ARDC Review Board Recommends 90 day Suspension for Shared Law Office Fiasco

The ARDC review board has recommended a 90-day suspension for Scott Thomas Kamin, 2016 PR 97. Kamin was the main tenant in a shared law office. He fell behind on the rent. When he was served with the eviction lawsuit he took service for the subtenants but failed to notify them of the existence of the eviction lawsuit.

The facts are described as follows:

The Administrator brought a one-count complaint against Respondent, charging him with engaging in dishonest conduct in connection with an eviction matter, in violation of 2010 Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c). Following a hearing at which Respondent was represented by counsel, the Hearing Board found that Respondent had committed the charged misconduct and recommended that he be suspended for 90 days.
Respondent filed exceptions to the Hearing Board’s dishonesty finding as well as its sanction recommendation. He asks this Board to reverse the Hearing Board’s misconduct finding and to dismiss the complaint against him. In the alternative, he argues that, if this Board affirms the misconduct finding, he should be reprimanded or censured instead of suspended.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Hearing Board’s dishonesty finding and agree with its recommendation that Respondent be suspended for 90 days for his misconduct.

Respondent was admitted to practice in Illinois in 1995, and has been a solo practitioner since 1997, focusing his practice on criminal and civil rights matters. He has no prior misconduct.
In 2015 and early 2016, Respondent leased office space at 55 East Jackson Boulevard in Chicago. He, in turn, sublet office space to other attorneys, including Carla Buterman, Eric Rakoczy, Phillip Brigham, Jason Epstein, and a few others. In March 2015, Respondent fell behind in his rent payments, and in September 2015, he stopped paying rent entirely. During that time, however, he continued accepting rent payments from his subtenants, who did not know that he had fallen behind in his own rent payments, and was struggling to pay his other bills.
On November 5, 2015, attorney Allen B. Glass filed an eviction lawsuit on behalf of the landlord against Respondent personally, his law office, and the law offices of Brigham, Epstein, Rakoczy, and “unknown occupants.” Glass testified at Respondent’s hearing that the subtenants had to be named in the lawsuit for possession purposes.
On November 6, Cook County Sheriff’s Deputy Tony R. Lampkin went to Respondent’s office and served the summons on him. He asked Respondent if he was authorized to accept service for the others on the service list, and Respondent said that he was. Lampkin thus indicated on the affidavit of service that he had left copies of the summonses and complaint with authorized persons. The subtenants were not in the office at the time Respondent accepted service. Respondent thinks he put the complaint and summonses in his desk drawer.
Buterman (who was not named in the complaint), Epstein, Brigham, and Rakoczy all testified that they did not authorize Respondent to accept service of process for them, and that Respondent did not tell them about the lawsuit or that they were named as defendants.

Respondent acknowledged that he accepted service on behalf of his subtenants; that he did not seek their authority to accept service on their behalf; and that he did not tell any of them that he had accepted service on their behalf.
On at least three occasions, Glass and Respondent appeared in court on the eviction lawsuit. Respondent did not tell the judge that the subtenants were not properly served. Glass testified that Respondent represented to the court that he was appearing on behalf of himself and the other named defendants. Respondent denied making any such representation and testified that the issue of who represented the subtenants never came up. The Hearing Board credited Glass’s testimony, not Respondent’s.
Respondent told Glass that he would be able to pay his back rent when he received a settlement from the City of Chicago. Glass agreed to continue the matter a few times to give Respondent a chance to present a payment plan. But the settlement that Respondent expected did not come through, and Respondent did not present a payment plan or pay any of his back rent.
Respondent told Glass that he would be able to pay his back rent when he received a settlement from the City of Chicago. Glass agreed to continue the matter a few times to give Respondent a chance to present a payment plan. The settlement that Respondent expected did not materialize and Respondent never presented a payment plan or paid any of his back rent.
Consequently, on January 21, 2016, the court entered an order of eviction and a judgment of $43,468.48 against Respondent and his law office subtenants. Respondent’s subtenants learned of the order of eviction around the time it was entered, or shortly thereafter.
Buterman testified that she learned about the impending eviction around January 19, when another subtenant, who was not named in the complaint, told her he thought they were being evicted. Respondent told Buterman about the eviction about a day later. He showed her a copy of the eviction complaint, after she asked to see it, but did not give her a copy. According to Buterman, Respondent said he had accepted service of the complaint on behalf of everyone in the office and then put the complaint in his drawer because he did not want anyone to know he had been served with the complaint. He told her that he did not notify her about the eviction because he feared the subtenants would leave before he had a chance to work things out with the landlord.
Rakoczy testified that Respondent told him about the eviction at the end of January. Respondent did not tell him that an order of possession had been entered or show him the complaint or summons. Rakoczy did not learn about the lawsuit or that he had been named as a defendant until after he had moved out in February. He learned about the lawsuit from either Brigham or Buterman.
Brigham testified that he learned of the eviction from Rakoczy, and that Respondent came to talk with him later that day or the next day. Respondent told Brigham he made a business decision not to notify anyone and that he thought he would be able to resolve the eviction lawsuit because he had expected some cases to settle. Respondent did not show or give Brigham a copy of the complaint, or tell Brigham that he was named as a defendant.
Epstein testified that he learned of the eviction when Respondent and another male subtenant came into his office and told him they had to move in ten to fourteen days. He did not recall Respondent saying that a lawsuit had been filed and that he had been named as a defendant. Respondent did not give Epstein a copy of the complaint or summons, or tell Epstein that he had accepted service on Epstein’s behalf. Epstein learned about the judgment after his conversation with Respondent.
After all of the tenants had moved out of 55 East Jackson, Rakoczy, Brigham, and Epstein filed motions to vacate the judgment against them, on the ground that service was improper because Respondent was not authorized to accept service for them. Glass agreed to vacate the judgment against the subtenants, and the court issued an order vacating the judgment against them.

HEARING BOARD’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Misconduct Findings

The Hearing Board found that Respondent had committed the misconduct with which he was charged – engaging in dishonest conduct in violation of Rule 8.4(c) by stating to Deputy Lampkin that he was authorized to accept service on behalf of the subtenants when he was not; failing to inform the court he did not have authority to accept service or appear on behalf of the subtenants; and concealing the eviction lawsuit from the subtenants.
Regarding the misrepresentation to Lampkin, the Hearing Board inferred dishonesty from the circumstances. It found that, contrary to Respondent’s assertion to Lampkin, he did not have authority to accept service on behalf of the subtenants nor did he have reason to believe that he had such authority. It reasoned that, given his experience as an attorney, his financial troubles, and his subsequent concealment of the lawsuit from his subtenants, it did not believe that his representation to Lampkin was an innocent mistake.
The Hearing Board also found that Respondent had concealed the lawsuit from his subtenants, noting that he kept the complaint and summonses in his desk drawer and decided not to tell the subtenants about the lawsuit or that they were named defendants in it. It found not credible Respondent’s explanation that not telling the subtenants about the lawsuit was a business decision, finding it more likely that he did not want the subtenants to learn that he had not been remitting their payments to the landlord and wanted to continue receiving their payments in order to pay his expenses. It found credible the subtenants’ testimony that Respondent did not provide them with a copy of the complaint after informing them of the impending eviction, which it found to be further evidence of his intent to conceal their status as defendants. It found it apparent that Respondent did not want the subtenants to know they were parties to the lawsuit or that he had taken action on their behalf without their knowledge and consent.
And last, the Hearing Board found that Respondent’s failure to inform the court that he had accepted service on behalf of the subtenant defendants without their authority was dishonest. It found that he knew he had accepted service without authority and that the subtenants had no knowledge of the lawsuit and were not properly before the court, and yet he made no effort to advise the court of the improper service, even after the subtenants were named in the order of possession. It found that, as an officer of the court and the only party who knew of the improper service, he had an obligation to inform the court of the facts of the case. It thus concluded that Respondent intentionally concealed information about service from the court, and from opposing counsel, because he did not want anyone involved in the lawsuit to know he was acting without the subtenants’ authority.

The Review Board upheld the finding of a violation of Rule 8.4(c).

ARDC Hearing Board Recommends 90 day suspension for Lawyer who concealed eviction lawsuit from subtenants

This was a decision of the ARDC Hearing Board, which recommended a 90-day suspension for an attorney who concealed an eviction lawsuit from his subtenants.

To understand the case, you have to understand how law offices in Chicago sometimes are set up as a shared law office. One lawyer will sign a lease for the premises and then will sub-lease individual offices to other attorneys. The practice can reduce costs and can create a collegial environment.

In this case the shared office arrangement somehow went awry. The lead tenant, Scott Kamin, allegedly fell behind on the rent and then was sued for eviction. He was disciplined for representing to the Sheriff that he had authority to accept service of process for his sub-tenants. Because Kamin took service of process himself, they were unaware of the eviction lawsuit.

The factual allegations:

On November 5, 2015, attorney Allen B. Glass filed an eviction lawsuit on behalf of 55 E. Jackson LLC against Law Offices of Scott T. Kamin, LLC, Scott T. Kamin, Law Office of Phillip Brigham LLC, Law Office of Jason R. Epstein, The Law Office of Erik Rakoczy LLC and Unknown Occupants. (Tr. 65; Adm. Ex. 5). Glass testified that as part of filing the lawsuit he determined who was in actual possession of the space because those entities had to be named for possession purposes. Consequently, the entities he identified as subtenants were named as defendants in addition to Respondent. (Tr. 64). Glass prepared the service list for the summonses. Some of the people on the service list were registered agents. (Tr. 66).
On November 6, 2015, Cook County Sheriff’s Deputy Tony R. Lampkin served summonses at 55 East Jackson upon Phillip Brigham, Law Offices of Scott Kamin, Scott Kamin, Law Offices of Erik Rakoczy, Law Offices of Jason Epstein and unknown occupants. (Tr. 85). Deputy Lampkin spoke to Respondent in his office. He asked if Respondent was one of the persons on the service list and whether he was authorized to accept service for the others on the list. Respondent said he was authorized to accept service. Based on Respondent’s representation, Lampkin marked on the affidavits of service that he left copies of the summons and complaint with authorized persons. (Tr. 86; Adm. Ex. 5). Deputy Lampkin’s practice is to use the phrase, “Are you authorized to accept for” another person. He completed the affidavits of service on the day he served the summonses. (Tr. 87).
Respondent acknowledged accepting service of the complaint and summonses from Deputy Lampkin. He did not seek authority from his subtenants to accept service on their behalf. (Tr. 133). The subleases did not address how to handle service of process. Respondent testified as follows regarding his thoughts at the time he accepted service:
At first, I didn’t know it was a lawsuit. Then I knew it was a lawsuit. As I was accepting service, I knew it was a lawsuit. I looked at what it was regarding and realized what was happening and realized the severity of it. But I still-to this day, I just don’t see why-what was the problem accepting service. Nothing in the contract said we’re not going to accept service.
(Tr. 149-150). Respondent thinks he put the complaint and summonses in his desk drawer after he received them from Deputy Lampkin. The subtenants were not in the office at the time of service. Respondent acknowledged he did not tell any of the subtenants he had accepted service for them. (Tr. 135).

The finding of misconduct:

The Administrator alleges Respondent acted dishonestly by stating to Deputy Lampkin he was authorized to accept service on behalf of the subtenants when he was not so authorized, failing to inform the court he did not have authority to accept service or appear on behalf of the subtenants, and concealing the eviction lawsuit from the subtenants. Respondent acknowledges he committed misconduct, but he denies it was intentional.
Rule 8.4(c) (formerly Rule 8.4(a)(4)) “is broadly construed to include anything calculated to deceive, including the suppression of truth and the suggestion of falsity.” In re Edmonds, 2014IL 117696, par. 53. “[M]otive and intent are rarely proved by direct evidence, but rather must be inferred from conduct and the surrounding circumstances.” In re Stern, 124 Ill. 2d 310, 315, 529 N.E.2d 562 (1988).
Here, the evidence established Respondent made a misrepresentation to Deputy Lampkin and did not disclose his acceptance of service on the subtenants’ behalf to the subtenants or to the Court. Contrary to Respondent’s assertion to Deputy Lampkin, he did not have authority to accept service on behalf of the subtenants nor did he have reason to believe he had such authority. The subtenants uniformly testified they did not authorize Respondent to accept service of process for them. Further, it is undisputed Respondent was not an officer, agent or registered agent for the corporate defendants, Law Office of Erik Rakoczy, LLC or Law Office of Phillip Brigham, LLC, so there was no legitimate basis upon which Respondent could accept service for those entities. Respondent realized the significance of the lawsuit at the time he was served. Given Respondent’s experience as an attorney, his financial troubles and his subsequent concealment of the eviction lawsuit, we do not believe his representation to Deputy Lampkin was an innocent mistake.
In addition, the evidence clearly established Respondent intentionally concealed the eviction lawsuit from the subtenants. He kept the complaint and summonses in his desk drawer and decided not to tell the subtenants about the lawsuit, much less that they were named defendants. Respondent characterized the concealment as a “business decision,” but we do not find his explanation credible. Rather, we find it more likely he did not want the subtenants to learn he had not been remitting their rent payments to the landlord and wanted to continue receiving their rent payments in order to pay his expenses. We also find the subtenants’ testimony that Respondent did not provide them with a copy of the complaint after informing them of the impending eviction both credible and further evidence of Respondent’s intent to conceal their status as defendants. This conduct cannot be explained as a business decision. Rather, it is apparent Respondent did not want the subtenants to know they were parties to the lawsuit or that Respondent had taken action on their behalf without their knowledge and consent.
We further find Respondent’s failure to inform the court of his acceptance of service without authority was a violation of Rule 8.4(c). Respondent knew he had accepted service without authority and knew the subtenants had no knowledge of the lawsuit and were not properly before the court. Nonetheless, Respondent made no effort to advise the court of the improper service, even after the subtenants were named in the order of possession. As an officer of the court and the only party with knowledge of the improper service, Respondent had an obligation to correctly inform the court of the facts of the case, “to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions.” In re Braner, 115 Ill. 2d 384, 392, 504 N.E.2d 102 (1987). Consistent with our findings above, we find Respondent purposely concealed information pertaining to service from the court, and from opposing counsel, because he did not want anyone involved in the lawsuit to learn he was acting without the subtenants’ authority. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we find the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c).

The Hearing Board recommended a 90-day suspension.

Filed November 29:

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ARDC Hearing Board Recommends Five Month Suspension For Lawyer Who Created Fake Loan Documents

Filed October 25:

Some of the allegations in ARDC matters are hard for me to believe. This is one such case. A lawyer was accused of dishonesty and fraud in violation of Rule 8.4(c). Essentially, the lawyer prepared fake subordination agreements so that he could secure additional financing for a family real estate business. A subordination agreement takes a lender with priority and moves that lender behind another lender. Lenders are reluctant to subordinate their loans because they lose their first claim to the collateral and give another lender an advantage. The Hearing Board voted a five-month suspension.

The facts, as found by the Hearing Board, were as follows:

Before becoming a lawyer, Respondent worked as a realtor and loan originator. He saw a business opportunity in the need of some real estate purchasers for short term loans until they could obtain long term financing. Consequently, Respondent formed LOP Capital, LLC (LOP). LOP made short term loans at a relatively high interest rate, until the borrower could get a conventional loan at a lower rate. The arrangement presupposed that the buyer would quickly obtain other financing and repay the loan from LOP. (Tr. 17-20, 89-93).
Respondent’s father and grandfather co-owed LOP with Respondent. They provided the funds with which to begin LOP’s operations, by taking out loans from American Community
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Bank and Trust (American Community). The loans exceeded $1.5 million. Respondent’s father and grandfather each owned real estate, which they pledged to secure these loans. Respondent was to make the payments due to American Community, which included monthly payments of approximately $10,000. (Ans. at par. 1; Tr. 18-23).
LOP enjoyed some initial success. However, beginning in 2008, widespread economic recession caused sharp declines in the real estate market and property values. This created significant problems for LOP, in bringing in revenue and in maintaining its loans from American Community. (Ans. at par. 1; Tr. 20-25, 42-43, 92-93).
As time went on, American Community began to require that its loans be renewed at increasingly shorter intervals. In the renewal process, American Community would assess the adequacy of existing collateral and sometimes required additional collateral to renew a loan. In that context, in 2009 or 2010, LOP executed a deed in trust to American Community, pledging property LOP owned in Stephens County, Georgia as additional collateral for LOP’s obligations to American Community. (Ans. at par. 1; Tr. 24-25, 43-44).
LOP’s financial problems continued over time. It became increasingly difficult for Respondent to make the payments due to American Community. Respondent described his concern with avoiding foreclosure, particularly on property owned by his father or grandfather. Respondent also described his reluctance to inform his father of the situation. (Ans. at par. 1; Tr. 23-26, 32-34, 42-45; Adm. Exs. 3-6).
In an effort to obtain funds to pay American Community, Respondent tried to sell property and borrow additional funds. Respondent received some loans from individuals, but found only one commercial lender willing to lend funds to him. That lender, Prime Equity of Atlanta, Georgia, agreed to lend LOP $25,000, at eighteen percent interest, provided it received a first security interest in LOP’s property in Georgia. That was the same property LOP had pledged to American Community. (Ans. at par. 2; Tr. 25-28, 79-80, 112, 114).
Respondent assumed American Community would not agree to subordinate its interest to Prime Equity, and he did not ask anyone at American Community about this issue. Instead, on or about January 10, 2011, Respondent created a document entitled “Subordination Agreement.” According to this document, American Community agreed to subordinate its rights in the Georgia property to the interests of Prime Equity. Respondent signed the document, using the names of American Community’s vice president, Rick Francois, and its chief financial officer, Robert W. Getty. Respondent then signed Mark Tarinelli’s name and used Tarinelli’s notary stamp to purportedly notarize the other signatures. (Ans. at pars. 3, 4; Tr. 26-30; Adm. Ex. 1).
Respondent attempted to mimic the signatures of each of these individuals. He did not have authority from any of them to sign their names to this document and did not have authority to use Tarinelli’s notary stamp. Tarinelli was an attorney with whom Respondent was working, and Respondent had access to Tarinelli’s office. Respondent likewise did not have any authority from American Community to take action on its behalf in relation to the Georgia property. Respondent knew the purported Subordination Agreement was false and that his conduct was wrong. (Ans. at pars. 4, 5; Tr. 26-30, 59, 64-65, 77-78).
Respondent tendered the Subordination Agreement to Prime Equity and caused the document to be filed with the local court clerk. Respondent obtained the loan and used the proceeds to pay amounts past due to American Community. (Ans. at par. 6; Tr. 30-31, 36-37).
Respondent also created a document entitled “Cancellation of Subordination Agreement” (Cancellation), which purported to show that American Community cancelled the Subordination Agreement. On this document, and without authority, Respondent signed Francois’s name and purported to notarize that signature using Tarinelli’s name and notary stamp. Respondent knew the Cancellation was false. Respondent recorded the Cancellation, on or about June 1, 2012, by filing it with the local court clerk. (Ans. at pars. 7, 8, 9; Tr. 31, 53, 64-65, 77-78; Adm. Ex. 2)¹.
At that time, Respondent had not fully paid the loans from Prime Equity or American Community. According to Respondent’s testimony, he intended to record the Cancellation as soon as the loan from Prime Equity was ready to go and the purpose of the Cancellation was to put things back in order, with American Community in a first position. Respondent did not notify anyone at American Community of the Subordination Agreement or Cancellation. Respondent knew if he did so the documents would be discovered as forgeries. (Tr. 53, 57, 113).
The Subordination Agreement and Cancellation came to light when American Community later foreclosed on the Georgia property. Francois first learned of those documents when they were sent to him in 2015. (Tr. 63-68). Francois sent the documents to Tarinelli, who likewise first saw them at that time, in August 2015. (Tr. 77, 85, 87).

The Hearing Board was unimpressed with the “remorse” shown by the lawyer:

Respondent engaged in serious misconduct, which entailed clear dishonesty. Respondent prepared and signed two documents, which he knew he had no authority to execute. Each document purportedly affected the right of a lender in collateral pledged to secure its loan. Respondent also falsely notarized the two documents, which ratcheted up the level of dishonesty present in this case.
Respondent’s misconduct was not a momentary lapse of judgment. Preparing, executing and purportedly notarizing these two documents involved a number of steps. Respondent also filed each document, filing the Cancellation a year and a half after the Subordination Agreement.
There was little mitigation. Respondent described some limited pro bono work. He did not present any character testimony.
Respondent suggested the Cancellation was mitigating, because it undid the Subordination Agreement. We disagree. Respondent’s theory suggests he does not understand the impact of his conduct. The Cancellation, if genuine, would have affected Prime Equity, whose loan had not been repaid when Respondent recorded the Cancellation. More fundamentally, the Cancellation constituted a second fraudulent document, which Respondent prepared knowing it was false and which provided a way to conceal the Subordination Agreement.
Respondent acknowledged his conduct was wrong and expressed remorse. However, to us, Respondent’s remorse appeared less related to his misconduct than to the overall situation involving the failure of LOP.

https://www.clintonlaw.net/legal-ethics.html

ARDC Hearing Board Recommends Two Year Suspension For Lawyer Who Threatened Administrator

Filed July 7:

This was a routine disciplinary investigation concerning a fee dispute and a client relations dispute until the respondent lawyer began to make voicemail threats to the Administrator. The Hearing Board recommended that he be suspended for two years and until further order of court. Please note that the lawyer defaulted and did not answer the complaint so the facts were deemed admitted against him.

Count I concerned the respondent’s actions in presenting a client with a $10,000 promissory note in order for him to handle a trial. The respondent violated Rule 1.8(a) by not instructing the client to obtain separate counsel to review the agreement. The Panel’s recitation of the facts follows:

“Beginning in March 2011, Respondent represented Dr. Rex Nzeribe in an action for dissolution of marriage. By May 2012, Dr. Nzeribe had paid Respondent approximately $4,450 in fees and costs. (Second Amended Complaint (Sec. Am. Compl.) at pars. 1, 2, 3).

However, as of May 10, 2012, Dr. Nzeribe had told Respondent he wished to terminate Respondent’s services and Respondent had sent Dr. Nzeribe notice of his motion to withdraw. The motion to withdraw was to be heard on May 16, 2012. (Sec. Am. Compl. at pars. 4, 5).

Trial was scheduled to begin on May 21, 2012, and the court denied the motion to withdraw. The court also heard a motion to compel Dr. Nzeribe’s deposition. The court granted that motion and ordered Dr. Nzeribe to appear for his deposition later the same day. (Sec. Am. Compl. at pars. 5, 7).

After these rulings, Respondent asked Dr. Nzeribe to pay him $10,000 in additional legal fees. Dr. Nzeribe refused. Respondent then informed Dr. Nzeribe that he would not represent Dr. Nzeribe at the deposition unless Dr. Nzeribe signed a promissory note, which required him to pay Respondent $10,000 in installments over the next four years. Believing he had no alternative, other than to represent himself, Dr. Nzeribe agreed, even though he did not owe Respondent $10,000. (Sec. Am. Compl. at pars. 8, 9).

Ultimately, the trial began on May 22, 2012 and continued through May 24, 2012. (Sec. Am. Compl. at pars. 10, 11). In the meantime, Respondent had prepared a promissory note, under which Dr. Nzeribe was to pay Respondent $10,000, with interest at four percent per year, in monthly installments of $250, beginning on July 15, 2012. Respondent presented the note to Dr. Nzeribe for signature on May 23, 2012. At that time, Respondent told Dr. Nzeribe that he would not continue to represent Dr. Nzeribe if he did not sign the note. Respondent did not inform Dr. Nzeribe of the risks involved with Respondent acting as both Dr. Nzeribe’s legal advisor and a participant in the transaction. He did not obtain Dr. Nzeribe’s informed consent to the transaction. Respondent also did not advise Dr. Nzeribe of his right to seek independent counsel or give him a reasonable opportunity to do so. Respondent did not tell Dr. Nzeribe that, as Dr. Nzeribe’s attorney, Respondent could not enter into a business transaction with Dr. Nzeribe, unless certain requirements were met. Dr. Nzeribe signed the note, believing he had no other alternative, if he wanted representation at trial. (Sec. Am. Compl. at pars. 9, 12-14).”

By failing to advise the client to obtain independent legal advice, the lawyer violated Rule 1.8(a).

Count II was a charge that the lawyer violated Rule 4.4(a) by making angry, harassing communications to a client.

Count III contained a much more serious charge that the Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) by making threats to the ARDC’s attorney.

The Hearing Panel found the facts to be these:

“From July 2015 through September 2016, Respondent made multiple telephone calls to a number he knew belonged to Scott Renfroe, the attorney then representing the Administrator in this case. All the calls were placed outside of normal business hours, and Respondent left voice mail messages. Respondent made each call with the intent to abuse, threaten or harass Renfroe. Respondent also sent Renfroe two electronic communications, sending each with the intent to threaten injury to Renfroe. (Sec. Am. Compl. at pars. 26-29, 31, 33-34, 36). Here, the “electronic communications” were e-mails, and we refer to them accordingly.

Respondent’s messages to Renfroe, by voice mail and e-mail where indicated, are summarized briefly below. The Second Amended Complaint outlined the messages in greater detail and included additional insults and expletives contained in the messages. (Sec. Am. Compl. at pars. 26-29, 31, 33-34, 36). Respondent’s messages were:

July 8, 2015, 7:39 p.m.: “You will apologize to me for wasting my time, end this or you will not make an example of me, I will make an example of you and your filthy ARDC organization ? this will not end pretty for you, for me, anyone, drop this now ?”

(Sec. Am. Compl. at par. 26).

July 8, 2015, 7:51 p.m.: “By the way, this is a fact, not a threat. When I get cancer, you will be the first to know about it.” (Sec. Am. Compl. at par. 27).

August 5, 2015, 9:46 p.m.: “When I get cancer, I am going to kill you with my bare hands.”

(Sec. Am. Compl. at par. 28).

January 6, 2016, 11:59 p.m., by e-mail: “I just noticed something on my neck, could be cancer, I hope so. (wink!)” The message concluded: “I shall never forget the kindness you and your filthy government comrades have shown me in these matters. ?The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants ? to the last I grapple with thee; from hell’s heart I stab at thee; for hate’s sake I spit my last breath at thee.’?”

(Sec. Am. Compl. at par. 29).”

Obviously, these are serious threats and would concern any disciplinary body. The respondent was suspended for two years and must reapply and prove he is fit to practice law before he would be allowed to practice law.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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ARDC Hearing Board Recommends Disbarment for Thefts And Efforts to Cover Up Misconduct

Filed February 9:

This is a very serious case where the lawyer was accused of converting client funds from a settlement and other misconduct. He was found guilty on Count I, which accused him of converting in excess of $32,000 in settlement funds. He was also found guilty in Count II of giving false testimony in a deposition. In Count III, the lawyer was found to have testified falsely in a disciplinary matter and found to have created false documents to cover up his misconduct. The lawyer apparently had false receipts prepared and he convinced his client to sign them. The Panel was not persuaded:

Rule 8.1(a) specifically provides that a lawyer, “in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact.” Comment [1] to Rule 8.1 states that “it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer’s own conduct.”

The letter sent to Respondent by Administrator’s counsel on July 7, 2015, expressly informed Respondent that there was an active disciplinary investigation into his conduct. (Adm. Ex. 15). Additionally, the voice messages Respondent left on Breeden’s telephone answering machine show that Respondent was fully aware of the disciplinary investigation and that he was preparing 19 receipts to be signed by Breeden for the purpose of documenting to Administrator’s counsel that Respondent paid Breeden the money set out on the receipts. (Adm. Ex. 21 at 14, 16, 20, 22, 24). Also, the Respondent’s testimony at the hearing and in his sworn statement on December 8, 2015, show that he did submit the 19 receipts to the ARDC and claimed them to be truthful. (Tr. 142-43; Adm. Ex. 23 at 35, 38-39). Consequently, the Respondent’s creation and submission of the receipts to the ARDC; his statements to Breeden in August 2015 to get Breeden to sign the 19 receipts; and his testimony in his sworn statement pertained to material facts in connection with a disciplinary matter.

In our Analysis and Conclusions in section (1) of Count I, above, we found that the Respondent intentionally took and used (converted) more than $32,000 in settlement funds from his client Mark Breeden’s personal injury case, knowing that he had no authority to do so. We

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also found that the Respondent did not distribute to Breeden any of the funds set out on the 19 receipts he prepared and which Breeden signed in August 2015. (Adm. Ex. 22). Additionally, we found that Respondent made false representations to Breeden to get Breeden to sign the 19 fraudulent receipts. We further found that Respondent prepared the 19 receipts knowing they were false and with the intent to present false evidence to the ARDC.

Based upon our findings in Count I, we find that, in connection with a disciplinary investigation, Respondent knowingly made false statements of material fact by knowingly creating and submitting false receipts to the ARDC. He also made false statements to Breeden that he (Respondent) was holding money for and would distribute it to Breeden. The purpose of the foregoing statements was to convince Breeden to sign the fraudulent receipts. In fact, Respondent had already taken and used the funds in question.

We also find that Respondent knowingly testified falsely during his sworn statement on December 8, 2015. He falsely testified that “I had paid out the money to Breeden over a period of time in cash;” that the 19 receipts signed by Breeden accurately showed the “cash disbursements to Mark Breeden;” and that all the receipts were signed by Breeden “on or about the dates indicated” on the receipts. (Adm. Ex. 23 at 35, 38).

Based upon the above, we find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly made false statements of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter, in violation of Rule 8.1(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

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2. The Administrator also charges in Count III that Respondent engaged in conduct involving fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation by making false statements to Mark Breeden; by knowingly creating and submitting false receipts to the ARDC; and by testifying falsely at his sworn statement to the ARDC on December 8, 2015, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

Based on our findings in section (1), above, we also find that Respondent engaged in fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation. By knowingly and purposefully making false statements to Mark Breeden, creating and submitting false receipts to the ARDC, and testifying falsely at his sworn statement Respondent engaged in conduct calculated to deceive his client and the ARDC. See Thomas, 2012 IL 113035, pars. 89-90. Therefore, we find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

On Counts V (failing to maintain trust account records) and Count VI (failing to file a lawsuit on time) the Panel also found against the respondent.

The Panel recommended disbarment.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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A Really Bad Idea – Trying To Limit A Client’s Ability to Contact the ARDC

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD:

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This is a complaint filed by the ARDC against an Illinois lawyer. Obviously, at this stage none of the facts have been proven. There has been no hearing and no answer has been filed by the lawyer.

Illinois Rule 8.4(h) prohibits a lawyer from “(h) enter[ing] into an agreement with a client or former client limiting or purporting to limit the right of the client or former client to file or pursue any complaint before the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.” The ARDC charged a lawyer with violating that provision because she included a clause in her engagement letter which stated: “”Client agrees to make all matters of said representation confidential between client(s), his/her agents, assigns and principals and to refrain from reporting any phase of said representation to any external agency including but not limited, to the Missouri Bar, ARDC etc.”

This is a rare occurrence. Most lawyers know that they cannot attempt to require a client to forgo the right to report misconduct. Should a lawyer include such a provision in an engagement letter, enforcement is virtually guaranteed.

But there are more allegations of misconduct. The client, a criminal defendant, filed a motion with the court to terminate the attorney. The respondent, unfortunately, responded to the client’s request in an angry fashion that caused the ARDC to pursue further charges. The complaint alleges:

On or about March 2, 2016, Adams wrote to the Monroe County Circuit Court and indicated that he wished to terminate Respondent as his attorney and hire new counsel in cases 2015 CF 52 et. al. The court treated Adams’ letter as a “Motion to Dismiss Counsel”.

4. On or about March 9, 2016, Respondent filed, as a matter of public record, an “Answer” to Adams’ Motion to Dismiss Counsel in cases 2015 CF 52 et. al. Respondent’s “Answer” consisted of a two-page letter, addressed to Adams and also copied to the ARDC. The letter is attached as Exhibit 1.

5. In the letter, Respondent stated inter alia:

that Adams had a “horrible criminal past” and a “violent criminal past”;

that Adams had been “arrested and/or convicted in Missouri at least fourteen times”;

that Adams “wanted to bribe the court in some manner”;

that Adams was a “paranoid ingrate and miserable con man who tries to blame everyone else but yourself for YOUR misdeeds TO WHICH YOU CONFESSED” (emphases in original);

that Adams was in “constant breach of the “Non-Disclosure” provisions of your contract with me”.

The ARDC alleged that the respondent’s letter improperly revealed confidential information without obtaining the client’s informed consent and alleged that the conduct violatedRule 1.6(a).

This is a rare case that was likely made far worse by the lawyer’s imprudent letter to the court and the ARDC revealing confidential information about the client.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

ARDC Accuses Lawyer of Altering Condominium Documents To Wrongfully Withdraw Association Funds

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD:

The respondent was a member of a condominium association board of directors. She was also the treasurer. After she was removed from her post, she allegedly created false documents, presented to a bank and withdrew $75,000 in association funds from the association’s bank account. The respondent then placed those funds with another bank, in the name of the association. The false documents were minutes of the Board of Directors which falsely stated that the Respondent had been elected the President of the Condominium Board. The ARDC did not bring a conversion allegation but did allege violations of Rule 8.4(a) and (c).

Again, these are allegations which have not been proven. They appear to be very serious allegations, however, and, if true, a lengthy suspension is warranted.

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ARDC Accuses Lawyer of Converting Bond Refunds

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD:

The ARDC has accused an attorney of converting bond refunds that were due to his clients. When a defendant is arrested he can often post a bond to allow him to remain free while the case is proceeding through the courts. Here, the ARDC has alleged that in four instances the attorney received a refund of the bond at the conclusion of the criminal case and that he was required to deposit the refund in his trust account and pay it (minus his legal fees) to the defendant.

These allegations have not been proven and there has been no finding of fact.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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ARDC Accuses Lawyer of Creating False Documents in Loan Transaction

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD:

The ARDC has accused a lawyer of creating false documents in a loan transaction. The pertinent allegations are these:

“2. In late 2010 or early 2011, Respondent was engaged in discussions with another lender, Prime Equity of Atlanta, Georgia, about borrowing $25,000 from Prime Equity. Respondent intended to use the proceeds of that loan to reduce the amount of LOP’s obligation to American Community. Prime Equity told Respondent that it would not lend the money to LOP unless Prime Equity received a first security interest in the Stephens County property, which would require American Community to agree to subordinate its own security interest in that property.

3. On or about January 10, 2011, Respondent created a document entitled “Subordination Agreement” that purported to show that American Community had “waive[d] and subordinate[d] all right, title or interest under its outstanding security deed in or to the [Stephens County] property as against the loan to be made by [Prime Equity] to [LOP] so that the security deed to be executed by [LOP] to [Prime Equity] shall convey title to the property superior to the outstanding security deed of [American Community] and superior to the indebtedness secured thereby.” Respondent added the purported signatures of American Community’s executive vice president (Rick Francois) and chief financial officer (Robert W. Getty) to the document, and then added the purported signature and notary stamp of Mark Taranelli, a notary and attorney with whom Respondent was acquainted.

4. At no time did Respondent request or receive authority from anyone at American Community to take any action concerning the Stephens County property on the bank’s behalf, nor did he have the authority of Mr. Francois, Mr. Getty or Mr. Tarinelli to add their purported signatures (and, in Mr. Tarinelli’s case, to use his notary stamp) on the purported agreement.

5. Respondent knew that the purported subordination agreement was false, because he knew that American Community had not agreed to waive or subordinate its interest in the Stephens County property, and because he knew that he had created the document and affixed purported signatures and a notary stamp to it without authority.

6. After he prepared the purported subordination agreement, Respondent delivered the document to representatives of Prime Equity in order to induce that entity to lend $25,000 to LOP based on the false representation that American Community had agreed to subordinate its interest in the Stephens County property. Respondent then caused the purported subordination agreement to be filed with the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court for Stephens County, Georgia.

7. On or about June 1, 2012, Respondent created a second document, entitled “Cancellation of Subordination Agreement,” that purported to show that American Community had cancelled the agreement described in paragraphs three through six, above. Respondent then added the purported signature of Mr. Francois and the purported signature and notary stamp of Mr. Taranelli to the document, which Respondent later caused to be filed with the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court for Stephens County, Georgia.

8. At no time did Respondent request or receive authority from anyone at American Community to take any action concerning the bank’s interest in the Stephens County property, nor did he have the authority of Mr. Francois or Mr. Tarinelli to add their purported signatures (and, in Mr. Tarinelli’s case, to use his notary stamp) on the purported cancellation document.

9. Respondent knew that the purported cancellation of the subordination agreement was false, because he knew that he had created the document, that he did not have authority from anyone at American Community to take any action on the bank’s behalf, and because he had affixed purported signatures and a notary stamp to the document without authority.

10. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, by knowingly creating and signing documents without authority that contained false signatures and notary stamps, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

In sum, these are allegations and have not been proven. The ARDC tends to be very concerned about cases where lawyers created false documents.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

Louisiana Disbars Attorney For Social Media Campaign Against Judiciary

IN RE McCOOL, La: Supreme Court 2015 – Google Scholar:

The respondent in this matter was disbarred because she made false and defamatory statements about judges.

“ By way of background, respondent was friends with Raven Skye Boyd Maurer (“Raven”). Following Raven’s divorce in 2006, she and her former husband were involved in a bitter child custody dispute. Raven accused her ex-husband of sexually abusing their two young daughters, H. and Z.,^[2] and unsuccessfully sought to terminate his parental rights in proceedings pending in Mississippi before Judge Deborah Gambrell.^[3] Respondent is not admitted to the Mississippi Bar and was not admitted pro hac vice in Raven’s Mississippi case, but she did offer assistance to Raven as a friend.

Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition in St. Tammany Parish on behalf of Raven’s new husband, who sought to adopt H. and Z. The presiding judge, Judge Dawn Amacker, stayed the intrafamily adoption proceedings pending resolution of the Mississippi matter. Judge Amacker also declined to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in response to a motion for emergency custody filed by respondent on Raven’s behalf. After Judge Amacker issued her ruling declining to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, respondent filed a writ application with the First Circuit Court of Appeal, which was denied.^[4] On August 31, 2011, this Court likewise denied writs. Maurer v. Boyd, 11-1787 (La. 8/31/11), 68 So. 3d 517.

Unhappy with the various rulings made by Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker and believing those rulings were legally wrong, respondent drafted an online petition entitled “Justice for [H] and [Z]” which she and Raven posted on the internet at change.org, along with a photo of the two girls. With regard to the Mississippi proceeding before Judge Gambrell, the online petition stated:

To Judge Deborah Gambrell, we, the undersigned, ask that you renounce jurisdiction in this matter to the Louisiana court because the children have lived exclusively in Louisiana for the past three years. Their schools, teachers, physicians, therapists, little sister and brother and the vast majority of significant contacts are now in Louisiana. There is also an adoption proceeding pending in Louisiana over which Louisiana has jurisdiction and in the interest of judicial economy, and the best interest of the girls, Louisiana is the more appropriate forum to oversee ensure [sic] the “best interest” of the girls are protected. If you refuse to relinquish jurisdiction to Louisiana, we insist that you remove the Guardian Ad Litem currently assigned to the case, and replace him with one that has the proper training and experience in investigating allegations of child sexual abuse in custody proceedings. We further insist that, in keeping [with] S.G. v. D.C. 13 So. 3d 269 (Miss. 2009), you specifically define the Guardian Ad Litem’s role in the suit; require the new Guardian Ad Litem [to] prepare a written report; require that the report be shared with all parties prior to a hearing; that all proceeding be conducted on the record, with advance notice and opportunity to be heard, and that an evidentiary hearing be conducted to review the allegations of child sexual abuse, and that no visitation be allowed until you have seen all of the evidence.

As to Judge Amacker and the Louisiana proceedings, the petition stated:

To Judge Amacker, we, the undersigned, insist that you withdraw the unlawful stay of the adoption proceedings currently pending in your court, and, in accordance with La.Ch.C. art. 1253, a hearing be set with all due speed to allow the girls’ stepfather to show why it is in the girls’ best interest that they be adopted by him, thereby terminating all parental rights of the girls’ biological father.

Respondent re-posted the online petition on her blog site and in online articles she authored, one of which again included a photo of the two girls. She provided contact information for the judges’ offices and this Court, and added comments in which she solicited and encouraged others to express their feelings to the judges and this Court about the pending cases:

In spite of overwhelming evidence that the girls have been abused by their father, the judge in Mississippi, Judge Deborah Gambrell, of the Chancery Court of Marion County, Mississippi, refuses to even look at the evidence, and has now ordered the girls be sent to unsupervised visitation with their father.

Judge Dawn Amacker, in the 22nd JDC, Division L, for the Parish of St. Tammany in Louisiana also refused to protect the girls, even though she has the power and authority to protect them. RM now has an application to the LA supreme court, asking that it order Judge Amacker to protect the children.

Insist that Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell do their jobs! If you want more info, go to [website] and read the writ application to the LA supreme court.

Please sign the petition, circulate it to all of your friends and families and call Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell during the hours of 8:30 to 5:00 starting Monday, August 15 to ask why they won’t follow the law and protect these children. Let them know you’re watching and expect them to do their job and most of all, make sure these precious little girls are safe!

Call the Louisiana Supreme Court and tell them you want the law to protect these girls [phone number]. [A]sk about the writ pending that was filed by attorney Nanine McCool on Friday, August 12, 2011.

Let’s turn this around and be [H’s] hero. Please sign the Care2 petition and continue to call Judge Gambrell to ask her why she is unwilling to afford [H] and [Z] simple justice.

You can sign the petition and lend your voice to this cause here. Or, you can contact directly. Contact information is: [provided contact information for the judges].

In response to the postings made by respondent, on August 14, 2011—two days prior to a hearing in Mississippi on Raven’s motion for contempt and to terminate her former husband’s parental rights—Judge Gambrell’s staff received an e-mail from Heather Lyons, a signer of the online petition. Ms. Lyons stated she lived and voted in Forrest County, Mississippi, and she would “be paying attention” to Raven’s case “due to the fact that Judge Gambrell refused to hear evidence of abuse in the case of little girls who are likely being molested by their father. She has an obligation to protect our most vulnerable children. Please do not let them down judge!””

The Louisiana Supreme Court held that McCool had violated Rule 3.5(a) and (b) and Rule 8.4(a) by conducting an online campaign and by faxing copies of certain online petitions to the courts. The Court further held that McCool violated Rule 8.4(c) by making false statements about the court proceedings in the adoption matter by claiming that the judges had “refused” to hear certain evidence. Lastly, the Court held that McCool had engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (Rule 8.4(d)). The court held that McCool was disbarred.

This case is similar to other cases involving similar conduct, such as the JoAnne Denison case in Illinois. Attacking the integrity of judges and the fairness of judicial proceedings in social media will often merit the most severe sanctions. Lawyers who engage in such conduct are risking their professional lives.

It is always good to remember that you can criticize the reasoning of a judicial opinion, but you cannot make false statements impugning the integrity of the judiciary. The courts regard defamatory statements as an attack on the integrity of the entire legal system.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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