it was a way to correct an improper allocation of credit on a handful of clients. He also felt, to some extent, that other people were riding on his coattails. He denied acting from ambition, and described himself as being conflicted over his conduct. He denied knowing he was among the highest paid non-equity principals. (Ans. at pars. 11, 12; Tr. 221-23, 229, 249-57, 267, 270, 274-78).
Discovery of Respondent’s Actions
Lieke Daley, controller at KSN and overseer of the firm’s database system, testified he received an email from a KSN attorney in April 2018 asking why certain client matters were not reflecting a split origination. After speaking to a Juris consultant, Daley began a time-consuming process of reviewing change logs, running reports, analyzing data, and confirming his findings with Juris. (Tr. 35-37, 41-43, 60).
Daley discovered that Respondent was the individual logged into the system when certain changes were made to origination credits. He identified two spreadsheets that reflect over 200 changes at the matter level and 20 changes at the client level. The changes resulted in an increase of $202,881.47 to Respondent’s book of business during the four year period and an increase of at least $30,000 to his origination compensation, to the detriment of other attorneys. The spreadsheets indicate numerous KSN attorneys were affected, including Robert Kogen and Ryan Shpritz. Once Daley was confident of his findings, he took the information to the executive committee. (Ans. at par. 10; Tr. 42, 46-55, 65, 72-73, 104; Adm. Exs. 3, 4).
Kogen testified he learned on April 18, 2018 that Respondent had changed origination credit for a number of accounts. On April 23, 2018 he and Matthew Moodhe, a member of KSN’s Executive Committee, met with Respondent for about two hours to question him about the changes. Kogen recalled Respondent vehemently denied doing so, and stated the changes must be a mistake. When they went to Respondent’s office to log in to Juris from Respondent’s computer, a screen appeared that was different than the screen on Kogen’s own computer and Kogen saw that changes could be made. After Respondent continued to deny changing any credits, Kogen suggested that he go home. (Ans. at par. 14; Tr. 93-96, 100-102, 120).
Kogen testified Respondent returned a short time later, broke down and admitted to what he had done. When Kogen asked for an explanation, Respondent stated he wanted to advance to equity partner quickly and once he started making changes, he could not stop. Kogen then spoke to his other partners and they agreed to terminate Respondent’s position with the firm. Kogen advised Respondent of their decision that evening. (Ans. at par. 14; Tr. 102-104).
Respondent attributed his initial denials of wrongdoing to being overwhelmed with fear and not thinking rationally. He knows he did not handle himself appropriately and testified if he were given the opportunity again, he would immediately admit his mistake. He agrees he was fired for conduct that was dishonest and which harmed his former law firm and colleagues. The day he was fired, he concluded his actions were wrong. (Tr. 224-25, 268).
Ryan Shpritz, an equity partner at KSN, testified Respondent was one of his best friends at the firm, but they have not spoken since shortly after Respondent’s termination. Shpritz recalled at that time Respondent was emotional and embarrassed; attributed his acts to pressure he place on himself to make equity principal; compared his behavior to an addiction; and stated he did not think he would be caught. Respondent testified he did not recall what he said at the time, but he would not characterize his actions as an addiction. (Tr. 126-29, 227-28).
Restitution to KSN
Kogen and Respondent both testified that Respondent offered to make restitution to KSN at their April 23, 2018 meeting, and again in subsequent email correspondence. No amount was discussed at those times. Kogen told Respondent he would get back to him, but did not do so. (Tr. 108-10, 229-31; Resp. Ex. 1).
On or about May 30, 2018 Respondent sent a letter to Kogen with a check for $30,432.22, which was the amount KSN had identified as being at issue in a communication to the ARDC. Respondent’s check included the words “Full Restitution” on the memo line. On June 11, 2018, a litigation attorney at KSN advised Respondent that the firm would not accept his check with the “Full Restitution” notation. Respondent sent a second check for $30,432.22 to KSN without any notation, and that check was accepted. (Tr. 111-13, 232-36; Resp. Exs. 2-5).

The Hearing Board found that the lawyer violated Rule 8.4(c) and recommended a suspension of one year. If you have questions about legal ethics, please review our legal ethics webpage. https://www.clintonlaw.net/legal-ethics.html

ARDC Review Board Reduces Punishment For Attorney Who Received Domestic Partner Benefits

The case, in re Barry Michael Lewis, 2016 PR 00007, concerns allegations that an attorney allegedly continued to receive domestic partner insurance benefits for 8 years after he was ineligible to receive said benefits.

The Hearing Board found liability and recommended a six-month suspension. The ARDC Review Board reduced the punishment to censure because no clients were harmed. The Review Board explains its ruling:

The Hearing Board’s sanction analysis in this case is well-reasoned and guides our recommendation. However, we believe that, in recommending a six-month suspension, the Hearing Board gave insufficient consideration to the fact that Respondent’s conduct did not involve or impact any clients. While any conduct involving personal or professional dishonesty is inexcusable and warrants discipline, in this matter, Respondent’s record of representing clients and conducting himself ethically in his profession remains unblemished after over 40 years of practice. Imposing discipline that would trigger the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 764, including the requirement that Respondent notify clients, courts, and others of his discipline, seems unduly harsh and akin to punishment. We thus have strived to reach a sanction recommendation that recognizes the seriousness of Respondent’s misconduct and achieves the objectives of discipline but does not seek to punish Respondent.
Accordingly, taking into account Respondent’s misconduct as well as the aggravating and mitigating factors present here, and giving particular consideration to the fact that Respondent’s misconduct did not involve or affect any clients, we recommend that Respondent be suspended for five months. We believe that this sanction is commensurate with Respondent’s misconduct, consistent with discipline that has been imposed for comparable misconduct, and sufficient to serve the goals of attorney discipline and deter others from committing similar misconduct.

If you questions about a legal ethics situation, do not hesitate to contact me. Our legal ethics webpage is located here. https://www.clintonlaw.net/legal-ethics.html