Overview
In recent years, it appears that there are more cases raising the issue of frivolous pleadings by lawyers. This case follows the pattern: the lawyer files unfounded pleadings and then doubles down when confronted with objections and concerns.
In re Michael P. Coghlan, Comm’n No. 2024PR00057 (Ill. ARDC Hr’g Bd., filed Sept. 15, 2026), is a two-count disciplinary matter arising from an attorney’s conduct in federal litigation he filed against a school district and in the legal malpractice action his former client later brought against him. The Hearing Board found all charges proved by clear and convincing evidence and recommended an 18-month suspension, to continue until further order of the Court.
Facts
The District 428 litigation. Michael Coghlan represented James Mason on a theory that DeKalb School District No. 428 permitted non-residents to enroll and thereby violated the civil rights of district taxpayers, who were forced to subsidize their education. He filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois in October 2017, before Judge Frederick Kapala with Magistrate Judge Iain Johnston. Thomas Lester of Hinshaw & Culbertson appeared for the defendants and told Coghlan from the outset that the case belonged in state court and that comity and the Tax Injunction Act barred federal jurisdiction.
The FOIA motions. At a January 23, 2018 status, Judge Johnston told Coghlan plainly that he does not entertain state FOIA disputes and that such matters belong with the Attorney General or the circuit court. Between February and June 2018 Coghlan nonetheless served four more FOIA requests on the district, and in July 2018 filed five motions — Rule 37 sanctions, declaratory judgment on the validity of his FOIA requests, an injunction compelling production, limited depositions and interrogatories, and a motion alleging a conflict of interest between Lester and his client. At the July 24, 2018 hearing, Judge Johnston repeated that state FOIA was not his to enforce, invoked comity and federalism, and suggested Coghlan take a voluntary dismissal and refile in state court if he lacked what he needed. Coghlan filed an amended complaint on July 31, 2018, then withdrew the pending motions on August 16 as moot.
The “way around it” exchange. At that same August 16, 2018 hearing, Lester asked whether the plaintiff intended to stand on the complaint or proceed through successive amendments. Judge Johnston observed that Rule 15 could permit multiple amendments but that “there is a way around that,” and Lester agreed. Coghlan was present in open court for the exchange, which was transcribed.
Dismissal and fee award. After Judge Kapala’s unexpected retirement, the case was reassigned in May 2019 to Judge Pallmeyer, who dismissed on September 5, 2019 — comity barred the claims, and the TIA deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the requested injunctive relief. She described Coghlan’s reliance on Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1 (2015), as “inapt.” Mason discharged Coghlan in October 2019 and retained Foster & Buick, which withdrew the reconsideration motion and dismissed a premature appeal. On March 29, 2021, the court awarded defendants $136,476.60 in fees, finding the attempt to litigate state taxation issues in federal court “frivolous and without grounds from the outset.”
The accusations. On July 5, 2019, Coghlan sent Lester a “Rule 11 Sanctions Notice” asserting that the August 2018 courtroom colloquy gave “the appearance of an out of court ex parte communication about the procedures for circumventing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.” Lester brought the letter to Judge Johnston’s attention at an October 19, 2019 hearing; Coghlan, pressed three times to explain how a conversation he personally attended could appear ex parte, maintained the accusation. In a May 29, 2020 email to Mason’s new counsel, he wrote that delay made it “look like the judge knows the school is wrong and that the school attorney tried to ‘cook the books.'” Testimony established that the continuances were routine — the magistrate judge had nothing to do while a dispositive motion was pending before a district judge who had just inherited a retired colleague’s docket.
The malpractice action. Mason sued Coghlan in DeKalb County in May 2021 for malpractice and unreasonable fees. The case went from Judge Waller (substitution) to Judge Voiland to Judge Klein. Coghlan’s filings included a “reply affidavit” attaching a police report and State Police Firearm Disposition Record concerning Mason, a Facebook photograph of Judges Rowland and Pallmeyer at a Hinshaw reception, and a “Corruptionpedia” screenshot. Later pleadings alleged judicial retaliation for his purported Rule 8.3 reporting, a pattern of misconduct “consistent with US v. Murphy,” and that Judge Buick used extrajudicial influence to make her associate judges protect her husband’s firm. A February 24, 2023 pleading attached a “collocation” diagram depicting fourteen individuals — four judges, opposing counsel, Mason’s successive lawyers, and ARDC intake counsel Guzman — as participants in a conspiracy. At a June 22, 2023 hearing he accused Foster of emerging from Judge Klein’s chambers, a claim contradicted by the judge, Foster, and Pioli. At an August 25, 2023 hearing he invoked Operation Greylord, Murphy, and LeFevour, and when Judge Klein asked whether he was accusing her of participating in a criminal enterprise, he answered: “The evidence accused you.”
Procedural History
The Administrator filed a two-count complaint on August 29, 2024.
- Count I (District 428 litigation): Rules 3.1 (frivolous proceedings), 8.2(a) (reckless statements concerning a judge’s integrity), and 8.4(c) (dishonesty).
- Count II (malpractice defense): Rules 4.4(a) (means with no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden), 8.2(a), and 8.4(c).
Coghlan’s answer was stricken in its entirety on October 29, 2024 for failure to comply with Commission Rule 233 and 735 ILCS 5/2-610. His amended answer was stricken on January 10, 2025 for the same reason, the Chair noting “improper lengthy narratives, a diagram with photographs, and extraneous statements.” His third answer again largely responded “neither admit nor deny.” Rather than permit a fourth attempt, the Chair entered an order on February 27, 2025 deeming admitted the allegations not properly answered.
The hearing spanned five days — August 25–26, October 9, and November 24, 2025, and January 9, 2026 — before a panel of Heather A. McPherson (Chair), Michael V. Casey, and Marc S. Needlman. Rory P. Quinn appeared for the Administrator. Coghlan represented himself. The Administrator called six witnesses; Coghlan testified over a day and a half. The Report and Recommendation was filed September 15, 2026.
Disposition
Findings. The Board found every charge proved. On Rule 3.1 it applied the objective standard — whether a reasonably prudent attorney acting in good faith would have brought the action — and held that neither the federal filing nor the four FOIA motions had an objectively reasonable basis, expressly rejecting Brohl as authority. It carved out one narrow exception: because a party may challenge opposing counsel’s representation where it adversely affects the party’s interests, see Jones v. Brown-Marino, 2017 IL App (1st) 152852, the Board declined to find the conflict-of-interest motion frivolous. On Rule 8.2(a), the Board applied the objective reckless-disregard standard, holding that suspicion, speculation, and conjecture cannot supply a reasonable belief. It declined to treat the ex parte allegations as an additional Rule 8.2(a) predicate in Count I because they fell outside the charging paragraph. On Rule 8.4(c), it found the after-the-fact characterization of the “Rule 11 Sanctions Notice” as a mandatory Rule 8.3 report “patently disingenuous” — the document never mentions Rule 8.3, and his claim of confidential reporting was irreconcilable with his claimed duty to report to the tribunal.
Mitigation. No prior discipline; civic and veterans’ organization service. His service as an assistant state’s attorney and elected State’s Attorney was expressly held not mitigating — given that role, he should have known better.
Aggravation. Conduct during the disciplinary proceeding mirrored the underlying misconduct and expanded to attacks on the Illinois Supreme Court, the ARDC, the Hearing Board, and the Administrator’s counsel; repeated inability or unwillingness to comply with basic rules of practice; misconduct spanning at least five years across numerous filings and appearances; and a complete absence of remorse — asked at the close of hearing whether he regretted the collocation diagram, he answered that it was “100 percent appropriate.” His voluntary retirement was given no weight, since re-registration under Ill. S. Ct. R. 756(a)(6) and (i) requires no fitness showing.
Sanction. The Administrator sought three years and until further order. The Board found the three-year comparators — Amu, Denison, and Jackson — materially more egregious, and found this conduct worse than the six-month cases (Cohn, Hoffman) but less severe in scope and gravity than the two-year cases (Walker, Greanias). It recommended suspension for 18 months and until further order of the Court, the UFO component grounded in its conclusion that Coghlan would likely repeat the conduct and should be required to prove fitness before resuming practice.
This is a Hearing Board recommendation only, subject to Review Board proceedings and final action by the Supreme Court.
Comment: Opponents often give feedback on your legal work. Much of that feedback may be meritless, but some of it is not, particularly when the judge agrees.