Tag: Unauthorized Practice

ARDC Review Board Recommends A Censure For Maurice J. Salem

The ARDC Review Board (essentially the ARDC’s appellate review panel) has recommended a censure for Maurice J. Salem, a New York lawyer who has practiced in Illinois in numerous cases over 15 years on a pro hac vice basis. Salem is not a member of the Illinois bar. He has handled a number of cases in Illinois, some of which have often been newsworthy. Because he is not licensed, Salem has incurred the wrath of some Illinois lawyers who have complained about him. The ARDC’s case against Salem did not prove out for a number of reasons, mostly though, because Salem was careful enough to make sure that he did not claim that he was an Illinois lawyer on his business card. Instead he used the phrase “federal court litigation.” In all but one case, he disclosed to the court that he was not licensed in Illinois and sought admission pro hac vice, which is a fancy term for admission in one particular case. This opinion constitutes a victory for Mr. Salem who, for the most part, defeated the allegations against him.

A dissenting member of the panel recommended a 30 day suspension.

Previously, the ARDC Hearing Board rejected most of the claims of misconduct and found one violation that Salem had held himself out as an Illinois law in one appearance before one judge.

The Review Board explained the facts in this way:

The Hearing Board noted that the charges in Count I3 presented it with a case of first impression:
namely, whether Respondent’s presence and the extent of his practice in Illinois constitute a violation of Rule 5.5 despite his compliance with Supreme Court Rule 707’s requirements for pro hac viceadmission, and whether Rule 5.5 requires an out-of-state attorney, admitted to practice in federal court in Illinois, to identify on his [or her] written communications where he or she is licensed and that he or she is not licensed in Illinois. (Hearing Bd. Report at 10.)
The Hearing Board found no violation of Rule 5.5(a) because Respondent had fully complied with Rule 707 and was authorized to appear pro hac vice in all of the cases identified in the complaint, and therefore did not practice law in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in Illinois. In making this finding, the Hearing Board noted that the allegations in Count I were limited to Respondent’s representation of clients in Illinois matters since 2010, and therefore that it did not consider events that predated 2010.
Similarly, the Hearing Board found that Respondent did not violate Rule 5.5(b)(1) because, according to Rule 5.5(d)(2), Respondent was permitted to establish an office and presence in Illinois in order to maintain his federal practice. It also found that Supreme Court Rule 707 provides guidance as to what the Court considers an acceptable level of participation in Illinois proceedings by an out-of-state attorney: An out-of-state attorney can apply for pro hac vice admission if he or she has not entered a pro hac vice appearance in more than five other
proceedings in the same calendar year. The Hearing Board noted that the Court has not articulated whether, if ever, there is a length of time or number of cases beyond which authorized pro hac vice representation turns into a Rule 5.5 violation, and that it was not the hearing panel’s role to make that determination. It thus concluded that, based upon Respondent’s right to practice in federal court in Illinois and his compliance with Rule 707 in obtaining authorization to appear pro hac vice in Illinois matters, it did not find a violation of Rule 5.5(b)(1).
The Hearing Board also found no violation of Rule 5.5(b)(2). It noted that the charge focused on Respondent’s failure to include particular language on his business cards indicating that he was not licensed in Illinois or only licensed in New York. It stated that it was not convinced that Rule 5.5(b)(2) required Respondent to indicate on his business cards where he was or was not licensed. It stated that neither the rule, the comments to the rule, nor case law imposed such requirements; that the Administrator was asking it to read requirements into the rule which would impose new obligations on out-of-state attorneys; and that it “decline[d] to take such a measure without direction from the Court.” (Hearing Bd. Report at 17.)
The Hearing Board noted that the Administrator had not explained how Respondent should have known he had a duty to include information about his licensure on his business cards without specific language in the rules, comments, or case law instructing him to do so. It stated that, if the Court “sees fit to impose such a duty” (id.), Respondent could not have known about this construction of the rule, and the charge should be dismissed, as in In re Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d 29, 45, 528 N.E.2d 694 (1988) (discharging attorneys who violated rules “without guidance of precedent or settled opinion”).
The Hearing Board acknowledged that an ISBA advisory opinion from October 2013 opined that a non-admitted lawyer’s letterhead, business cards, website, and advertising materials should state that the lawyer is not admitted in Illinois and that his practice is limited to immigration matters. See ISBA Professional Conduct Advisory Opinion No. 13-08 (October 2013). It stated that it had no disagreement with the advisory opinion, but that the advisory opinion did not lead it to conclude that Respondent had violated Rule 5.5(b)(2). It found that the advisory opinion involved a different set of facts, and that, unlike in the advisory opinion, Respondent had used the phrase “Federal Court Litigation” in his communications and relied on the direction he received from the Character and Fitness Committee in doing so.
The Hearing Board reasoned that, even if Respondent had been aware of the advisory opinion, and there was no evidence that he was, it could not find that he was required to follow the advisory opinion’s requirements when the Court had not adopted those requirements. It further reasoned that, if the Court had wished to impose specific requirements regarding disclosure of an attorney’s licensure, it would have done so as it did in Rule 7.4.4 The Hearing Board thus concluded that it would be overstepping its bounds to impose requirements on Respondent that the Court has not included in the Rules of Professional Conduct or addressed in the comments to the Rules.
The Hearing Board also found that, while Respondent’s business cards identified him as an attorney and included only his Illinois address and phone numbers, they also included the phrase “Federal Court Litigation,” which the Character and Fitness Committee had advised him to add. It found that the inclusion of “Federal Court Litigation” sufficiently indicates that Respondent is not holding himself out as a lawyer generally admitted to practice in Illinois, and that Respondent had made an effort to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Last, the Hearing Board found that the Administrator did not establish that any member of the public or legal profession was led to believe, based upon Respondent’s business
cards, that Respondent held an Illinois license. It noted that the Administrator charged Respondent with violating the 2010 Rules, but did not present evidence that, during the relevant time period from January 1, 2010 forward, Respondent’s business cards led anyone to believe he was an Illinois attorney. It found that Respondent’s general testimony that he has used his business cards during the last 10 years and has given them to clients in Illinois is not specific enough to meet the Administrator’s burden of proof, especially considering that Respondent represents clients primarily in federal court.
Rule 8.4(c)
The Hearing Board found that Respondent had not engaged in dishonesty in violation of Rule 8.4(c). It found that his business cards did not contain false information, and that Respondent had made an effort to describe the limitations on his practice by including the phrase “Federal Court Litigation.” It did not find Respondent’s omission of licensure information to be dishonest because it found that Respondent was not required to include that information. It also found no evidence that Respondent had intended to deceive anyone. It found, to the contrary, that the evidence showed that Respondent had made efforts to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct by following the instruction of the Character and Fitness Committee to add “Federal Court Litigation” to his business cards. It thus concluded that, absent clear and convincing evidence that Respondent had created and used his business cards with dishonest intent, it could not find a violation of Rule 8.4(c).
Finding of Misconduct
The sole misconduct found by the Hearing Board was a violation of Rule 5.5(b)(2), as alleged in Count III, in connection with Respondent’s appearance before Judge Feerick.
The Hearing Board found that the letterhead that Respondent sent to Judge Feerick improperly held him out as an Illinois attorney. It found that the letterhead differed from his business cards in that it did not state “Federal Court Litigation.” It found this to be a significant omission because there was nothing else in the letterhead to signal that Respondent was not licensed in Illinois.
It further found that, unlike in Count I, there was evidence that Judge Feerick believed Respondent to be an Illinois attorney at the time he sent his letter and for a period of time thereafter. It found it reasonable to believe that Respondent’s communications with the court, including his letterhead, contributed to the court’s lack of knowledge. It thus found that the Administrator proved that Respondent had held himself out as an attorney in the forcible detainer matter. However, it stated that it did not find that he did so intentionally, noting that Rule 5.5(b)(2) does not include an element of intent.

 

 

The Appeal. The ARDC argued that the Hearing Board erred in rejecting most of the charges and that Salem deserved a 90-day suspension.
 
The Review Board affirmed the Hearing Board’s findings of fact and it affirmed the sanction as well.
 
The major issue in the appeal was whether Salem had violated Rule 5.5(b)(2). Rule 5.5 deals with the unauthorized practice of law. It provides:
 
RULE 5.5: UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW
      
      (a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.
      (b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not:
      (1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or
      (2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.
      (c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:
      (1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;
      (2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;
      (3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or
      (4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.
      (d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction or admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in a foreign jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction or the equivalent thereof, may provide legal services through an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction that:
      (1) are provided to the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or
      (2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law or rule to provide in of this jurisdiction.
      (e) For purposes of paragraph (d), the foreign lawyer must be a member in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a foreign jurisdiction.
 
The Review Board concluded that Salem did not violate 5.5(b)(2). I have provided the key portion of the opinion here:
 

 

Respondent’s Use of the Phrase “Federal Court Litigation”

 

The Administrator contends that Respondent’s adding the phrase “federal court litigation” to his business cards and, sometimes, to his letterhead does not specifically communicate to the public that Respondent is not licensed to practice law in Illinois, and therefore does not absolve him of the charge that he violated Rule 5.5(b)(2).
As the Hearing Board noted, this argument effectively asks this Board to rule, as a matter of law, that a lawyer in Respondent’s circumstances (i.e., one who is not admitted in Illinois but is practicing in Illinois – whether in federal court or in state court via pro hac vice admission – and using an Illinois address) must identify on business cards and letterhead that he or she is not licensed to practice in Illinois. The Hearing Board declined to make such a ruling because it believed that, by doing so, it effectively would be imposing new obligations on out-of-state attorneys, which it believed was within the Court’s authority but not the Hearing Board’s. We fully agree with the Hearing Board’s sound reasoning, and therefore also decline to make such a ruling.
The Administrator also argues that Respondent’s use of the phrase “federal court litigation” instead of specifically identifying that he is licensed only in New York and not in Illinois “was a deliberate attempt to foster ambiguity as to his licensing status.” (Appellant’s Brief at 22.) Aside from the fact that this argument goes more to Respondent’s alleged dishonesty, which we address below, than to an alleged violation of Rule 5.5(b)(2), the Hearing Board specifically found that Respondent did not intend to mislead or deceive anyone by what he included or did not include on his business cards and letterhead. Consequently, this argument asks this Board to overturn the Hearing Board’s credibility finding.
While we give deference to all of the Hearing Board’s factual determinations, we do so particularly to those concerning the credibility of witnesses, because the Hearing Board is able to observe the testimony of witnesses – which we are not – and therefore is in a superior position to assess their demeanor, judge their credibility, and evaluate conflicts in their testimony. In re Kleczek, 05 SH 24 (Review Bd., June 1, 2007), at 8, petitions for leave to file exceptions denied, M.R. 21745 (Sept. 18, 2007) (citing In re Spak, 188 Ill.2d 53, 66, 719 N.E.2d 747 (1999); In re Wigoda, 77 Ill.2d 154, 158, 395 N.E.2d 571 (1979)). The Hearing Board clearly accepted Respondent’s testimony that he did not intend to deceive anyone with his business cards. Thus, it presumably found that aspect of his testimony to be credible, and the Administrator has given us no reason to overturn that finding.

 

Respondent’s Incorporation of his Law Office in Illinois

 

The Administrator provides no authority for the proposition that Respondent’s incorporation of his law office in Illinois in 2011 violated Rule 5.5(b)(2), and we have found none. Moreover, Respondent arguably was permitted to do so under the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Rule 5.5(d)(2) states: “A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that . . . are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or
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other law of this jurisdiction.”6 In addition, comment 15 to Rule 5.5 explains that paragraph (d) identifies circumstances under which “a lawyer who is admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction, and is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law.” Comment 18 further notes that Rule 5.5(d)(2) “recognizes that a lawyer may provide legal services in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not licensed when authorized to do so by federal or other law, which includes statute, court rule, executive regulation or judicial precedent.”
As the Hearing Board noted in its report, Respondent has been an Illinois resident since 2003 and has been admitted to federal court in Illinois during the entire time period at issue in this matter. It concluded that Respondent’s presence and office in Illinois did not violate Rule 5.5(b)(1) because, pursuant to Rule 5.5(d)(2) and comments 15 and 18, he was permitted to have an office and presence in Illinois in order to maintain his federal practice, and there was no evidence that Respondent used his office to solicit Illinois clients or otherwise engage in the unauthorized practice of law.
We see no flaw in the Hearing Board’s reasoning. Moreover, although the Hearing Board engaged in this analysis in the context of finding no violation of Rule 5.5(b)(1), we believe the same analysis holds true for Rule 5.5(b)(2). The crucial part of the Hearing Board’s reasoning is that our rules appear to have specifically allowed Respondent to establish a law office for his federal practice. Given that, we do not believe the Administrator has shown how Respondent’s incorporation of his law office in Illinois constituted improperly holding himself out to the public as an Illinois lawyer.
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Respondent’s Filing of the Two Tax Appeals

 

The Administrator further argues that Respondent clearly held himself out as an Illinois attorney and engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in 2015 when he filed the two tax appeals without seeking pro hac vice permission to do so.
However, as the Hearing Board reasoned, Respondent’s conduct in connection with the tax appeals was not charged in the complaint. Well-established precedent dictates that we may not consider uncharged misconduct in imposing discipline. See, e.g., In re Karavidas, 2013 IL 115676, par. 73 (“An attorney’s procedural due process rights, including the right to fair notice and the right of an opportunity to defense against all charges, would be violated if an attorney were disciplined for uncharged misconduct”). We therefore decline to consider Respondent’s conduct in connection with the tax appeals to find that he engaged in misconduct. (As noted below, however, we do find those actions to be aggravating.)

 

Rule 8.4(c)

 

The Administrator contends that, for years, Respondent consistently identified himself as an attorney with only Illinois addresses on his business cards and letterheads, which would lead a reasonable person to believe that he possessed an Illinois law license. He argues that Respondent’s use of “federal court litigation” on his business cards and on some letterhead instead of a more definitive phrase like “practice limited to federal court litigation” or a list of jurisdictions where he is admitted to practice is proof that he has sought to keep his licensure ill-defined.
The Hearing Board specifically found, however, that, by adding “federal court litigation” to his business cards and letterhead, Respondent was following the directions of the Character and Fitness Committee and making an attempt to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct.”

Update: the Illinois Supreme Court increased the penalty for Ms. Salem. On January 19, 2019, he was suspended 90 days and until further order of court. This should bring Mr. Salem’s legal career to an end.
 
 
 
 

 

ARDC Hearing Board Recommends Censure for Maurice J. Salem

Filed October 18:

Maurice Salem is not licensed in Illinois. He is licensed in New York, but has appeared in a number of cases in the Illinois courts. He was accused of falsely claiming that he was licensed in Illinois. The Law Bulletin has written a number of stories about Mr. Salem and some members of the legal community may have been concerned that the never made an attempt to become licensed in Illinois.

However, Salem avoided serious discipline because, in all his cases save one, he took the time to be admitted pro had vice. In this article I will discuss two of the charges: (a) the alleged violation of Rule 5.5(a) and the alleged violation of Rule 5.5(b)(2).

The Hearing Board explains:

Rule 5.5(a) prohibits a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction. Ill. Rs. Prof’l. Conduct R. 5.5(a). Comment [1] to Rule 5.5(a) provides, “A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis.”
Rule 5.5(c) sets forth the following circumstances in which an out-of-state lawyer may provide legal services on a temporary basis in Illinois without violating Rule 5.5:
    A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:
(1)    are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;
(2)    are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;
(3)    are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; and
PAGE 13:
(4)    are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.
Comment [9] to Rule 5.5 further explains:
    Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may be authorized by law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal or agency. This authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. Under paragraph (c)(2), a lawyer does not violate this Rule when the lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency pursuant to such authority. To the extent that a court rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction to obtain admission pro hac vice before appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency, this Rule requires a lawyer to obtain that authority.

There is no question Respondent provided legal services in Illinois matters without holding an Illinois law license. However, we do not find a violation of Rule 5.5(a) because Respondent was authorized to appear pro hac vice in all of the cases identified in the Complaint. Respondent fully complied with the requirements of Rule 707 in the matters identified in the Complaint. Consequently, he was authorized by law to practice to provide legal services on a temporary basis for each matter in which he received permission to appear pro hac vice. Comment [9] sets forth that, under paragraph (c)(2), a lawyer does not violate this Rule when the lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency pursuant to authority granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission pro hac vice. Applying this principle to the facts of this matter, Respondent did not violate Rule 5.5(a).

As to the charge that Salem did not indicate on his business cards that he was not licensed in Illinois, the Hearing Board rejected that charge as well.  The explanation:

3.    Holding himself out to the public or otherwise representing that he is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction when he is not so admitted (Rule 5.5(b)(2))

A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. Ill. Rs. Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5(b)(2). The Administrator’s charge focuses on Respondent’s failure to include particular language on his business cards indicating he was not licensed in Illinois or was licensed only in New York. We find the Administrator did not prove a violation of Rule 5.5(b)(2) for the following reasons.
First, we are not convinced Rule 5.5(b)(2) required Respondent to indicate on his business cards where he is or is not licensed. Neither the Rule, the Comments to the Rule, nor the case law impose such requirements. The Administrator is asking us to read specific requirements into the Rule which have not heretofore existed and would, in our view, impose new obligations on out-of-state attorneys who may provide legal services in Illinois from the full range of practice settings, from solo practitioners to those in the largest law firms. We decline to take such a far-reaching measure without direction from the Court.
Moreover, the Administrator fails to explain how Respondent should have known he had a duty to include information about his licensure on his business cards without language in the Rules, Comments or case law instructing him to do so. If the Court sees fit to impose such a duty, Respondent could not have been aware of such construction of the Rule and, therefore, the charge should be dismissed. See In re Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d 29, 528 N.E.2d 694 (1988).

The Hearing Board did make a finding that Salem did misrepresent his status to one judge, and for that misconduct, recommended that Salem be censured.
Comment: I would expect the Administrator to appeal this decision.
Update: in January 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court suspended Mr. Salem for 90 days and until further order of court. That means he must seek reinstatement in order to practice law in Illinois.

ARDC Charges Lawyer with Practicing After Failing to Register

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD:

According to the complaint, the lawyer failed to register but continued to do legal work:

“3. On November 1, 2012, the Administrator mailed a 2013 registration form to Respondent at the last business address listed by Respondent on her Illinois attorney registration. Respondent received the registration form shortly thereafter.

4. As of January 28, 2013, Respondent had not register for 2013, and, on that date, the Administrator mailed Respondent a final registration notice, cautioning her that her name would be removed from the roll if she did not register for 2013.
5. As of February 1, 2013, Respondent had not registered with the Commission or paid the annual fee due, and, on March 29, 2013, the Administrator removed Respondent’s name from the roll of attorneys authorized to practice law in Illinois.
6. On April 2, 2013, the Administrator sent Respondent a notice that her name had been removed from roll of licensed attorneys in the State of Illinois as a result of her failure to register and pay her 2013 registration fee. Respondent received the Administrator’s notice of removal shortly thereafter.
7. At no time between March 29, 2013 and July 24, 2017, the date that this complaint was voted by Inquiry Panel D of the Commission, had Respondent register to practice law in Illinois.
8. Between March 29, 2013, and July 24, 2017, Respondent was not authorized to practice law in Illinois or to hold herself out as so authorized.
9. In or about 1999, Respondent began working for the City of Berwyn as the Director of Administrative Hearings. As of July 24, 2017, the date that this complaint was voted by Inquiry Panel D of the Commission, Respondent was employed as Director of Administrative Hearings for the City of Berwyn.
10. As part of her duties as Administrator of Administrative Hearings for the City of Berwyn, Respondent performed legal work representing the city in municipal ordinance violation cases. Such proceedings were held in connection with citations that had been issued by the City of Berwyn Police Department for offenses such as disorderly conduct, municipal animal code violations, and juvenile offenses like curfew violations.
11. Between March 29, 2013, and July 24, 2017, while her name was removed from the roll of attorneys authorized to practice law in Illinois, Respondent held herself out as an attorney and represented the City of Berwyn in one to two contested matters per week (approximately 75 matters in total).
12. At no time did Respondent notify the City of Berwyn, the counsel for any defendants in municipal citation cases, or the hearing officers presiding over the administrative hearings referenced in paragraph 11, above, that she was not authorized to practice law in Illinois.
13. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:
  1. practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction in violation of Rule 5.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and Supreme Court Rule 756(d) by handling legal municipal citation matters for the City of Berwyn and holding herself out as an attorney after her name was removed from the roll of licensed attorneys in 2013; and
  2. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct by handling legal matters and holding herself out as an attorney after her name was removed from the roll of licensed attorneys in 2013.”

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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ARDC Charges Two Lawyers With Allowing Disbarred Lawyer to Use Their Offices to Practice

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD:

The ARDC has charged two lawyers for assisting a disbarred lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. Kathleen Niew was disbarred in November 2013. One of the lawyers charged was her husband, Stanley Niew.  Ms. Niew was convicted of converting $2.3 million in client funds. She was sentenced to six years in federal prison. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-radio-host-lawyer-sentencing-met-20150210-story.html

The Complaint alleges:

Between December 20, 2013 and about early June 2014, Ms. Niew communicated with at least two legal clients, John Vlahos (“Vlahos”) and Arno Reichel (“Reichel”), via the law firm email regarding Vlahos’ guardianship matter and Reichel’s estate planning matters, and she received at least two facsimiles on the law firm fax machine regarding those legal matters.
16. On December 10, 2013, Kelly Vos (“Vos”), an accountant who had joined Respondent Niew’s office in October 2013, sent Tichy an email, which Tichy forwarded to Respondent Niew that same date. The email from Vos stated:
Actually you need to hire someone else. I don’t feel comfortable with someone who has been disbarred for fraud and still is making contracts for new business. She should be home and I don’t believe some of the personal expenses should be paid by the company.
17. For six months after receiving the email that Vos sent to Tichy, described in paragraph 16, above, Respondent Niew did not take any action to insure that Ms. Niew did not maintain a presence in the Jorie Boulevard law office, and she continued to do so.
18. On May 8, 2014, the Administrator docketed an investigation against Respondent Niew based on concerns that he may have been assisting Ms. Niew in the unauthorized practice of law. On May 13, 2014, the Administrator sent Respondent Niew a letter asking him to address the Administrator’s concerns regarding Ms. Niew’s continued presence in the Jorie Boulevard law office and concerns that Ms. Niew had been meeting with clients. Respondent Niew received the letter shortly thereafter.
19. After receiving the Administrator’s May 8, 2014 letter, in June 2014, Respondent Niew took actions to insure that Ms. Niew did not maintain a physical presence in the Jorie Boulevard law office.
20. On June 18, 2014 Ms. Tichy sent Respondent Niew the following an email stating:
I am emailing you because I just took a phone call from a woman named Vena Gandhi at approximately 8:59am this morning.
Vena said that she had been texting with Kathleen Niew around 3-4pm yesterday afternoon and that KIN told her that she would be giving me (HMT) books approx. 10 books regarding retirement planning called The Retirement Miracle by Patrick Kelley and another called Tax Free Retirement and that Vena could come into our office today and pick-up the books…
I am not comfortable with KIN regularly giving out my name and telling people that they can/should call your office and to ask for me to schedule appointments with ARA and/or pick-up KIN’s books/docs from me.

22. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent Niew has engaged in the following misconduct:
a. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, by conduct including, but not limited to, failing to take reasonable action necessary to insure that Ms. Niew did not maintain a presence in an office where the practice of law was conducted after the Illinois Supreme Court entered an order disbarring her as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 764, and allowing her to conduct meetings and to use the law firm email and fax machine in an office where the practice of law is conducted after her disbarment, by disregarding the Court’s order and processes in In re Niew, M.R. 26310, 2012PR000162 (November 20, 2013), and by failing to take action after receiving Vos’ email, in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and
b. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by conduct including, but not limited to, failing to file a certification with the Clerk of the Supreme Court in In re Niew, M.R. 26310, 2012PR000162 (November 20, 2013) setting forth the actions taken to insure compliance with Supreme Court Rule 764(b), in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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ARDC Amends Complaint In Case Against Maurice Salem

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD:

The ARDC has amended its complaint against Maurice J. Salem, a New York lawyer who does not have a license to practice in Illinois. The ARDC is seeking to bar Salem from practicing in Illinois.

The scope of the alleged work done by Salem after his application to practice law in Illinois was rejected by Character and Fitness is simply remarkable:

1. On January 8, 2003, Respondent was admitted to practice law in the State of New York.
2. In December 2003, Respondent moved to Illinois and leased a single-family house located at 7400 Choctaw Road, Palos Heights, Illinois (“the Choctaw Road house”), from Said and Nancy Ghusein (“the Ghuseins”), for one year. Respondent agreed to pay monthly rent to the Ghuseins in the amount of $1,650. Respondent and the Ghuseins thereafter agreed to extend the term of the lease each year, until 2013.
3. At all times alleged in this complaint, the Ghuseins owned and operated a retail bridal clothing business located in Oak Lawn, Illinois, which operated under several trade names, including the names, “Eva’s Bridal” and “Exclusives for the Bride.”
4. In September 2004, Respondent and the Ghuseins agreed that Respondent would represent them and their business in pending and future Cook County legal matters relating to their business. At that time, Respondent and the Ghuseins agreed that the Ghuseins would pay Respondent’s legal fees by waiving his $1,650 monthly rent obligation for the Choctaw Road house and allow Respondent to reside in the Choctaw Road house.
5. On October 21, 2004, Respondent applied for admission to the Illinois Bar.
6. On November 1, 2005, the Committee on Character and Fitness rejected Respondent’s application citing, in part, concerns that Respondent was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by holding himself out as an attorney by providing an Illinois address on his letterhead without any limitations indicating that he is not in fact admitted to practice law in Illinois.
7. On August 8, 2006, Respondent filed with the Illinois Supreme Court a Petition for Review of the Committee’s denial of his application to practice law in Illinois. Since Respondent attached a copy of the Character and Fitness Committee’s findings to his petition as an exhibit, that opinion is now public record. On September 21, 2006, the Illinois Supreme Court denied Respondent’s Petition for Review of the Committee’s decision. In re Salem, M.R. 21103 (September 21, 2006).
8. At no time alleged in this complaint has Respondent ever been admitted to practice law in Illinois.
9. Between September 2004 and March 2012, Respondent represented the Ghuseins and their business in the following matters in the Circuit Court of Cook County:
Miller v. EFTB, 04 M1 153369;
Terman v. Exclusives for the Bride (“EFTB”), 04 M1 116476;
Monale NY v. Exclusives for the Bride, 04 M1 164625;
Devon Clark Currency Exhange, Inc. v. EFTB, 04 M1 169930;
Pronovias USA, Inc. v. EFTB, et al, 03 M1 153841;
Superior Street v. Exclusives for the Bride, 04 M1 183565;
Advance Magazine v. Exclusives for the Bride, 05 M1 110560;
Oak Lawn Bank v. Exclusives for the Bride, 03 CH 5175;
Midwest Bank v. EFTB, 05 L 10570;
Eva’s Bridal v. Integrity Payment Systems, 06 CH 18755;
Chicago Sedgewick v. EFTB, 06 M1 106834;
Kishore v. Eva’s Bridal, 07 M1 703669;
Washington Mutual Bank v. Ghusein, et al, 07 CH 29020;
Symphony Bridal v. Eva’s Bridal, 07 M1 216827;
Deutsche Bank v. Ghusein, et al, 07 CH 25954;
Eva’s Bridal v. Halanack Enterprises, 11 L 7306; and,
Sarmiti v. Ghusein, 11 L 8145.
10. With regard to each of the matters referenced in paragraph nine, above, Respondent communicated with the Ghuseins regarding the matters, gave them legal advice, filed appearances and pleadings on their behalf, and appeared on their behalf before the Circuit Court, obtaining leave of the court to appear pro hac vice in each matter.
11. Between at least January 1, 2010 and August 2013, Respondent resided at 7400 Choctaw Road, Palos Heights, Illinois, and used a portion of his residence as an office from which he performed legal work on behalf of the Ghuseins in Illinois State Court matters, including the matter of Eva’s Bridal v. Halanack Enterprises, 11 L 7306 and Sarmiti v. Ghusein, 11 L 8145.
12. On November 19, 2011, Respondent filed incorporation documents for the entity entitled “Law Offices of Salem and Associates, Professional Corporation” with the Illinois Secretary of State. In the articles, Respondent indicated that the primary business of the Law Offices of Salem and Associates, Professional Corporation, was the handling of legal matters on behalf of clients.
13. In August 2013, Respondent relocated his residence and law office to a house located at 6201 West 124th Street, Palos Heights, Illinois, and from August 2013 to at least June 2014, Respondent used a portion of his residence at 6201 West 124th Street in Palos Heights as an office from which he performed legal work for clients whom he represented in Illinois State Court matters.
14. From January 1, 2010 to the present, Respondent also maintained a mailing address at a UPS storefront facility in Palos Heights, Illinois, which was designated, “7156 West 127th Street, B-149, Palos Heights, Illinois” (“UPS facility”). Respondent used the UPS facility as his address on his letterhead, in pleadings, and on his business cards in his communication with attorneys and members of the public in the following Illinois State Court matters:
Amalgamated Bank of Chicago v. Wauconda Shopping Plaza, LLC, et al, 14 CH 316;
Marayah Diagnostics, LLC v. Westfield Plaza, LLC, et al., 12 CH 22853;
Massad Naim, et al. v. Amin Ijbara Equity Corp., 13 L 3588;
Anwar Elmosa et al., v. Nabil Haffar et al., 12 L 4811; and,
Prime Builders & Development, Inc., et al. v. Allstate Indemnity Co., et al., 15 L 7034.
15. From January 1, 2010 through at least August 2015, Respondent’s representation of the Ghuseins and the other clients referred to in paragraph 14, above, in Illinois legal matters was systematic and continuous and was not temporary.


Disclaimer: these are allegations that have not been proved true before a finder of fact. Salem has filed an answer to these charges which can be found at the ARDC’s website.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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ARDC Alleges That A Retired New York Lawyer Wrongfully Engaged In Unauthorized Practice of Law

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD:

The ARDC has filed a complaint against a retired New York lawyer, Richard Peter Caro, who moved to Illinois and, allegedly, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  The pertinent allegations are as follows:

1. At no time has Respondent applied for admission to practice law in Illinois or been admitted to the Illinois bar.
2. On April 24, 1974, Respondent was admitted to practice law in New York. At no time was he admitted to practice law in any other states. On August 12, 2010, he registered for retirement status with New York, and he remained on retirement status until August 19, 2011, when he resumed active status. While on retirement status, Respondent was not permitted to practice law in any jurisdiction.
3. On July 1, 2005, Respondent leased an apartment from Dennis Martinek (“Martinek”) at 111 Groveland Avenue in Riverside, Illinois (“the Groveland apartment”). Shortly thereafter, Respondent informed Martinek that he was a New York attorney.
4. From February 5, 2008, to August 12, 2011, Martinek was an investor in a business, Politico, LLC d/b/a Vini’s of Lincoln Park, which operated a pizza restaurant, Vini’s Pizza, at 2429 N. Lincoln Avenue in Chicago (hereinafter, collectively “Vini’s”).
5. In August 2010, Martinek informed Respondent about a number of legal problems that Martinek had encountered in connection with Vini’s, including alleged fraud and mismanagement by the then-General Manager of the company, Rosendo Diaz (“Diaz”).
6. Between August 2010 and September 2010, Respondent and Martinek agreed that Respondent would represent Martinek and Vini’s in at least eight different legal matters. Those matters included:
a. a tax claim by the State of Illinois because Diaz had allegedly failed to pay sales tax on pizza sales at Vini’s;
b. a claim against Diaz related to his purported mismanagement of Vini’s;
c. the defense of four creditors’ claims against Vini’s for accounts receivable, including claims by:
i.   DePaul University;
ii.  S&S Heating and Cooling, Inc.;
iii. Ice Town Leasing;
iv. Sysco Chicago, Inc.
d. An eviction matter related to a 5-day notice that had been served on Vini’s on September 10, 2010 to vacate its business premises on Lincoln Avenue in Chicago;
e. An alleged banking error by Vini’s credit card processing company, First Merit Bank, wherein Vini’s had purportedly not been credited with $5,000 in pizza sales proceeds.
7. Between August 2010 and September 2010, Respondent and Martinek began negotiating as to the fees that Respondent would be paid for the legal work referenced in paragraph six, above, but they did not enter into a specific agreement as to the amount of those fees at that time.
8. Between September 2010 and August 2011, Respondent provided legal advice and services to Martinek and Vini’s on the matters referenced in paragraph six, above. During that period, Respondent corresponded with Vini’s creditors and their counsel, reviewed and analyzed documents related to the respective claims, performed legal research on those claims, drafted letters to creditors for Martinek’s signature, and advised Martinek as to how to proceed in each matter.
9. In or about July 2011, Respondent and Martinek agreed that Martinek would barter monthly rent payments from Respondent’s rental of the Groveland apartment by applying those amounts as payments toward Respondent’s legal fees for the matters referenced in paragraph six, above. The monthly rental amounts were $1,000 from July 1, 2011 through July 1, 2012. For legal services that Respondent provided on Martinek’s behalf in 2011 and 2012, Martinek waived a total amount of $12,000 in rental payments.
10. In addition to the waiver of rental payments as referenced in paragraph nine, above, between September 2010 and August 2011, Respondent also received $20,605.46 in payments for fees by or on behalf of Martinek and Vini’s in connection with the matters referenced in paragraph six, above.
11. On February 14, 2003, Martinek filed a complaint against Respondent in the Circuit Court of Cook County, seeking to evict Respondent from the Groveland apartment and to recover $7,530 in allegedly unpaid rent. That case was docketed as Martinek v. Caro, case number 2013 M1 703844. Respondent was served with the complaint and summons in the matter shortly thereafter.
12. On October 3, 2013, Respondent and his wife, Svetlana Caro, jointly filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and that case was docketed as In re Caro and Caro, case number 13 BK 38958. The matter was assigned to the Honorable Janet Baer. Respondent’s filing of the bankruptcy petition caused Martinek’s claim in case number 2013 M1 703844 to be stayed.
13. On November 25, 2013, in connection with case number 13 BK 38958, Respondent filed an adversary complaint against Martinek. The adversary complaint was docketed as Caro v. Martinek, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois case number 13-1334. In the adversary claim, Respondent sought an order denying Martinek’s claim for unpaid rent and granting Respondent compensation for legal services provided to Martinek “[b]eginning in September 2010 and until Richard Caro ceased representing Martinek at the end of June 2012.”
14. Respondent attached to his adversary complaint in case number 13-1334, a copy of a Statement for Services dated October 26, 2012 (Attached hereto as Exhibit 1). The Statement of Services listed the time expended by Respondent handling legal matters on behalf of Martinek, and it included a total of 170.6 hours for the matters referenced in paragraph six, above. On in his Statement of Services, Respondent listed 105.3 hours that he had expended between August 12, 2010, and August 19, 2011.
Conclusion: there appears to be no doubt as to the unauthorized practice of law. The decision to file the adversary complaint in bankruptcy appears to have caused the bankruptcy court and the ARDC to look into the matter.
Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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Illinois Asserts Jurisdiction Over Violations That Occurred in Michigan

This is a rarity at the ARDC Hearing Board. The prosecution of a lawyer who engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Michigan. The respondent lawyer is licensed in both Illinois and Michigan and he did not answer the charges.

The Majority:

The allegations were that the respondent improperly handled a bankruptcy in Michigan when he was not admitted in Illinois. The respondent also made false statements to the bankruptcy judge about the status of his license. The bankruptcy case he filed was dismissed because the filing was deficient.

The majority explains:

Supreme Court Rule 756(a) requires that every attorney admitted to practice law in Illinois, with stated exceptions that do not apply to Respondent, register and pay an annual registration fee to the ARDC on or before the first day of January of each year. Supreme Court Rule 756(g) provides that the Administrator, on February 1 of each year, remove from the master roll of attorneys authorized to practice law in Illinois the name of any attorney who has not registered for the year as required by Supreme Court Rule 756(a). This rule further states that any person whose name is not on the master roll and who practices law or holds himself out as being authorized to practice law in Illinois has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
On October 13, 2013, the Administrator mailed a 2014 registration form to Respondent at the last business address listed by him on his Illinois attorney registration. He received the registration form shortly thereafter. As of February 1, 2014, Respondent had not registered with the ARDC for 2014 pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 756. On that date, the Administrator sent him a final notice of registration, which he received shortly thereafter.
As of March 12, 2014, Respondent had not registered with the ARDC for 2014 pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 756, and, on that date, the Administrator removed his name from the roll. On March 14, 2014, the ARDC sent Respondent a Notice of Removal from Master Roll informing him that his name had been removed from the roll of licensed attorneys in Illinois as a result of his failure to register and pay his registration fees. He received the notice shortly thereafter. At no time between March 12, 2014, and October 20, 2015, was Respondent authorized to practice law in Illinois. Respondent also has not been admitted to practice law in any state jurisdictions other than Illinois.
On January 18, 2012, Respondent was admitted to practice law before the USDC-EDM. According to LR83.20 of the USDC-EDM rules, attorneys must report to the chief judge any change in the status of his permission to practice law in any other jurisdiction in order to maintain eligibility to practice law in the USDC-EDM. At no time between March 12, 2014, and October 20, 2015, did Respondent inform the Chief Judge of the USDC-EDM that his name had been removed from the roll of attorneys in Illinois for failure to register. Since Respondent did not report his removal from the roll in Illinois to the Chief Judge of the USDC-EDM, he was ineligible to practice law in the USDC-EDM after March 12, 2014, and he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by representing others in cases in the USDC-EDM subsequent to that date.

The majority recommended a suspension of one year and until further order of court. Panel Member Champ Davis, of Davis McGrath, dissented. What he had to say is interesting:

In this action the Administrator wants to suspend a non-resident attorney for one year and until further order of the Court notwithstanding that the attorney is not authorized to practice law in Illinois and was not authorized to practice in Illinois at the time of the misconduct. Moreover, the misconduct occurred entirely within the state of Michigan.
I dissent on the ground that I do not believe this matter is properly before the Illinois disciplinary authorities. The misconduct should be dealt with by the Michigan disciplinary authorities — not the Illinois ARDC. Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5(a) provides in relevant part that “A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction (i.e., Michigan) is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction.”
The misconduct alleged in this case arose solely from services which Respondent provided in Michigan. Respondent was disbarred from practice before the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for that misconduct. I respectfully suggest that the present case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that any further discipline of Respondent be left to the Michigan disciplinary authorities.

The dissent addresses an excellent question – what are the limits of the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authorities in one state. The ARDC believes, and the majority agreed, that if you are a member of the Illinois bar you can be disciplined in Illinois for violations that should really be the concern of Michigan. I think the dissent is correct. This is an issue, the unauthorized practice of law, that concerns Michigan. Illinois is making a mistake in asserting intergalactic jurisdiction here.
Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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ARDC Files Complaint Alleging that lawyer practiced law in years when he failed to register with the ARDC

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD:

One easy way to get disciplined is to fail to register with the ARDC for a number of years, but maintain a law practice during those years. The ARDC really has no choice. They have to enforce these rules by instituting discipline proceedings against such people.

The ARDC alleges:

1. Respondent was admitted to practice law on January 7, 1992.
2. At all times alleged in this complaint, Supreme Court Rule 756(a) required that every attorney admitted to practice law in Illinois, with stated exceptions that do not apply to Respondent, register and pay an annual registration fee to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (“the Commission”) on or before the first day of January of each year. 3. At all times alleged in this complaint, Supreme Court Rule 756(h) provided that the Administrator, on or after February 1 of each year, remove from the master roll of attorneys authorized to practice law in Illinois the name of any attorney who had not registered for that year, as required by Supreme Court Rule 756(a). Rule 756(h) further stated that any person whose name was not on the master roll and who practiced law or held himself out as being authorized to practice law pursuant to an Illinois license, had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
4. Between 2003 and 2011, Respondent had not registered with the Commission by January 1st of each year in the years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2011, and had been removed from the master roll for a period of time during those years. Sometime after receiving notice from the ARDC of his removal, Respondent registered and paid whatever fees and penalties were due and was restored to active status.

5. As of March 10, 2015, Respondent had not registered with the Commission or paid the annual fee that had been due since January 1, 2015, and on that date the Administrator removed Respondent’s name from the master roll of attorneys authorized to practice law pursuant to an Illinois license.

During one or more of the years the Respondent handled a divorce case and defended a client against a collection case.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

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ARDC Files Unauthorized Practice of Law Complaint Against A New York Attorney

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD:

Maurice J. Salem is not licensed to practice in Illinois. He is licensed in New York, but he does not apparently practice in New York.  After a few recent stories in the press, the ARDC has filed an unauthorized practice of law complaint against Salem.

Here is a portion of count I of the complaint:

17. Respondent’s business cards, as described in paragraph 16, above, are false and misleading because they identify Respondent as an attorney at an Illinois address and do not state that Respondent is not authorized to practice in Illinois or that the only state in which Respondent was licensed was New York.
18. Between January 1, 2010 and at least June 2014, Respondent provided the business cards referenced in paragraph 16, above, to attorneys, judges, and others to lead them to believe that he had been generally admitted to the Illinois bar and that he had been authorized to practice law in Illinois without limitation.
19. Between at least January 1, 2010 and April 20, 2016, the date a complaint was voted by an Inquiry Panel of the Commission, Respondent has maintained a law office, and has maintained a continuous and systematic presence within the State of Illinois, by practicing state law from offices in his residences at the Choctaw Road house and 6201 West 124th Street in Palos Heights and identifying himself as an attorney at the UPS facility address without disclosing that his sole law license was from New York.
20. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, by conduct including Respondent’s representation of clients in Illinois legal matters, since January 1, 2010, in violation of Rule 5.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct;
  2. establishing an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction, by conduct including Respondent’s maintenance of a law office in Palos Heights, Illinois, and representation of clients in Illinois legal matters, since January 1, 2010, in violation of Rule 5.5(b)(1) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);
  3. holding himself out to the public or otherwise representing that the lawyer is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction, when he was not so admitted, by conduct including Respondent’s use of business cards which identified him as an attorney, without stating that he is not licensed in Illinois or that the only state in which he was licensed to practice law was in New York, in violation of Rule 5.5(b)(2) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);
  4. making a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services that contains a material misrepresentation of fact, by conduct including Respondent’s use of business cards wherein he held himself out as an attorney without stating that he is not licensed in Illinois or that the only state in which he was licensed to practice law was in New York, in violation of Rule 7.1 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and,
  5. engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, by conduct including Respondent’s use of an Illinois address in pleadings and business cards which identified him as an attorney without disclosing that his sole law license was from New York, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

Salem was also charged with making false statements to two judges. Again, here is a quotation from the allegations concerning a matter in the Circuit Court of Cook County:

38. On or about February 20, 2015, Respondent filed a verified statement pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 707 with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County in Massad Naim, et al. v. Amin Ijbara Equity Corporation, et al., case number 13 L 3588, for permission as an out-of-state attorney to represent Amin Ijbara Equity Corporation and Amin Ijbara in the case. Upon the filing of the verified statement in compliance with Rule 707(a), Respondent was authorized to provide legal services in the proceeding without an order from the court.39. On September 9, 2015, the Administrator filed a motion to terminate Respondent’s permission to practice in case number 13 L 3588. The Administrator alleged that Respondent’s permission should be terminated because he had violated Rule 5.5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct by holding himself out as an Illinois attorney and by establishing a systematic and continuous presence in Illinois, and because he had violated Supreme Court Rule 707 by representing his wife, Claudia Salem, in Cook County case number 13 M5 39 without filing a verified statement, among other grounds.

40. On November 17, 2015, the Honorable John C. Griffin held a hearing on the Administrator’s motion to terminate Respondent’s permission to practice in case number 13 L 3588. Respondent appeared at that hearing and argued in opposition to the motion. At that time, Judge Griffin questioned Respondent regarding his appearance on behalf of his wife, Claudia, in case number 13 M5 39, as described in paragraph 25, above. Respondent stated to the court that “I never filed an appearance…” He further stated, “I didn’t file an appearance for her, Your Honor.”
41. Respondent’s statements to the court that he had not filed an appearance on his wife’s behalf in case number 13 M5 39 was false.
42. At that time, Respondent knew his statements were false because on February 7, 2013, Respondent filed an appearance in case number 13 M5 39 on behalf of himself and his wife as defendants in the matter. On that same date, Respondent had also filed a document entitled Verified Answers, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim and Crossclaim on behalf of himself and his wife.
43. On November 17, 2015, the Administrator’s motion to remove Respondent as counsel in case number 13 M5 39 was granted based on Respondent’s continuous and systematic presence in Illinois.
44. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct:

  1. knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal, by conduct including Respondent’s assertion that he did not file an appearance on behalf of his wife, Claudia Salem, in case number 13 M5 39, in violation of Rule 3.3(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and,
  2. engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, by conduct including Respondent’s false statement regarding his appearance on behalf of Claudia Salem in case number 13 M5 39, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

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