Lawyer Suspended For Violating An Order of Protection And Failing To Report Conviction to ARDC

The Hearing Board suspended a lawyer for two years and until order of court for the conduct described below:

“An emergency order of protection, entered following the dissolution of Respondent’s marriage, prohibited Respondent from contacting his ex-wife or entering their former home. Even though Respondent was personally served with that order, he sent his ex-wife multiple text messages. After being arrested for violating the order of protection, Respondent sent his ex-wife additional text messages. Those messages included false claims, which Respondent reiterated to police and medical personnel, that he had been raped. He was arrested again. Subsequently, Respondent entered and removed property from the marital house and then drove to his ex-wife’s residence, conduct for which Respondent was arrested a third time.Respondent pled guilty to violating the order of protection and was placed on probation. Probation was revoked after Respondent violated probation by continuing to use alcohol and failing to report.

In aggravation, Panel considered the fact that Respondent violated court orders knowingly, repeatedly and over time. His false claims of rape included racial slurs. Respondent’s minimal participation in his own disciplinary proceedings is a serious aggravating factor. Although he participated the first prehearing, thereafterRespondent ignored these proceedings.”

The decision was issued on September 16, 2021. 2020 PR 00069. The respondent was charged with (a) conviction of a crime and (b) failing to report his conviction to the Administrator.

ARDC Recommends Suspension for Lawyer Who Disparaged Opposing Counsel and Judge

The ARDC Hearing Board has recommended a three month suspension for a lawyer who disparaged opposing counsel during a deposition and then disparaged the judge who ruled on a discovery motion arising out of that incident.

Count I

The first violation involved conduct at a deposition that was transcribed by a court reporter.

“Respondent represented William Green, the plaintiff in an insurance coverage declaratory judgment action filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Keely Hillison represented defendant American Freedom Insurance Company (American Freedom), and Alvin Becker and Mark Evans represented defendant Insure on the Spot. The case was assigned to the Hon. Franklin U. Valderrama. (Amend. Ans. at par. 1; Tr. 51)

On November 10, 2016, Hillison took Green’s discovery deposition. Respondent, Green, Hillison, Becker, and a court reporter were present. (Tr. 59).

One of the issues Hillison sought to explore in the deposition was whether Green was using his insured vehicle for business purposes, which would not have been covered under his policy. (Tr.55). When Hillison asked Green if he had been provided a vehicle to use in connection with his employment, Respondent objected. When Hillison responded by certifying the question, the following exchange occurred:

Respondent:        Okay. Then certify your own stupidity at this point.

Hillison:             Counsel, I’m not going to sit here and take insults from you.

Respondent:        At this point in time, a man who insults on a daily basis everybody he does business with has now been elected President of the United States. The standards have changed. I’ll say what I want.

(Adm. Ex. 2 at 9-10). 

Hillison testified that Respondent was angry at the time he made these statements. (Tr. 68). Becker perceived Respondent’s demeanor and tone to be “hostile from inception and insulting.” (Tr. 237).

When Respondent said, “certify your own stupidity at this point,” Hillison felt rattled and embarrassed to be insulted in front of Becker, whom she has known for a long time. (Tr. 69, 72). According to Respondent, he was not saying Hillison was generally a stupid person but was referring to her actions at the time. (Tr. 347). 

Another exchange occurred when Hillison began to question Green about attorney fees he incurred. Hillison sought this information because Green’s complaint, which Respondent drafted, included a request for attorney fees under Section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code. (Tr. 55-57, 78). When Hillison asked Green whether he had received any invoices or bills from Respondent, Respondent said, “Don’t waste your breath.” He then objected and directed Green not to answer. When Hillison asked that the question be certified, Respondent said: “Motion for sanctions; indicate that on the record. I’m going to get sanctions against your firm like you wouldn’t believe, bitch.” (Adm. Ex. 2 at 10).

When Respondent interrupted Hillison and said “don’t waste your breath,” Hillison felt he was deliberately undermining her efforts to take the deposition and represent her client. (Tr. 78). When Respondent threatened Hillison with sanctions and called her “bitch,” she felt verbally abused and again felt rattled and embarrassed. Hillison took Respondent’s use of the word “bitch” to be a derogatory, insulting word for a nasty woman. (Tr. 81-83). 

Respondent thought Hillison’s questions were improper because he forgot that the Green complaint sought attorney fees. He acknowledged that Hillison was not responsible for his mistake, but said he might have backed down if she had brought it to his attention. (Tr. 292). Respondent testified he was protecting Green because Hillison was abusing him and questioning him unfairly and angrily. (Tr. 448-49). 

Hillison viewed her questions as proper. She did not use insulting language toward Respondent or raise her voice. She completed the deposition, although it was difficult and Green refused to answer some of her questions. (Tr. 81-85).

In Becker’s opinion, Hillison did not do anything to provoke Respondent. Becker described Hillison as a “quiet, nice, meek, nonconfrontational person.” (Tr. 237-39). He found her questioning to be professional and routine, both in the types of questions she asked and her demeanor and tone. (Tr. 248). 

Following the deposition, Hillison filed a motion to compel Green to answer the questions he refused to answer, which also mentioned Respondent’s verbal abuse. (Tr. 90; Adm. Ex. 3). The parties appeared before Judge Valderrama on the motion to compel on December 15, 2016. This proceeding is discussed in more detail in Section II below.

On December 22, 2016, Respondent filed a response to the motion to compel. In addressing the comments he made at the deposition, Respondent apologized and further stated, “the comments were intemperate, inappropriate and made in an ill-tempered reaction to what I perceived as bullying and improper questions of the plaintiff by Mrs. Hillison and a general angry tone by her that was quite visible to this counsel though it did not necessarily come out as clearly on the record.” (Adm. Ex. 3). Respondent also made comments about Judge Valderrama, which are discussed in Section II.

On January 30, 2017, Judge Valderrama entered an Order, a portion of which addressed Respondent’s comments to Hillison. Judge Valderrama described Respondent’s comment that the presidential election altered the standards of professional conduct as “preposterous.” He found Respondent’s abusive statements about Hillison more disturbing and “wholly inexcusable under any and all circumstances.” Judge Valderrama characterized Respondent’s apology in his Response as a “half-hearted or non-apology apology” because he blamed Hillison for bullying Green and asking questions in an angry tone. (Adm. Ex. 8 at 11-14).

Hillison testified that Respondent’s conduct derailed the possibility of settling Green’s case. It also affected her handling of the case because she felt the need to limit contact with Respondent to written communication. (Tr. 114, 194-97). Respondent disputed that his conduct negatively impacted the case because he and Hillison had civil email correspondence following the Green deposition. (Tr. 479-80).”

The ARDC Hearing panel determined that the respondent had violated Rule 3.5(d) (duty to abstain from disruptive conduct); Rule Rule 4.4(a) (harassment) and Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Count II

The respondent was also found to have disparaged Judge Valderama involution of Rule 8.2(a). The opinion sets forth the facts as follows:

“When Respondent, Hillison, and attorney Mark Evans appeared on December 15, 2016, on American Freedom’s motion to compel, Judge Valderrama admonished Respondent for the comments he made to Hillison. Evans recalled that Judge Valderrama appeared to be offended by Respondent’s conduct and told Respondent the language he used was inappropriate. (Tr. 207-212). Hillison remembered Judge Valderrama telling Respondent he was lucky the only relief Hillison was seeking was to compel answers to her deposition questions. Both Hillison and Evans testified that Judge Valderrama remained calm and did not raise his voice or appear to be angry. (Tr. 96-97, 207-212). Respondent, on the other hand, believed Judge Valderrama was very angry with him but could not recall the words Judge Valderrama used. (Tr. 353). No court reporter was present. (Tr. 96-97). 

On December 22, 2016, Respondent filed a response to American Freedom’s motion to compel which included statements about Judge Valderrama’s conduct during the December 15, 2016 proceeding. Respondent stated that he would have apologized to Hillison at that time, “but the court, in its anger, refused to let this counsel speak and further made comments attempting to hold me to the statement made in the deposition.” (Adm. Ex. 5 at 8).

Respondent went on to characterize Judge Valderrama as being “in a rage.” He stated that Judge Valderrama “flew into a rage of his own at this counsel for what was said in the deposition.” Respondent acknowledged that Judge Valderrama had made some favorable rulings for his client in the past, but said that “in light of recent events, and most particularly the ?robe rage incident’ of December 15, 2016, it is unclear to this counsel whether the client, who has a meritorious case and said nothing inappropriate at his deposition, will now suffer because of the anger this court holds against his counsel.” Respondent continued, saying “In this case, the judge saw an angry situation develop in a deposition and reacted in anger. It is always preferable if a judge is able to put out fires rather than pour oil on the flames.” Respondent then repeated his questioning of Judge Valderrama’s ability to act impartially toward Green, saying, “On the other hand, such temper as was displayed by the Court calls into question the impartiality of the tribunal.” Respondent said he was sorry if Judge Valderrama considered his words to be a personal attack, but “as an attorney representing a client, it is necessary to protect that client from the judicial anger that clearly occurred on December 15.” (Adm. Ex. 5 at 8-9).

According to Respondent, when he used the term “robe rage” he was merely expressing that Judge Valderrama was angry while he was on the bench. (Tr. 357). He had doubt as to Judge Valderrama’s impartiality because of the anger Judge Valderrama displayed. (Tr. 366).

In the Order entered on January 30, 2017, Judge Valderrama addressed Respondent’s comments about him at length. The Order stated that the court is presumed to be impartial and judicial remarks that are critical or disapproving of counsel ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. It further stated that “an objective, reasonable person would not conclude that the Court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned based on the Court’s admonishment of Cohn at the December 15, 2016 Hearing.” (Adm. Ex. 8 at 16-17).”

The Panel found that the lawyer had violated Rule 8.2(a) by making false statements concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge. The respondent defended himself on the ground that none of the statements was false or defamatory and that he had a First Amendment right to make those statements and that those statements were protected opinions under the First Amendment.

The Panel recommended a three month suspension. In re Charles Andrew Cohn, 2018 PR 00109.

ARDC Proposes 3 Month Suspension For “Offensive Language” Targeting Women Lawyers

On October 22, 2019, the ARDC Hearing Board recommended a 3 month suspension for Jason Craddock who, it found, used offensive language with women lawyers.

The respondent made demeaning and insulting remarks to two women lawyers in the course of litigation. The Northern District of Illinois suspended Respondent for six months for his actions.

The ARDC Hearing Panel identified two incidents of inappropriate language. The Opinion states in part:

“September 15, 2016 Incident in the Wyman Matter

The first incident occurred in the hallway of the federal courthouse after a hearing in the Wyman matter. Judge Kennelly had set a briefing schedule on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. After Respondent failed to file a response, Judge Kennelly, on his own motion, issued a rule to show cause why Respondent should not be sanctioned or held in contempt. (Ans. at par. 3; Tr. 33-35, 115).

The hearing on the rule to show cause was held on September 15, 2016. At the hearing, Respondent requested an additional extension of time to file his response. Ms. Lindbert opposed the request. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Kennelly agreed to give Respondent one more opportunity to respond and granted him a final extension. (Ans. at par. 3; Tr. 35-37, 115).

According to Ms. Lindbert, prior to the rule to show cause hearing, she had sent Respondent a letter pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure notifying him she did not believe Wyman’s claim had merit. After they left Judge Kennelly’s courtroom and were walking toward the elevators, she told Respondent she would be filing a motion for Rule 11 sanctions and was going to report him to the ARDC. Ms. Lindbert testified that she had her back to Respondent at the time and asked Respondent if he had heard her. Respondent responded, “I heard you Cuntney.” Ms. Lindbert turned around and said, “Excuse me?” Respondent then repeated, “I heard you Cuntney.” (Tr. 37-39, 60-61).

Ms. Lindbert testified that she was in shock after Respondent’s remarks and did not respond. She returned to the office and met with both Frank Andreou and Luke Casson, the firm’s partners, and they consulted with ethics counsel for advice. (Tr. 39-42; Tr. 51).

Ms. Lindbert testified she experienced a variety of feelings, including anger and embarrassment. She believed Respondent’s use of that word and his incorporation of it into her name was inappropriate anywhere, particularly in the hallway of the federal courthouse. She testified that the situation made her uncomfortable and was a little intimidating. (Tr. 39-42).”

Later the respondent again used inappropriate language in an email as follows:

“The second incident occurred after summary judgment was granted in favor of Evgeros in the Knapp matter. Respondent sought to challenge that ruling and filed a motion to reconsider. Evgeros filed its response to the motion on November 7, 2016. In accordance with the briefing schedule set by the court, Respondent filed his initial reply on behalf of Knapp on November 21, 2016. On November 27, 2016, without leave of court, Respondent filed an additional pleading which he called a “Corrected Reply.” (Adm. Ex. 8T; Tr. 33, 42-43, 121-22).

On December 2, 2016, Ms. Lindbert filed a motion for sanctions and to strike the Corrected Reply. She believed the filing was untimely in the sense that he had filed two pleadings without leave of court. Ms. Lindbert acknowledged that she asserted in her motion that both the original reply and the Corrected Reply were untimely and should be stricken. (Adm. Ex. 8T; Tr. 44-45, 65-67).

On Friday, December 2, 2016, Judge Feinerman denied, without prejudice, Evgeros’ motion for sanctions and to strike. He also directed that if the motion were re-filed, the defendant clarify what it meant by untimely and without leave of court. (Ans. at par. 5; Tr. 45-46, 68).

The next day, Saturday evening December 3, 2016, at 10:46 p.m., Ms. Lindbert received the following email message from Respondent on her work email:

Cuntney Lindbitch, your days of filing unnecessary, frivolous motions and abusing and harassing attorneys with disabilities will come to an end. This last effort by you?trying to prejudice me by claiming that a timely filing was filed “untimely and without leave of court” was over the top. Your client will soon see that it is YOU, not me, who is “bleeding it dry.” (Ans. at par. 5; Adm. Ex. 1; Tr. 46).

Ms. Lindbert viewed the language in the email as threatening. She stated that she was shocked and scared, and no longer wanted anything to do with the situation. (Tr. 47-50). Ms. Lindbert forwarded the email to Mr. Andreou and Mr. Casson, who told her not to respond. The following Monday, she was advised she was being taken off the cases and needed to report the matter to the ARDC. Mr. Casson took over the cases and filed motions for sanctions attaching the email. (Tr. 49-51).”

The Panel found that the Respondent had violated Rules 4.4(a) ([i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person”) and 8.4(d) (prejudice to the administration of justice).

The Panel opinion concluded with these comments;

“After considering precedent, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the goals of the disciplinary process, we conclude that a three-month suspension is appropriate discipline in this matter. This is within the range of sanctions imposed in cases involving misconduct of this nature. While it is debatable whether Respondent’s misconduct is as serious as in the cases at the higher end of this range, we believe it warrants more than the minimum sanction. This is particularly true since Respondent’s misconduct involved multiple incidents as well as significant additional aggravation.

We also note that while precedent was considered, each case is unique and must be decided based on its own facts. After considering the particular facts and circumstances in this case, we believe that a meaningful period of suspension is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the disciplinary process. Respondent’s misconduct presents a particularly egregious example of incivility as well as the mistreatment of women in the legal profession. Such grossly unprofessional conduct brings the entire profession into disrepute. We believe a message needs to be sent to Respondent as well as the rest of the bar that such conduct is unacceptable, will not be tolerated, and will be met with serious consequences. We also believe that the Illinois bar should be ahead of, not behind, society’s long overdue attention to misogyny. Our sanction recommendation also reflects these concerns.”

I agree with the decision of the Hearing Panel, which, in my opinion, is well reasoned and thoughtful.