The South Dakota Supreme Court suspended a former attorney general following an accident in which he struck and killed a pedestrian with his motor vehicle.[¶4.] On September 12, 2020, Ravnsborg drove his personal vehicle to attend a Republican political event in Redfield, South Dakota. After the event ended, he began driving back to his residence in Pierre. At approximately 10:30 p.m., after passing through Highmore, Ravnsborg’s vehicle struck and killed Joe Boever, who was walking on the shoulder of the road. The facts:
[¶5.] Ravnsborg slowly brought his vehicle to a stop and called 911. He immediately told the 911 operator, “I’m the Attorney General. And I am . . . I don’t know . . . I hit something.” The 911 operator asked him if he hit “a deer or something” to which he responded, “I have no idea, yeah it could be, I mean it was right in the roadway.” Hyde County Sheriff Mike Volek was dispatched to Ravnsborg’s location.
[¶6.] Ravnsborg and Sheriff Volek briefly scanned the surrounding area but did not locate what Ravnsborg had hit. Shortly thereafter, Sheriff Volek offered Ravnsborg his personal vehicle to drive back to Pierre because Ravnsborg’s vehicle was unable to be driven.
[¶7.] The next day, Ravnsborg returned to Highmore with his chief of staff, Tim Bormann, to return Sheriff Volek’s personal vehicle. On the way, Ravnsborg and Bormann stopped at the crash scene. Ravnsborg quickly discovered Boever’s body just off the side of the road, near where the crash occurred. Bormann and Ravnsborg then drove to Sheriff Volek’s residence to inform him of their discovery. Sheriff Volek directed Ravnsborg to return to Pierre. Sheriff Volek contacted the South Dakota Highway Patrol and the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). Because the DCI is under the direction and control of the attorney general’s office, the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigation (NDBCI) was contacted to investigate the crash.[1] The South Dakota Highway Patrol was also involved in the post-accident investigation.[2]
[¶8.] Ravnsborg was interviewed two separate times by the NDBCI. Ravnsborg also turned over both his personal and work cell phones to allow NDBCI to download metadata that was generated by the phones around the time of the crash. Law enforcement also drew Ravnsborg’s blood and conducted toxicology tests. The South Dakota Highway Patrol performed an accident reconstruction and NDBCI interviewed multiple individuals who interacted with Ravnsborg prior to and after the accident.
[¶9.] Ravnsborg denied he had consumed any drugs or alcohol on the night of the accident, which was confirmed by witnesses who observed him during the evening and by the absence of any drugs or alcohol in his system at the time of the blood test. Investigators concluded that Ravnsborg had been on his personal phone for much of his commute from Redfield to Highmore, but that both phones were locked at the time of the accident. It was also determined that excessive speed did not contribute to the accident. Furthermore, despite varying opinions regarding how far his vehicle veered off the road, investigators concluded that Ravnsborg’s vehicle was outside the lane of travel when the accident occurred.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota found several violations of Rule 8.4.
[¶31.] Rule 8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]” Ravnsborg urges this Court to adopt the Referee’s conclusion that he did not violate Rule 8.4(c). He argues that the Referee correctly found that the facts could not prove he was dishonest, misleading, or uncooperative throughout the investigation and any allegation to the contrary was not based upon fact.
[¶32.] From our review of the record, several of Ravnsborg’s statements after the accident raise significant questions about his honesty and truthfulness. Ravnsborg’s statement to the 911 operator that he hit something “right in the roadway” and his statements to investigators that he believed he was in the roadway are contrary to the forensic evidence. While there was some question regarding how far onto the shoulder Ravnsborg’s vehicle was, the forensic evidence clearly established Ravnsborg’s vehicle was not in the middle of his driving lane when it struck Boever.
[¶33.] In addition, Ravnsborg’s statements regarding his phone usage on the night of the accident raise serious concerns about his truthfulness with investigators. At the outset of his second interview with NDBCI, Ravnsborg emphatically denied using his phone while driving back from Redfield, except for two calls he made to his father shortly after leaving Redfield. Ravnsborg denied accessing his emails at any point during his commute home and stated that he did not text anyone or otherwise recall using his phone at any time during the drive.
[¶34.] Later in the interview, investigators told Ravnsborg that they found “internet activity” on his phone just before the accident occurred. Ravnsborg responded by stating “I don’t not use my phone” but reaffirmed that he was not using either phone at the time of the crash. Ravnsborg was then directly asked if he used his phone up to the time of the crash. In response, Ravnsborg put his head down, remained silent for a few seconds, and eventually stated “not that I can recall.” Ravnsborg explained that he remembered setting the phone down when he drove into Highmore because it had fallen from the vehicle’s center console during the trip but emphasized “I was not using it at the time [of the crash].” Ravnsborg was then asked what he was doing with the phone before he got to Highmore to which he responded by stating, “I looked at the time . . . I glanced at it . . . but nothing sticks out to me.”
[¶35.] Ravnsborg was then confronted with specific metadata found on his phone shortly before he had made the 911 call at 10:24 p.m. The metadata showed Ravnsborg had unlocked his phone, checked his Yahoo email account, accessed the Dakota Free Press website, and clicked on a political news article minutes before the accident. Once informed of this information, Ravnsborg’s story took another turn. He admitted that he “looked at stuff” on his phone and then sat it down to begin thinking about cases from work but reiterated that he was not looking at his phone when the accident happened.
[¶36.] Like Rule 8.4(b), the prohibition against dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in Rule 8.4(c) applies in the context of a lawyer’s professional obligations and ability to practice law. “The purpose of lawyer discipline is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely properly to discharge their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession.” ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 1.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1992). “Not every lawyer misstatement poses that risk . . . [i]nstead, there must be a rational connection between . . .” the dishonest act and purpose of attorney discipline to protect the profession and administration of justice. In re Conduct of Carpenter, 95 P.3d 203, 208 (Or. 2004). “If the evidence in a discipline case does not establish such a nexus, then the lawyer is not subject to professional discipline.” Id.
[¶37.] In the context of attorney misconduct, we define dishonesty as “conduct evincing a lack of honesty, probity or integrity; [a] lack of fairness and straightforwardness[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n. of Maryland v. McDonald, 85 A.3d 117, 140 (Md. 2014) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sheridan, 741 A.2d 1143, 1156 (Md. 1999)). This also “encompasses the nondisclosure of a material fact.” In re Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 973 (Or. 2000) (citing In re Weidner, 801 P.2d 828, 832 n.2 (Or. 1990)). This “may be a lie, a half-truth, or even silence.” Id. (citation omitted). “A misrepresentation becomes fraud or deceit `when it is intended to be acted upon without being discovered.'” Id. (quoting In re Hiller, 694 P.2d 540, 542-44 (Or. 1985)).
[¶38.] We emphasize that Ravnsborg, just like every other criminal defendant, had a constitutional right to maintain silence. However, once he decided to submit to an interview with NDBCI, Ravnsborg failed to conduct himself with honesty. His evolving explanation regarding the extent of his cell phone use while driving involved actual dishonesty and misrepresentations within the meaning of Rule 8.4(c). Ravnsborg initially denied ever using his phone while driving, except to call his father. He only reluctantly admitted that he “looked at stuff” on his phone after he was confronted with specific information found on his phone. Even then, Ravnsborg attempted to downplay the extent of his phone usage by stating that he only used his phone to check the time.
[¶39.] At oral argument, Ravnsborg’s explanation about his statements to NDBCI concerning his phone usage raises even more concerns. Ravnsborg told this Court that he denied using his phone during the trip because he believed that his phone usage at the time of the accident was the only relevant time period regarding his phone activity. The questions from law enforcement were clear and directed Ravnsborg to disclose any phone use on the drive back from Redfield. Further, he would have undoubtedly been aware that law enforcement was investigating whether any violations of the law had occurred on the night of the accident and that using his phone at any point while driving was a statutory violation. See SDCL 32-26-47.1. Despite this knowledge and the clarity of the questions, Ravnsborg continued to deny or omit this information until it became obvious that investigators already knew the answer to their questions. Ravnsborg’s responses demonstrated a concerted effort to avoid criminal liability, through dishonesty and misrepresentations, which violated Rule 8.4(c). Finally, Ravnsborg’s patent dishonesty concerning the use of his phone, as well as the developed forensic evidence, raise genuine questions about the integrity of his statements regarding the night of the accident. This conduct, particularly considering Ravnsborg’s prominent position as attorney general, reflected adversely on the legal profession as a whole and impeded the administration of justice.
The Court also found violations of Rule 8.4(d) and (e).
